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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG  
Ghana steht derzeit vor der Herausforderung, sich schnellstmöglich an 
Klimaveränderungen anzupassen und insbesondere in den Bereichen 
Landwirtschaft und Katastrophenschutz wirksame Maßnahmen gegen 
klimabezogene Risiken zu entwickeln. Gleichwohl ist bereits absehbar, 
dass traditionelle Anpassungstechniken und vorhandene finanzielle Mit-
tel dazu nicht ausreichen werden. Auch lokale Institutionen stoßen ange-
sichts dieser Aufgaben an die Grenzen ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit. Dennoch 
liegt für Ghana bislang keine umfassende Studie vor, welche diese trans-
formativen Herausforderungen in systematischer Weise untersucht und 
sich in den Bereichen Katastrophenmanagement und Klimawandelanpas-
sung mit dem Zusammenspiel von Akteuren, Diskursen und institutio-
nellen Prozessen von der nationalen bis zur lokalen Ebene befasst. Vorlie-
gende Anpassungsstudien beschäftigen sich in erster Linie mit spezifi-
schen Politikfeldern (z. B. Landwirtschaft und Ressourcenmanagement) 
sowie mit sozialen Risiken im ländlich-kleinbäuerlichen Bereich. Die Ent-
stehung neuer Risiken durch voranschreitende Urbanisierung sowie die 
empirische Untersuchung von urbanen und ländlichen Risiken in verglei-
chender Perspektive findet bisher nur wenig Beachtung. 
Als gesellschaftliche Querschnittsaufgabe ist Anpassung jedoch nicht al-
lein durch politikfeldspezifische und räumlich begrenzte Ansätze zu be-
wältigen. Dementsprechend besteht in auch in Ghana finanzpolitische 
Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit gesellschaftlicher und struktureller Trans-
formationsprozesse, insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund schnell voran-
schreitender Urbanisierung, zunehmender Ressourcenknappheit und be-
reits auftretender sowie noch zu erwartender Klimaveränderungen. So 
veröffentlichte das Ghanaische Finanzministerium sein Budget für das 
Jahr 2015 unter dem Titel "Transformational Agenda: Securing the Bright 
Medium Term Prospects of the Economy.". Das Budget unterstreicht die 
besondere Notwendigkeit, geeignete institutionelle Strukturen zu etablie-
ren, um Green Economy Ansätze sowie Klimawandel-Programme in die 
Praxis umzusetzen, die Umweltschutz, Jobwachstum und Armutsreduk-
tion miteinander verbinden.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisationale Prozesse sollen einer Neubewertung unterzogen werden, 
um mittelfristig eine "klimasensitive" Finanzplanung sicherzustellen. Re-
formorientierte Dezentralisierungsprozesse in den Bereichen Katastro-
phenmanagement und Anpassungsplanung rücken daher zunehmend in 
den Fokus der staatlichen Entwicklungspolitik.  
Wie genau solch "transformative" Anpassungsmaßnahmen in gesell-
schaftlichen und institutionellen Entwicklungsprozessen umgesetzt wer-
den können, ist jedoch nach wie vor umstritten. Bislang liegen für Ghana 
so gut wie keine empirischen Studien vor, die sich mit der wesentlichen 
Rolle von Institutionen im Rahmen von "transformativ" ausgerichteten 
Anpassungskonzepten befassen und dabei die institutionellen Voraus-
setzungen für mögliche "Anpassungspfade" berücksichtigen. Generell be-
schäftigen sich Transformationsdiskurse in erster Line mit struktur- und 
energiepolitischen Erwägungen der Industrieländer, beispielsweise im 
Kontext der deutschen "Energiewende", wobei eine klare Verengung der 
Debatte auf naturwissenschaftlich-technische sowie ökonomische Fragen 
zu beobachten ist.  
In den Ländern Westafrikas, die bereits heute unter den negativen Folgen 
klimatischer Veränderungen leiden, finden gesellschaftliche Transforma-
tionsprozesse jedoch unter fundamental anderen Vorzeichen statt. Die 
Transformationsdebatte im Rahmen der internationalen Klimapolitik ist 
daher als Chance zu begreifen, um die konsequente Umsetzung bestehen-
der entwicklungspolitischer Ziele und Vereinbarungen voranzubringen 
und Fortschritte im Hinblick auf eine nachhaltige sowie sozialverträgliche 
Anpassungspolitik zu erzielen.  
Insgesamt werden dringend neue Perspektiven benötigt, die den Begriff 
der Transformation im Sinne einer globalen Veränderung von Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft in Richtung Nachhaltigkeit sowie als wissensbasierten 
und gesamtgesellschaftlichen Lern-, Such- und Handlungsprozess verste-
hen (siehe TransZent; WBGU 2011). Um entsprechende empirische For-
schungslücken zu schließen, verbindet die vorliegende Studie Konzepte 
der Anpassungsforschung mit neueren Theorien der Institutionenlehre, 
der Diskursanalyse und der risikobezogenen Szenarioplanung. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auf diese Weise sollen institutionelle, d. h. normative, diskursive und or-
ganisationale Faktoren herausgearbeitet werden, die gesellschaftliche An-
passungspfade und Transformationskapazitäten in Ghana auf verschiede-
nen Ebenen beeinflussen.  
Hierbei gilt es insbesondere die Frage zu beantworten, ob und inwiefern 
Risikodiskurse sich in politischen Mehrebenenprozessen verändern und 
welche Definitionen und Priorisierungen von klimabezogenen Risiken die 
praktische Umsetzung von Anpassungsstrategien bestimmen. Hervorzu-
heben sind insbesondere die politischen Ziele der kürzlich formulierten 
Klimawandel- und Anpassungspolitiken Ghanas. Hinzu kommt, dass   
die Aktivitäten von Akteuren der internationalen EZ im relativ neuen    
Politikfeld der "Klimawandelanpassung" (climate change adaptation)   
bisher nur wenig Beachtung finden. Allerdings üben internationale    
Geldgeber großen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung und Implementierung 
von Anpassungsstrategien in Ghana aus. 
Forschungshintergrund 
Die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift ist Teil der Forschungen im Rahmen 
des afrikanisch-deutschen Verbunds "WASCAL" (West African Science Ser-
vice Center on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use; www.wascal.org). 
WASCAL wird gefördert durch das Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung (BMBF) und geht seit 2012 der Frage nach, wie negative Aus-
wirkungen des Klimawandels auf die Landwirtschaft und die Ökosys-
teme in Westafrika abgemildert und soziale Risiken gemindert werden 
können. WASCAL besteht aus drei zentralen Komponenten: Einem Kom-
petenzzentrum für Klimafragen in Burkina Faso, einem zentralen For-
schungsprogramm sowie einem Graduiertenprogramm. Insgesamt sind 
zehn westafrikanische Länder und zahlreiche deutsche und afrikanische 
Forschungsinstitute in WASCAL eingebunden. 
Im Kontext des zentralen Forschungsprogramms untersucht die vorlie-
gende Arbeit die institutionellen und politischen Dimensionen von An-
passung in Ghana. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ziel der Arbeit  
Das Ziel der Arbeit ist es, durch eine systematische Analyse des instituti-
onellen Umfeldes in den Politikbereichen Klimawandelanpassung und 
Katastrophenmanagement bestehende Forschungslücken zu schließen 
und den Einfluss von institutionell-strukturellen Faktoren auf menschli-
che Vulnerabilität herauszuarbeiten. Im Mittelpunkt der Arbeit steht die 
Untersuchung komplexer Wechselwirkungen zwischen institutionellen 
Mehrebenenprozessen, Risiko- und Anpassungsdiskursen sowie lokaler 
Vulnerabilität. Die praktische Relevanz für politische Entscheidungspro-
zesse ist ein erklärtes Ziel der Arbeit, da basierend auf empirischer For-
schung verschiedene institutionelle "Anpassungspfade" bzw. Szenarien 
herausgearbeitet werden, die als Orientierung für künftige politische Ent-
scheidungsprozesse dienen können. 
Forschungshypothese 
Die Forschungshypothese der vorliegenden Arbeit besagt, dass sich sozi-
ale Vulnerabilität nicht allein auf Umweltveränderungen zurückführen 
lässt, sondern im Kern von politisch-institutionellen Prozessen abhängt. 
Basierend auf einem Ansatz der kritischen Sozialforschung wird daher 
davon ausgegangen, dass komplexe Institutionensysteme soziale Vulne-
rabilität strukturieren. Vulnerabilität gegenüber klimatischen Faktoren 
wird somit verstanden als ein Glied in einer spezifischen Kette von insti-                          
tutionell-strukturellen Interaktionsprozessen, die insgesamt dazu führen, 
dass sich Menschen in einer Risikosituation befinden, der sie aus eigener 
Kraft kaum entkommen können.  
Aufbau und Methoden 
Im Rahmen der Dissertation werden drei inhaltliche Schwerpunkte ge-
setzt:  
1) Die Entwicklung von innovativen theoretischen Ansätzen und 
heuristischen Kategorien zur Analyse von normativen Anpas-
sungsmodellen und institutionellen Anpassungspfaden;  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) die Untersuchung von Risikodiskursen auf nationaler, regionaler 
und Distriktebene, basierend auf einem Ansatz der Wissenssozio-
logischen Diskursanalyse; 
3) die Durchführung einer Vulnerabilitätsanalyse, basierend auf quan-
titativen Haushaltsumfragen (n=484 HH) und Methoden der qua-
litativen Sozialforschung. 
Die Ergebnisse der Diskursanalyse werden abschließend mit den Resulta-
ten der Vulnerabilitätsanalyse verglichen, um Rückschlüsse bezüglich 
möglicher Diskrepanzen zwischen normativem Diskurs und Empirie so-
wie hinsichtlich spezifischer institutioneller Einflüsse auf Anpassungs-
prozesse zuzulassen. Dabei wird insbesondere untersucht, inwiefern sich 
Risikodiskurse verändern, wenn komplexe Konzepte wie Klimawan-
delanpassung mehrere administrative Ebenen durchlaufen und in lokalen 
soziokulturellen Kontexten Anwendung finden. 
Feldforschung 
Während eines Aufenthalts in der Landeshauptstadt Accra zu Beginn der 
Feldforschung wurden ausgewählte Regierungsangestellte und Spezialis-
ten im Bereich Klimaanpassung befragt. Anschließend wurden in der For-
schungsregion im Norden Ghanas Haushaltsumfragen in fünf ländlichen 
sowie zwei städtischen Gemeinden innerhalb des Vea Catchments durch-
geführt. Das Vea Catchment ist ein großes Wassereinzugsgebiet in der 
Oberen Ostregion Ghanas, welches sich über zwei Verwaltungsdistrikte 
erstreckt, den Bongo District und den Bolgatanga Municipal District. 
Im urbanen Raum wurden Haushalte in Bolgatanga befragt, die zum 
überwiegenden Teil keine Landwirtschaft betreiben und regelmäßig von 
schweren Überflutungen betroffen sind. Bei den ausgewählten Gemein-
den im ländlichen Raum handelt es sich um Yikene Adohbisi, Vea-Gunga, 
Zaare Amoabisi und Namoo-Akunka. Die Mehrheit der Haushalte in den 
ländlichen Gemeinden ist eher kleinbäuerlich geprägt und betreibt regen-
gespeiste Landwirtschaft. Dementsprechend sind viele Haushalte poten-
tiell anfällig für klimabedingte Risiken, da insbesondere während der Tro-
ckenzeit nur wenige (oder gar keine) alternativen Bewässerungs- und Ar-
beitsmöglichkeiten zur Verfügung stehen. Als weitere Vergleichsgruppe 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
im ländlichen Raum wurden zudem Haushalte in Vea befragt, die inner-
halb eines staatlichen Bewässerungsprojekts auch während der Trocken-
zeit kommerzielle Landwirtschaft betreiben.  
Forschungsfragen 
Die Arbeit widmet sich im Kern vier Fragestellungen, um die zentrale  
Forschungshypothese ("Institutionen sind der ausschlaggebende Faktor 
für soziale Vulnerabilität innerhalb der Forschungsregion") anhand empi-
rischer Forschung zu überprüfen: 
1. Wie lässt sich die institutionelle, d. h. die normative, diskursive 
und organisationale Dimension von Klimawandelanpassung in 
Ghana ontologisch, epistemologisch und empirisch am besten er-
fassen? Welche ethischen Implikationen gibt es? 
2. Welche normativen Rahmungen von klimabezogenen Risiken be-
stimmen die politischen Handlungsstrategien der Ghanaischen 
Regierung? Verändern sich Definitionen und Priorisierungen in 
politischen Mehrebenenprozessen?  
3. Welche institutionellen Faktoren beeinflussen die Adaptivität,   
die Anpassungsoptionen und die soziale Vulnerabilität von kom-
merziellen Farmern sowie städtischen und ländlichen Haushal-
ten? Gibt es bedeutende Unterschiede innerhalb der Forschungs-
region? 
4. Wie unterscheiden sich Risiko- und Anpassungsdiskurse von der 
empirischen Realität in der Forschungsregion? Welche Schlussfol-
gerungen und Empfehlungen für zukünftige Anpassungspoliti-
ken und transformative Anpassungspfade lassen sich aus diesen 
Erkenntnissen ableiten? 
 
Wichtigste Ergebnisse der Untersuchung 
Die durchgeführten Untersuchungen in Ghana zeigen deutlich, dass insti-
tutionelle Prozesse nicht nur ausschlaggebend für die Definition und Pri-
orisierung von Risiken und damit für die strategische Verteilung von ma-
teriellen und symbolischen Ressourcen sind, sondern auch in entschei-
dendem Maße die Vulnerabilität der Bevölkerung gegenüber negativen 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
klimatischen Einflüssen strukturieren. Wenngleich eingeräumt werden 
muss, dass Umweltfaktoren wie unfruchtbare Böden oder natürliche     
Klimavariationen als kontrafaktische Argumente gegenüber einer rein 
strukturell determinierten Sicht auf soziale Risiken geltend gemacht    
werden könnten, so ist dennoch zu betonen, dass selbst bei diesen            
"natürlichen" Risiken menschliche Handlungen wie Übernutzung oder 
die armutsbedingte Abhängigkeit von regengespeister Landwirtschaft 
das Ausmaß der Vulnerabilität bestimmen. 
Ferner lässt die Fallstudie zu Beginn der Untersuchung deutlich erkennen, 
dass die konfliktträchtige Politisierung von Anpassungsmaßnahmen oft 
unterschätzt wird (für ein ähnliches Beispiel aus Malawi siehe: Harrison 
and Chiroro 2016). Vermeintlich inklusiv und "partizipatorisch" durchge-
führte Planungsprozesse haben im Fall der geplanten Instandsetzung des 
Vea Bewässerungsprojekts nicht zu einer nachhaltigen und friedlichen 
Lösung von sozialen Konflikten beitragen können. Dies liegt maßgeblich 
an unterschwelligen und historisch bedingten Streitigkeiten um Macht 
und Einfluss zwischen traditionellen Institutionen, in die auch Vertreter 
der staatlichen Verwaltung und lokale Gemeinschaften involviert sind. 
Zusätzlich verstärkt werden bestehende Konflikte durch einen aggressi-
ven Umgang mit abweichenden Interessen und die selektive Einbin-  
dung lokaler Machteilten sowie einflussreicher politischer Netzwerke.  
Die Grundannahme, dass Gemeinden oder "communities" weitgehend 
homogene Entitäten mit neutralen und lösungsorientiert im Gemeinsinn 
wirkenden Institutionen sind, ist daher im besten Fall als politisch naive 
Haltung und im schlimmsten Fall als gravierendes Risiko für die sozial-
verträgliche Umsetzung von dringend erforderlichen Anpassungsmaß-
nahmen bzw. Infrastrukturprojekten zu bezeichnen. Weiterhin ist festzu-
halten, dass rationale Planungsprozesse gleichermaßen in komplexe kul-
turelle, materielle und institutionelle Strukturen eingebunden sind und 
daher keinesfalls als uneingeschränkt objektiv oder frei von normativen 
Interessen betrachtet werden sollten.  
Die inkrementelle Reformfähigkeit komplexer politischer Systeme, die 
oftmals  durch  eine routinebasierte, managementorientierte und von po-     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
litischen Partikularinteressen geleitete Handlungslogik dominiert wer-
den, muss daher zumindest angezweifelt werden. 
Diese institutionelle Frage der Reformfähigkeit weist auf die Notwendig-
keit transformativer Anpassungspfade hin, deren gesellschaftliche Inno-
vationskraft sich aus dem potentiell produktiven und kreativen Antago-
nismus des Politischen speist. Dennoch ist auch für transformative gesell-
schaftliche Anpassungsprozesse ein förderliches institutionelles, sozio-
ökonomisches und kulturelles Umfeld vonnöten, zumindest wenn da- 
von ausgegangen wird, dass gesellschaftliche Transformation nicht als           
ein weitgehend unkontrollierter Umbruch zwischen verschiedenen sys-
temischen Grundzuständen erfolgt, etwa aufgrund sozialer und ökologi-
scher Krisenauswirkungen. 
Die Ergebnisse der Diskurs- und der Dispositif-Analyse lassen dennoch 
den Rückschluss zu, dass selbst konservative Interpretationen transfor-
mativer Anpassungspfade – etwa im Sinne einer Neuordnung des land-
wirtschaftlichen Systems – bislang keine nennenswerten Auswirkungen 
auf die praktische Ausgestaltung der Ghanaischen Anpassungspolitik   
haben. Derzeit ist die offizielle normative Rahmung von Anpassungs- 
strategien durch die Ghanaische Regierung im weitesten Sinne als eine 
Mischung aus politisch-organisationalen und wirtschaftlichen Reform- 
bestrebungen sowie Infrastrukturprojekten zu bezeichnen.  
Aufgrund der politischen Eigendynamik von Mehrebenenprozessen und 
"Mainstreaming"-Bemühungen von internationalen Organisationen ist 
auf regionaler und Distrikt-Ebene zudem eine Verschiebung offizieller 
Definitionen und Priorisierungen von Anpassung zu beobachten. Diese 
Prioritätenverschiebung ist insofern relevant, als dass Anpassung zuse-
hends auf "klimabedingte" und "natürliche" Risiken bezogen und im Sinne 
eines politisch konservativen Resilienzdenkens verstanden wird, welches 
progressive strukturelle Veränderungen und die politische Natur sozialer 
Vulnerabilität weitgehend ausblendet. Diese Erkenntnisse unterstreichen 
erneut die Bedeutung der Vea Fallstudie, die das konkrete Risiko einer 
solchen diskursiven und planerischen Engführung deutlich macht. 
Im direkten Vergleich weisen die empirischen Ergebnisse der Risikoana-
lyse darauf hin, dass sich Risiko- und Anpassungsdiskurse teils deutlich 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
von der empirischen Realität in der Forschungsregion unterscheiden. 
Trotz der Betonung reformorientierter Klima- und Anpassungspolitik in 
zentralen strategischen Dokumenten der Ghanaischen Regierung beste-
hen nach wie vor große Probleme im Bereich der Implementierung, die 
insgesamt durch institutionelle bzw. strukturelle Hindernisse bedingt 
sind. Gleichermaßen beeinflussen diese institutionell-strukturellen Fakto-
ren die Adaptivität, Anpassungsoptionen und die soziale Vulnerabilität 
von städtischen und ländlichen Haushalten. In diesem Zusammenhang 
von Anpassungs"fähigkeit" (oder adaptive capacity) zu sprechen erscheint 
unangemessen, da Menschen oftmals über eine beindruckende Vielfalt 
von Fähigkeiten verfügen und dennoch verwundbar sind, beispielsweise 
aufgrund von struktureller Marginalisierung oder von institutionellen 
Faktoren, die jenseits ihrer individuellen Einflusssphären liegen. Trans-
formative Anpassung betont daher die Notwendigkeit, institutionell und 
systemisch bedingte Hindernisse zu überwinden, wobei inkrementelle 
Reformbemühungen durch oftmals selbstreferentielle Managementstruk-
turen als weitgehend unzureichend angesehen werden. 
Insgesamt ist gerade das Zusammenspiel von institutionellen Strukturen 
und organisationalen Prozessen ausschlaggebend für die Umstände unter 
denen Risiken für die Bevölkerung entstehen. Bedingt durch "relationale" 
Prozesse der institutionellen Territorialisierung einerseits, sowie durch       
"situierte" Risiken andererseits (z. B. die Lage eines Hauses in einem Über-
flutungsgebiet) wird soziale Adaptivität strukturiert. Oftmals bleibt je-
doch weitgehend unhinterfragt, warum bestimmte Bevölkerungsgruppen 
stärker von situierten "natürlichen" Risiken betroffen sind als andere. Mit 
anderen Worten, natürliche Risiken wie Dürren und Überflutungen sind 
niemals rein natürlich in Bezug auf ihre Auswirkungen, insbesondere vor 
dem Hintergrund des anthropogenen Klimawandels und erhöhter Klima-
variabilität. 
Im Kontext der Risikoanalyse wurde daher eine Reihe von entscheiden-
den institutionellen Risikofaktoren ermittelt, deren komplexes Zusam-
menspiel als zentral für die soziale Vulnerabilität der Bevölkerung in der 
Oberen Ostregion Ghanas gelten kann. Diese Risikofaktoren sind: (a) der 
nicht abgeschlossene fiskalische und politische Dezentralisierungsprozess 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in Ghana; (b) die schlechte finanzielle, personelle und technische Ausstat-
tung der staatlichen Organe, die mit der Implementierung von anpas-
sungsrelevanten Maßnahmen beauftragt sind; (c) das Fehlen relevanter 
Expertise auf subregionaler Ebene; (d) die fehlende Abstimmung zwi-
schen Regierungsorganisationen und internationalen Partnern sowie zwi-
schen Regierungsorganisationen in verschiedenen Politikfeldern unterei-
nander; (e) teils unklare oder sich überschneidende politische Mandate; (f) 
Korruption und Klientelpolitik; (g) sowie entwicklungsbezogene Heraus-
forderungen im weitesten Sinne. 
Der letzte Punkt beschreibt vor allem strukturelle Probleme wie defizitäre 
Infrastruktur, hohe Jugendarbeitslosigkeit, Armut und mangelnde ökono-
mische Perspektiven durch schlechte Bildung und Ausbildungsstandards, 
unkontrollierte Urbanisierung und damit einhergehende Landnutzungs-
konflikte, sowie die zunehmende Desintegration sozialer Netzwerke jen-
seits der Kernfamilie. In Verbindung mit zunehmenden Belastungen der 
natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen durch (oft armutsbedingte) Ressourcen-
übernutzung sowie eine rasch wachsende Bevölkerung führen diese Fak-
toren zu einer geringen Adaptivität von Individuen und gesellschaftli-
chen Strukturen. 
Im Hinblick auf bestehende Unterschiede in der Adaptivität ländlicher 
und städtischer Haushalte zeigt die Haushaltsumfrage (n=484 Haushalte) 
in der Oberen Ostregion, dass 92.6 Prozent aller befragten Haushalte in 
ländlichen Gebieten von saisonaler Ernährungsunsicherheit betroffen 
sind. Vor allem der Zeitraum von März bis Mai muss als besonders her-
ausfordernd betrachtet werden. Darüber hinaus wird deutlich, dass direk-
ter Zugang zu Bewässerungsanlagen oder Kreditprogrammen die Ernäh-
rungssicherheit von ländlichen Haushalten in der Forschungsregion nicht 
signifikant verbessert hat. Die saisonale Ernährungssicherheit ländlicher 
Haushalte, die kommerziell ausgerichtete Landwirtschaft betreiben und 
besseren Zugang zu Krediten und einem staatlichen Bewässerungsprojekt 
haben, ist gleichermaßen hoch. Auch hier liegt der Wert bei 90 Prozent. 
Es ist daher festzuhalten, dass der Zugang zu Ressourcen, Infrastruktur 
und staatlichen Dienstleistungen allein nicht ausreichend ist, um die Er-
nährungssicherheit von ländlichen Haushalten in der Forschungsregion 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
zu gewährleisten, solange Fragen der Qualität und Nutzung bzw. der lang-
fristigen Nutzbarkeit nur eine vergleichsweise geringe Rolle spielen. 
Selbst wenn Zugang zu Kreditdienstleistungen formeller oder informeller 
Art besteht und auf landwirtschaftliche Produktionsmittel wie anorgani-
schen Dünger oder Pestizide zurückgegriffen werden kann, so ist deren 
Einsatz häufig unwirksam. Dies hängt teilweise mit Faktoren wie einem 
generellen Arbeitskräftemangel für die Bodenvorbereitung und dem 
schlechten Zustand der Bewässerungsinfrastruktur zusammen, ergibt 
sich allerdings auch aus der riskanten Natur der Landwirtschaft im Allge-
meinen. Wenn Haushalte etwa durch zusätzliche Risiken wie Stürme, 
Starkregen, Überschwemmungen oder Dürren betroffen sind, so ist die 
staatliche Katastrophenschutzorganisation (NADMO) nicht in der Lage, 
Haushalte hinsichtlich der mittel- und langfristigen Auswirkungen von 
Ernteausfällen bzw. Sach- oder Personenschäden zu unterstützen. Da Ern-
ten und Hausrat in der Regel nicht versichert sind, können landwirtschaft-
liche Haushalte durch wiederholt auftretende Elementarschäden leicht in 
eine Armutsfalle geraten, zumal gegebenenfalls erhaltene landwirtschaft-
liche Kredite unter den entsprechenden Umständen oft anderweitig ver-
wendet werden (müssen).  
Im direkten Vergleich mit ländlichen Gebieten ist die Situation städtischer 
Haushalte als moderat besser anzusehen, wobei jedoch immer noch 64 
Prozent aller befragten Haushalte von saisonaler Ernährungsunsicherheit 
betroffen sind. Ein anzunehmender Grund für diese moderat bessere Lage 
ist, dass die städtische Bevölkerung im Forschungsgebiet in geringerem 
Maße auf risikoreiche Landwirtschaft als primäre Wirtschaftsaktivität an-
gewiesen ist, mit mäßig positiven Effekten für die Ernährungssicherheit 
der Haushalte. Dennoch sind die Ergebnisse zumindest teilweise überra-
schend, da eine Analyse der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen eben-
falls ergeben hat, dass insbesondere Haushalte in von rascher Urbanisie-
rung betroffenen peri-urbanen Gebieten sozial weniger gut vernetzt sind 
als ihre ländlichen Pendants. 
Im Hinblick auf die teilweise widersprüchlichen sozialen Auswirkungen 
von Urbanisierungsprozessen im Kontext des sich rasch verändernden 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land-Stadt Kontinuums in Ghana sind daher dringend vertiefende Stu-
dien vonnöten. Basierend auf den Ergebnissen der Untersuchung muss 
zunächst davon ausgegangen werden, dass das urbane Umfeld in Bol-
gatanga grundsätzlich strukturelle Vorteile bietet, die sich positiv auf     
die Ernährungssicherheit der befragten Haushalte auswirken. Diejenigen 
Faktoren, die am ehesten eine positive Auswirkung auf Ernährungssicher-
heit haben sind Bildung, wirtschaftlich vermarktbare Fähigkeiten und die 
Haushaltszusammensetzung, während frühere Studien nahelegen, dass 
Faktoren wie Geldsendungen aus dem In- und Ausland (remittances) und 
der Zugang zu Krediten in städtischen Gebieten weniger relevant sind 
(siehe z. B. Maxwell u.a. 2000, Frimpong und Asuming-Brempong 2013). 
Insgesamt gibt es daher Grund zur Annahme, dass eine bessere Ausbil-
dung zu der höheren Wahrscheinlichkeit führt, eine auskömmliche Er-
werbstätigkeit zu finden. Dies ermöglicht potentiell höhere Pro-Kopf-
Ausgaben für Lebensmittel und kann höhere Lebenshaltungskosten in ei-
nem städtischen Umfeld kompensieren. Im Umkehrschluss ist jedoch 
ebenfalls klar, dass ein regionales politisches und Handelszentrum wie 
Bolgatanga aufgrund seiner mäßig diversifizierten Wirtschaftsstruktur 
und damit verbundener Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten mehr Menschen 
mit höherem Bildungsniveau anzieht. Die Umfrageergebnisse belegen 
dies gleichermaßen. 
Es lohnt sich daher in weiteren Untersuchungen der Frage nachzugehen, 
unter welchen Voraussetzungen Urbanisierung die Ernährungssicherheit 
verbessert und die Chancen auf eine auskömmliche nicht-landwirtschaft-
liche Beschäftigung für benachteiligte Gruppen bzw. gering qualifizierte 
Personen erhöht. Bisherige Erkenntnisse der Studie lassen die Vermutung 
zu, dass unkontrollierte Urbanisierung in Ghanas Norden bestehende Un-
gleichheiten und Landnutzungskonflikte eher verstärkt, da sich zwar 
neue Chancen für ohnehin gut ausgebildete Bevölkerungsschichten erge-
ben, sozial benachteiligte Gruppen aber kaum profitieren. 
Auf Grundlage dieser Erkenntnisse gilt es abschließend zu bewerten, wel-
che Anpassungsoptionen, Handlungsoptionen und Forschungsempfeh-
lungen sich aus der Risikoanalyse ableiten lassen, die mithilfe des neu ent-
wickelten Ansatzes der "Institutionellen Anpassungspfade" durchgeführt 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
wurde. In diesem Zusammenhang wurden insgesamt vier plausible Sze-
narien für mögliche Anpassungspfade berücksichtigt. Diese Szenarien 
sind: (1) "Ausgleich" (adjustment); (2) "Reform" (reform); (3) "Transforma-
tion" (transformation); sowie als konterfaktisches Szenario (4) "Business-as-
Usual". 
Wie bereits erwähnt lassen die Ergebnisse der Diskursanalyse den Schluss 
zu, dass die offizielle normative Rahmung von Anpassungsstrategien 
durch die Ghanaische Regierung derzeit als eine Mischung aus politisch-
organisationalen und wirtschaftlichen Reformbestrebungen sowie Infra-
strukturprojekten angesehen werden kann. Das erste Szenario der "An-
gleichung" basiert daher auf der Annahme, dass konservatives Resilienz-
denken und das Paradigma "klimafester" (climate-proof) ökonomischer 
Entwicklung mittel- und langfristig die Ghanaische Anpassungspolitik 
bestimmen. Der konservative Ansatz der Angleichung wird derzeit von 
der Regierung und einflussreichen Ghanaischen Entscheidungsträgern 
vertreten. Dementsprechend geht das erste Szenario davon aus, dass zu-
künftig finanzielle Mittel, Ressourcen und Risiken aufgrund von Entschei-
dungen verteilt werden, die das klare Ziel verfolgen "klimafeste" Wert-
schöpfungsketten, Infrastruktur, sowie Energie- und Landnutzungssys-
teme aufzubauen. Weiterhin wird bei einem solchen Szenario besonderes 
Augenmerk auf den Katastrophenschutz gelegt, beispielsweise durch die 
Einrichtung von verbesserten Frühwarnsystemen. Insgesamt ist das Ri-
siko der Fehlanpassung bei einem solchen Szenario dennoch als hoch ein-
zustufen.  
Diese Einschätzung ist vor allem dadurch zu begründen, dass asymmet-
rische Machtverhältnisse sowie soziokulturelle und institutionelle Bedin-
gungen von Vulnerabilität und Marginalisierung weitgehend außer Acht 
gelassen werden, während für eine Implementierung der angestrebten 
Maßnahmen notwendige weitreichende organisationale und strukturelle 
Reformen zugunsten technischer, fragmentierter und sektorspezifischer 
Planungsansätze vernachlässigt werden. 
Im direkten Vergleich geht das Szenario "Reform" davon aus, dass struk-
turelle und politische Reformanstrengungen zugunsten benachteiligter 
Bevölkerungsgruppen das erste Szenario der "Angleichung" ergänzen. 
Eine Grundvoraussetzung für das Reformszenario ist, dass insgesamt der 
politische Wille zur Umsetzung progressiver Elemente aus der klimapoli-
tischen Strategie Ghanas (National Climate Change Policy 2013) sowie aus 
entwicklungspolitisch relevanten Richtlinienpapieren besteht (siehe z. B. 
NCCAS 2010, SADA 2010, GSGDA II 2014, DESA 2015). 
Im Hinblick auf die Ermöglichung eines solchen reformorientierten An-
passungspfades ist es jedoch entscheidend, zunächst die organisationalen 
und politischen Voraussetzungen für eine wirksame Umsetzung von An-
passungsmaßnahmen in der Region zu schaffen. Dies beinhaltet (a) die 
Verbesserung von armutsorientierten Dienstleistungen und Strukturen 
im Bereich Katastrophenrisikominderung (insbesondere für die langfris-
tige Unterstützung betroffener Haushalte nach dem Katastrophenfall), (b) 
die Schaffung von politischen und strukturellen Rahmenbedingungen zur 
Bereitstellung von adäquater Infrastruktur, (c) sowie die Etablierung von 
langfristigen Qualitätskontrollen und Instandsetzungsvereinbarungen, 
um die wirksame Koordinierung und Ermöglichung flexibler Anpas-
sungspfade zu gewährleisten. 
Dabei muss vor dem Hintergrund der Erfahrungen der Fallstudie davon 
ausgegangen werden, dass zur Ermöglichung solcher Anpassungspfade 
nicht nur organisationale und finanzielle Schwierigkeiten überwunden 
werden müssen, sondern auch politische und institutionelle. Vor allem 
sollte die frühzeitige und langfristige Einbindung der lokalen Bevölke-
rung sowie lokaler sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschungseinrichtungen in 
Planungsprozesse beachtet werden, um einen sozialverträglichen Interes-
senausgleich zu gewährleisten. Marginalisierte Gruppen sollten im Fokus 
der Aufmerksamkeit stehen, um Partizipation nicht auf lokale Eliten und 
traditionelle Autoritäten zu beschränken, die oftmals ihre eigene politi-
sche Agenda verfolgen und nicht notwendigerweise im Gemeinsinn han-
deln. Ferner ist zu beachten, dass ein ressourcenorientierter Planungs-   
ansatz die Nachhaltigkeit, Robustheit und Flexibilität von Anpassungs-
pfaden erhöhen kann, da auf diese Weise eine planerische Engführung auf 
bestimmte Politiksektoren oder lokale Gemeinschaften vermieden wird, 
deren spezifische Interessen den Nutzungsinteressen anderer Gruppen 
bzw. Sektoren potentiell zuwiderlaufen. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zusätzlich ist festzustellen, dass Anpassungsprojekte häufig organisatori-
sche Parallelstrukturen schaffen, die von der Bevölkerung in bestehende 
soziale Netzwerke und hierarchische Machstrukturen integriert werden. 
Auch diese Integrationsprozesse erfolgen jedoch nicht notwendigerweise 
im Sinne einer sozial ausgewogenen Anpassungspolitik, da einflussreiche 
Netzwerke und Interessengruppen oft privilegierten Zugang zu bereitge-
stellten Ressourcen haben. Nach dem Auslaufen der entsprechenden Pro-
jekte wird nur sehr selten die Nachhaltigkeit und langfristige Wirkung der 
Projektinterventionen in den Blick genommen, bzw. tatsächlich überprüft 
welche strukturellen Integrationsprozesse langfristig zu beobachten sind. 
Im Hinblick auf die Situation in der Oberen Ostregion ist es daher insge-
samt fraglich, ob ein "partizipativer" Planungsansatz sowie eine starke Fo-
kussierung politischer Maßnahmen auf priorisierte Risikofaktoren wie 
Trockenheit oder Dürre langfristig zu einer besseren Integration von Ka-
tastrophenrisikominderungs- und Anpassungsmaßnahmen sowie zu ei-
ner positiven Veränderung der Lebenssituation der Menschen führt.  
Zum einen stützt sich diese vergleichsweise pessimistische Einschätzung 
auf die Erfahrungen der Fallstudie. Obwohl die Fallstudie nicht repräsen-
tativ für die Situation in der Region insgesamt ist, so zeigt sie dennoch 
typische Marginalisierungsprozesse und Dynamiken der Politisierung 
auf. Zum anderen verdeutlicht die Analyse des politischen Umfelds in 
Ghana, dass ein nicht abgeschlossener Dezentralisierungsprozess, klien-
telistische Netzwerkstrukturen, traditionelle Geschlechterrollen und De-
fizite im Hinblick auf organisationale Abläufe und Strukturen die Umset-
zung von politischen Reformvorhaben und die effektive Beteiligung von 
benachteiligten Bevölkerungsgruppen erschweren. 
Im Vergleich zu inkrementellen Reformpfaden geht das progressive Sze-
nario der geplanten gesellschaftlichen "Transformation" daher von der 
Prämisse aus, dass inkrementelle Reformen und Interventionen innerhalb 
bestehender Strukturen und Paradigmen allein unzureichend sein wer-
den, um systemisch bedingte Risiken zu überwinden. Die diskursive Rah-
mung des Transformationsbegriffs ist jedoch politisch umstritten. Wäh-
rend ein progressiver Transformationspfad die grundlegende Verände-
rung des unnachhaltigen ökonomischen Systems sowie gesellschaftlicher 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macht- und Naturverhältnisse im Sinne eines sozial gerechten Gesell-
schaftsvertrags anstrebt, ist die konservative Auslegung des Transforma-
tionsbegriffs gegenwärtig auf die Anpassung des landwirtschaftlichen 
Sektors an klimatische Veränderungen beschränkt, etwa durch die geo-
graphische Verschiebung von Anbaugebieten. 
Grundsätzlich ist es jedoch sowohl im Kontext eines konservativen als 
auch eines progressiven Transformationspfades notwendig, eine ausge-
wogene Strategie für die Umgestaltung landwirtschaftlicher Systeme zum 
Zwecke der nachhaltigen Ernährungssicherung zu entwickeln. Hierbei ist 
zu berücksichtigen, dass die generelle Adaptivität und Produktivität 
kleinbäuerlicher landwirtschaftlicher Systeme nicht nur durch industrielle 
Landwirtschaft, Intensivierung, Exportorientierung und Expansion er-
höht werden kann, sondern auch durch Methoden der nachhaltigen öko-
logischen Landwirtschaft (siehe z. B. EOA 2015). 
Obwohl je nach ökologischer Situation und Bodenbeschaffenheit moderne 
landwirtschaftliche Methoden wie Mechanisierung nicht grundsätzlich 
abzulehnen sind, bestehen beachtliche Risiken beim Transfer eines indust-
riellen "Green Revolution" Ansatzes in die Obere Ostregion und nach 
Ghana insgesamt. Die konkreten Gefahren sind eine erhöhte Abhängig-
keit der Landwirte von der Preispolitik und den Produkten großer Agrar-
Konzerne, z. B. durch die Nutzung von hybridem Saatgut, das jede Saison 
neu erstanden werden muss, oder durch den teuren Erwerb von anorga-
nischen Düngemitteln und Pestiziden. Gleichzeitig sind die negativen 
ökologischen und gesundheitlichen Folgen industrieller landwirtschaftli-
cher Methoden zu berücksichtigen, die etwa durch den Einsatz von che-
mischen Produkten entstehen. Expansion und Exportorientierung können 
zudem zu Landnutzungskonflikten und der Verdrängung von Kleinbau-
ern führen, wobei letztlich nicht einmal die erhöhte Produktivität und 
ökonomische Rentabilität von hybriden Sorten in jedem Fall als ausschlag-
gebendes Argument gelten kann. So sind etwa im Vergleich zu hybriden 
Maissorten traditionelle Varianten wesentlich besser an die lokalen öko-
logischen Bedingungen der Oberen Ostregion angepasst, beispielsweise 
durch eine erhöhte Widerstandsfähigkeit gegen spät auftretende Dürren, 
was Ernteausfällen vorbeugen kann. Hinzu kommt, dass traditionelle Sor-
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ten insgesamt günstiger im Anbau sind, da sie weniger chemische Dün-
gemittel und Pestizide benötigen, wobei sich das Saatgut von selbst repro-
duziert. 
Die gezielte Förderung ökologischen Landbaus in Verbindung mit sozial-
verträglichen Modernisierungsansätzen und Strategien zur verbesserten 
Einbindung von Kleinbauern in Wertschöpfungsketten kann daher als ein 
komplexer "transformativer" Pfad für die Umgestaltung landwirtschaftli-
cher Systeme bei geleichzeitiger Erhöhung der Adaptivität, Produktqua-
lität und Ernährungssicherheit gelten. Nicht auszuschließen wäre zudem 
ein Rückgang der (Jugend-)Arbeitslosigkeit in ländlichen Gebieten, insbe-
sondere während der Trockenzeit, und damit eine potentielle Verlangsa-
mung rasch voranschreitender Urbanisierungsprozesse durch Land-Stadt 
Migration. Zusätzlich besteht ein großes Potential für die Intensivierung 
der städtischen Landwirtschaft durch eine verbesserte staatliche Unter-
stützung in den Bereichen Produktsicherheit und Landnutzungsplanung 
sowie durch gezielte landwirtschaftliche und technische Beratung. Dieses 
Potential kann erschlossen werden, um Einkommensquellen zu diversifi-
zieren und die Adaptivität sowie die Ernährungssicherheit insbesondere 
der sozial benachteiligten städtischen Bevölkerung zu erhöhen, mit poten-
ziell positiven Auswirkungen in den Bereichen Bildung, Gesundheit und 
soziale Sicherheit. 
Dennoch muss festgehalten werden, dass der Transformationsbegriff bei 
einer derartigen Verengung und konservativen Auslegung kaum noch 
vom Begriff der Reform oder der "klimafesten" ökonomischen Entwick-
lung nach bestehendem Muster abgegrenzt werden kann, da inkremen-
telle technische und organisationale Veränderungen des landwirtschaftli-
chen Systems im Mittelpunkt stehen. Die gesellschaftlichen Machtverhält-
nisse auf denen das unnachhaltige ökonomische System insgesamt beruht 
werden nicht angezweifelt, obwohl globale "Megatrends" wie der anthro-
pogene Klimawandel, Bevölkerungswachstum und Urbanisierung, Res-
sourcenknappheit und die immer weiter auseinanderklaffende Schere 
zwischen Arm und Reich systemverändernde Lösungen erfordern.  
So würden sich beispielsweise selbst bei einer anzunehmenden Umstel-
lung auf 100 Prozent erneuerbare Energien in allen Wirtschaftssektoren 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bestehende Produktions-und Konsummuster nicht grundlegend verän-
dern. Es besteht also das transformative Grundproblem der Entkopplung 
von wirtschaftlichem Wachstum und steigendem Ressourcenverbrauch. 
Aufgrund anzunehmender Schwierigkeiten im Zusammenhang mit der 
gesellschaftlichen Umsetzung progressiver Anpassungspolitiken geht das 
konterfaktische Szenario daher davon aus, dass sozial unausgewogene    
oder gescheiterte Reformen sowie ein konservatives Transformations- 
bzw. Resilienzdenken zur Ermöglichung von "Business-As-Usual" Ent-
wicklungspfaden beitragen. Oftmals verschwimmen grundlegende Un-
terschiede zwischen institutionellen Angleichungs-, Reform- und Trans-
formationspfaden zusehends, sobald es um eine praktische politische Um-
setzung von Anpassungsmaßnahmen geht.  
Demzufolge plädiert die Arbeit für einen prozessualen Anpassungsbe-
griff, der davon ausgeht, dass die konkreten politischen Ziele hinter einem 
Anpassungspfad – etwa Angleichung, Reform oder Transformation – für 
die langfristige Abstimmung und Umsetzung von einzelnen Anpassungs-
schritten ausschlaggebend sein sollten. Darüber hinaus wird die Transi-
tion entlang eines bestimmten institutionellen Anpassungspfades – der im 
Idealfall auf ein bestimmtes Ziel hin ausgerichtet ist – permanent durch 
kulturell-kognitive, soziale, politische, ökonomische, technologische und 
ökologisch-materielle Faktoren beeinflusst. Daher ist davon auszugehen, 
dass viele inkrementelle Reformen entlang eines Anpassungspfades ins-
gesamt eine transformative Wirkung entfalten können, wobei dennoch 
immer auch mit einem gescheiterten oder regressiven Anpassungsprozess 
gerechnet werden muss. Dies ist genau der Punkt, bei dem das vierte Sze-
nario ansetzt. 
Die Arbeit bezieht sich in diesem Zusammenhang auf den Kernbegriff der        
"Politik des Indeterminismus" bzw. Politik der Unbestimmtheit.   
Mit diesem Begriff verbunden sind einerseits diskursive Rahmungen von 
Anpassung, die permanente Unbestimmtheit und abstraktes Risiko als 
politische Grundgegebenheiten adaptiver Prozesse an die Öffentlichkeit 
vermitteln und es somit ermöglichen, verschiedenste politische und wirt-
schaftliche Maßnahmen oder Strukturreformen unter dem Deckmantel ei-
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ner notwendigen Anpassung an den Klimawandel voranzutreiben. Öf-
fentliche Diskurse über die gesellschaftliche Verteilung von Risiken im 
Beck’schen Sinne der "Risikogesellschaft" (Beck 2009) werden somit als 
politisch ermöglichendes Moment verstanden, um Ressourcenverteilung, 
gesellschaftliche Machverhältnisse (z. B. die Gewährung von "Sicherheit") 
und den Zugang zu privilegiertem Expertenwissen über die Natur von 
Risiken im eigenen Interesse zu strukturieren. 
Andererseits bezieht sich der Begriff "Politik des Indeterminismus" auch 
auf konkrete strukturelle und institutionelle Hemmnisse wie den nicht  
abgeschlossenen Dezentralisierungsprozess in Ghana, die fehlende Koor-
dinierung von Anpassungsmaßnahmen sowie unklare oder sich über-
schneidende politische Mandate. Diese "Unbestimmtheiten" ermöglichen 
es gesellschaftlichen Akteuren ihre Partikularinteressen zu verfolgen, be-
günstigen Korruption in verschiedenen Formen und ermöglichen es in-
transparenten Netzwerken sich materieller Ressourcen zu bemächtigen, 
die ursprünglich sozial benachteiligten Gruppen zugutekommen sollten. 
Die Verwendung von "partizipativen" Beteiligungsformen in Planungs-
prozessen ist daher in jedem Fall kritisch zu hinterfragen, da Partizipation 
in hierarchischen (oder in wenig transparenten und unkontrollierten)  
Entscheidungsstrukturen nicht unbedingt zu progressiven Ergebnissen 
führen muss, sondern auch rein legitimierende Wirkung entfalten kann. 
Weiterhin ist im kognitiv-kulturellen Sinne natürlicherweise mit Wider-
stand gegen gesellschaftliche Neuerungen zu rechnen, was hier nicht im 
Detail ausgearbeitet werden soll, aber durch umfangreiche Forschungsli-
teratur in den Bereichen der Transformationsforschung, der Politikwis-
senschaft, der Organisationslehre, der Umweltpsychologie und des Tran-
sitionsmangement bzw. Change Management zu belegen ist. Sollten "win-
win" Lösungen keine realistische Option sein, ist zudem mit politisch und 
wirtschaftlich motivierten Auseinandersetzungen um die gesellschaftli-
che Ermöglichung transformativer Anpassungspfade zu rechnen. 
Zusammenfassend gilt es daher festzuhalten, dass unter Berücksichtigung 
der empirischen Erkenntnisse der Studie teils positive und teils negative 
Anpassungsszenarien im Kontext von vier möglichen institutionellen An-
passungspfaden veranschaulicht und diskutiert wurden. Zusätzlich er-
hebt die Studie im weitesten Sinne den Anspruch, kritische Denkanstöße 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
für eine realistischere Einschätzung von Anpassungsproblemen zu geben, 
die gleichermaßen konkrete Planungsperspektiven für Entscheidungsträ-
ger eröffnen. 
Insgesamt lassen die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung in vielen weiteren Be-
reichen Forschungsbedarf erkennen. So liegen etwa kaum Untersuchun-
gen zu den konkreten Auswirkungen von Urbanisierungsprozessen in 
den kleineren und mittleren Städten Ghanas vor, obwohl Urbanisierung 
dort mittlerweile am schnellsten voranschreitet. Zudem ist es notwendig, 
die institutionelle Pfadanalyse besser mit bestehenden Landnutzungsmo-
dellen und Klimaszenarien in Einklang zu bringen, um die Robustheit der 
einzelnen Szenarien weiter zu erhöhen.  
Ferner besteht im Bereich der Ernährungssicherheit die dringende Not-
wendigkeit, sich neben Fragen des Zugangs auch verstärkt mit Fragen der 
Qualität, der Nutzung und der langfristigen Nutzbarkeit von Ressourcen, 
Dienstleistungen und Infrastruktur auseinanderzusetzen. Hinsichtlich be-
stehender Schwierigkeiten in den Bereichen Anpassungsfinanzierung, 
Bürgerbeteiligung und Dezentralisierung ist zudem eine bessere wissen-
schaftliche Begleitung und Unterstützung von politischen Reform- und 
Transformationsprozessen vonnöten, um den aktiven Dialog zwischen 
Wissenschaft, Zivilgesellschaft, Planungspraktikern und Entscheidungs-
trägern nicht abreißen zu lassen.  
Abschließend ist anzumerken, dass sowohl theoretische als auch ethische 
Fragen äußerst relevant für die Umsetzung sozialer Transformations- und 
Anpassungsprozesse sind, etwa im Hinblick auf die Ausdifferenzierung 
von gesamtgesellschaftlichen Zielen und normativen Wertvorstellungen. 
Daher ist mit der vorliegenden Arbeit auch das grundlegende Ziel ver-
bunden, einen theoretischen Beitrag zur Fortentwicklung der politikwis-
senschaftlichen und entwicklungsgeographischen Transformations- und   
Anpassungsforschung zu leisten. 
 
Stichworte: Anpassungspfade; Klimawandelanpassung; Gesellschaftli-
che Transformation; Institutionentheorie; Risikoanalyse; Ghana 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
The idea of climate change adaptation is now officially 'mainstreamed' 
into Ghana’s poverty reduction and development strategies at different 
levels of government. Climate change is commonly seen as a risk for socio-
economic development, but also as a 'game changer' and political window 
of opportunity to address well-known development priorities by adopt-
ing an approach that puts the poor and vulnerable at the center. Adap-
tation policy narratives in Ghana are thus closely linked to familiar de-
velopment discourses, although new financial instruments and political 
narratives about 'transformative' development in the context of the        
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are becoming increasingly influ-
ential. The key political entry points for the implementation of adaptation 
measures in Ghana are currently market-based interventions as well as 
infrastructure improvement, disaster risk reduction, and natural re- 
source management. 
Yet, beyond the thin veneer of dominant policy narratives and transient 
project interventions, adaptation mostly takes place in the form of auto-
nomous livelihood adaptations by often disenfranchised populations  
who are confronted with multiple risks, including the negative effects of 
climate change and increased variability. Developing supportive strate-
gies for the most vulnerable will therefore require an approach that lays 
emphasis on the wider institutional and political context in which        
adaptive trajectories unfold. However, a major knowledge gap persists   
on how complex and politicized institutional settings are shaping both,  
autonomous and planned adaptation processes in Ghana. 
In attending to this knowledge gap, and by focusing on the institutional 
dimensions of adaptation, this study develops and applies a novel institu-
tional pathways approach that sets out to systematically explore the social 
production of risk – materially as well as discursively – to inform adapta-
tion policy scenarios. This includes the question of how individuals can 
adapt to rapidly changing environmental and social conditions, and how 
organizations are prepared to flexibly respond to emerging livelihood 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
risks that are likely to become more pronounced in the near future. Draw-
ing on information gathered from field research that took place between 
2012 and 2013 in the Vea Catchment area in north-eastern Ghana, the main 
objective of the study is to investigate how power asymmetries, institu-
tions and risk discourses influence human vulnerability as well as present 
and future adaptation pathways. The underlying hypothesis is that insti-
tutional processes – and not climate-related influences – are the primary 
factor that determines social vulnerability in the research area. 
In sum, the study is structured into five parts. At the outset, the introduc-
tory chapter presents the natural scientific context for climate-related re-
search in Ghana. Proceeding from the assumption that contested narra-
tives about modernity and risk implicate different models of human de-
velopment under climate change, the chapter also offers an introduction 
of basic analytical concepts such as adaptation, vulnerability and disaster 
risk. These concepts are introduced, discussed, and systematically related 
to each other. The chapter concludes by reviewing the most pertinent crit-
icisms of the adaptation concept that are currently under debate in the in-
terdisciplinary literature on climate change adaptation and development. 
The second chapter deepens the theoretical discussion by engaging with 
contemporary debates about institutions, discourse analysis and power to 
better understand how institutions influence the social production of risk, 
materially as well as discursively. The key motivation is to contribute to 
theory development in political science and human geography by further 
exploring a transformative perspective on the institutional dimensions of   
social life, based on questions of normative sociology and ethics. These 
conceptual deliberations also provide the bedrock for the development of 
a novel institutional pathways approach to adaptation planning and risk  
assessment. Four institutional pathway scenarios are introduced as heu-
ristic tools to guide empirical research on the functioning of institutional 
processes and their possible future trajectories. The chapter closes with a 
brief description of the research questions, research methods, and selected 
field sites. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third chapter then applies select methods offered by the Sociology of 
Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) to illustrate how adaptation 
is discursively framed by adaptation specialists and practitioners at dif-
ferent levels of society. Drawing on quantitative survey data and semi-
structured interviews, the ambition is to provide a broad-based overview 
of relevant adaptation discourses in Ghana. Particular attention is paid to 
the organizational and material-technological infrastructure (the so-called 
dispositif) on which contested adaptation discourses rest. 
In the fourth chapter, the findings of the discourse analysis are tested 
against the background of a multi-hazard risk assessment (MRA). The aim 
is to identify differences and similarities between managerial discourses 
of risk and observed local vulnerabilities. Methodologically, a household 
survey (n=484 HH) in both, rural and urban areas of the Vea Catchment is 
combined with qualitative research tools. The selection of field sites al-
lowed for a direct comparison between different farming and irrigation 
practices as well as between small-scale subsistence farmers, commer-
cially oriented farmers, and non-farm households. Moreover, it was pos-
sible to analyze the influence of institutional processes on the distribution 
of risk, both spatially and socially, among rural and urban populations 
with diversified sources of income. Facilitated group discussions were 
held in the research area to triangulate the findings of the quantitative 
MRA component. The key goal of these group discussions was to learn 
more about peoples’ risk perceptions and adaptation strategies. 
In the fifth and last chapter, the results of the study are systematically re-
lated to plausible institutional pathway scenarios, namely: (1) adjustment, 
(2) reform, and (3) transformation. These scenarios are meant to serve as 
heuristic devices to support decision making. It is neither assumed that 
any particular institutional pathway presents an optimal adaptation solu-
tion nor that there is always a choice between alternative options. Hence 
the concluding chapter also discusses institutional factors embedded in 
each of the three adaptation pathways vis-à-vis the regressive tendencies 
of (4) business-as-usual.  
 
While investigating the possible scenarios, particular emphasis is placed 
on the inherently political nature of adaptation pathways. It is argued that 
integrated scenario development with a strong emphasis on the institu-
tional dimensions of social-environmental change can further increase the 
robustness of adaptation planning. It also allows for realistic and flexible 
decision making that integrates multiple pathway options into a coherent 
strategic approach. At the same time, the results of the institutional path-
ways analysis can be used to reflect on enabling institutional arrange-
ments that are crucial to implement existing adaptation strategies and 
achieve the progressive political goals of the National Climate Change 
Policy (NCCP 2013). 
Against this background, the first institutional pathway scenario of 'ad-
justment' is based on the core assumption that the paradigms of techno-
logical adjustment and conservative resilience thinking will continue to 
dominate adaptation policy making in the short and medium term. Espe-
cially the agenda of 'climate-proofing' economic development is currently 
promoted as a key policy response by a variety of influential political ac-
tors in Ghana. Moreover, a detailed analysis of organizational discourses 
at the national, regional and district levels revealed that the understand-
ing of adaptation as adjustment to climatic stressors presently dominates 
organizational perceptions at multiple levels.  
In view of these converging trends, adjustment is a highly probable adap-
tation scenario that is likely to generate additional organizational feed-
backs and shape future adaptation pathways through the distribution of 
resources and risks. However, the focus of adjustment adaptation is not 
so much on the social root causes of multidimensional risks and vulnera-
bilities, but rather on the safeguarding of economic growth and develop-
ment under conditions of climate change and increased variability. There-
fore, it can be argued that technical adjustment approaches alone will not 
be sufficient to reduce complex vulnerabilities and move multi-layered in-
stitutional settings toward more integrated, equitable and forward-look-
ing adaptation pathways.  
The second scenario explores under what circumstances a more 'reform'-    
oriented pathway may be required to complement or enable proposed 
adjustment measures. Findings show that current attempts at increasing 
the adaptiveness of Ghanaian farmers and government organizations   
are still fundamentally constrained by the converging structural pro-
blems of unfinished political and fiscal decentralization. In addition,   
there are challenges related to conflicting and/or overlapping political 
mandates that hinder effective policy implementation. Yet, how exactly 
structural reforms could be carried out despite a long history of political 
resistance at the level of the central government is far from being clear. 
Moreover, the empirical findings of the study reveal that it is crucial for 
improving food security and household adaptiveness to avoid an overly 
narrow planning focus on patterns of access to, for example, infra-       
structure, credit, services, inputs, markets, etc. Existing problems of     
utilization, quality control, and long-term reliability need to be ad- 
dressed as well.  
Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that dominant organizational  
interpretations of 'reform' are still primarily concerned with managerial 
processes. While these aspects are certainly important, it should be borne 
in mind that attempts at increasing public participation and incrementally 
reforming top-down governance structures have been beset by many 
problems in the past, including entrenched standard planning protocols, 
vested interests, and risk aversion among decision makers. The analysis 
of dominant adaptation discourses also reveals that reformist policy and 
planning narratives still exhibit the tendency to naturalize socially pro-
duced risk, and to depoliticize adaptation by assuming that complex na-
ture-culture relations are governed by clearly identifiable, benevolent, and 
neutral institutions. 
With regard to the third institutional pathway scenario of 'transforma-
tion', it should be kept in mind that the practical translation of trans-     
formative institutional pathways depends on how the goals behind the 
idea of transformation are discursively framed. Like the idea of reform, 
transformation can be interpreted in both, a more socially progressive or 
xx
in a rather conservative way. A socially progressive interpretation of 
transformation assumes that deep transformations of existing institu-
tional structures and dominant social, political, and economic paradigms 
are required to avoid negative effects on social equity and the Earth sys-
tem. A more conservative view of transformation, in turn, is based on 
the rather narrow definition of transformation as an agricultural policy 
approach that advocates for a large-scale transformation of food systems 
in line with the conventional model of industrial agriculture. 
Since the latter idea of transformation currently dominates relevant policy 
discourses, it must be borne in mind that such an approach involves con-
siderable social and ecological risks. If modernization and expansion strat-
egies for rural agriculture are not implemented in a socially equitable 
manner, it is to be expected that these interventions will create economic 
dependencies on large corporations and lead to the expropriation of small-
holder farmers in areas with scarce land resources, thereby deepening al-
ready existing social problems and potentially creating new ones. The 
general lack of non-farm economic alternatives in northern Ghana, which 
is further aggravated by the realities of increased climate variability and 
uneven urbanization, at least suggests that the effectiveness of transform-
ative adaptation strategies hinges on finding the right balance between 
necessary agricultural modernization, inclusive social development, and 
increased support for agroecological food systems. 
Lastly, the counterfactual 'business-as-usual' scenario points toward insti-
tutional voids, overlapping normative reference systems and processual 
gaps that provide opportunities for regulatory capture and profiteering. 
Under such a scenario, it is assumed that patronage ties and elite networks 
may encourage socially entrenched practices like clientelism, corruption 
and rent-seeking behavior. These practices normally reinforce deep-
seated power asymmetries, for instance in cases where resource flows, 
subsidies or 'pro-poor' interventions are diverted from their intended use. 
Transient institutional arrangements set up by donor-funded projects may 
further aggravate such tendencies, since infrastructural adjustment inter-
ventions such as the building of bridges and irrigation canals, for example, 
rarely include provisions for collective and inter-group maintenance into 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
their project design, thus often leaving the physical infrastructure in       
disrepair and disuse after several years. In the worst case, business-as-
usual may therefore encompass situations in which no sustainable long-
term adaptation is undertaken at all.  
Hence it is suggested that a progressive transformative perspective on in-
stitutional pathways is needed as well to avoid self-referential debates 
about organizational reform, which neglect the fact that adaptation plan-
ning is not a straightforward and normatively neutral approach to ad-
dressing risk and vulnerability. The case study on the rehabilitation of the 
Vea dam clearly illustrates that planning practices are embedded in wider 
sociocultural, material and political contexts, and that they are guided by 
contested normative values and paradigms. In other words, it must be 
considered that planning, project interventions and other power-ridden 
processes of rational organizing are themselves influencing social risk and 
vulnerability. 
 
Keywords: adaptation pathways; climate change adaptation; sustainabil-
ity transformation; institutional theory; risk analysis; Ghana 
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GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS 
Adaptation 
For the purpose of this study, adaptation will be defined as an iterative 
social process that aims to reduce  risk, and seeks to increase the abil-
ity to avoid risk. Adaptation can be a reactive or proactive effort and 
may be construed as  adjustment,  reform or  transformation. 
Adjustment 
Adjustment favors the return to a  normatively desirable state of sys-
temic equilibrium by adjusting to actual or expected  climate change 
and its effects. In the context of  adaptation, the concept of adjustment 
is sometimes used to refer to infrastructural approaches and technical 
solutions, since adjustment does not necessarily imply to address the 
social root causes/drivers of particular change events. 
Climate Change 
According to the standard definition by the World Meteorological Or-
ganization, climate change refers to a statistically significant variation 
in either the mean state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for 
an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may 
be due to natural internal processes or external forcings, or to persis-
tent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in 
land use. 
Depoliticization 
Depoliticization refers to a critical  discourse and to a field of study. 
Research on depoliticization explores how  governance techniques 
may lead to the suppression of alternative views and dissent in politi-
cal processes due to unequal power relations. Depoliticization also     
refers to attempts by political actors to conceal, manipulate, ignore or 
divert attention from knowledge that does not conform with their pri-
orities, goals or desires. 
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Disaster 
A disaster is a serious large-scale event that disrupts the functioning of 
a particular group or society. A disaster typically exceeds the capacity 
of the affected group or society to autonomously cope with the effects 
of the event. 
Discourse 
Discourses are performative statement practices which constitute real-
ity orders and produce power effects in a conflict-ridden network of 
social actors,  dispositifs, and knowledge systems. Discourse analysis 
follows a critical and situational logic, according to which 'truth' is cre-
ated through shared  normative definitions of reality, but not inde-
pendent of power relations and social, political, economic, cultural and 
historical circumstances and practices.  
Dispositif 
The dispositif describes the  institutional, organizational and techno-
logical infrastructure on which  discourses rest and through which 
they are mediated or translated into real life outcomes. 
Exposure 
The term exposure connotes a place or location exposed to a  hazard, 
whereby to be exposed does not mean to be  vulnerable. 
Governance 
Generally, there are three ways in which the governance concept is 
used in the literature and in public debates. First, governance can be 
understood as a scientific concept that is employed to conceptualize 
and empirically trace  transformations and  institutional interven-
tions in societies. Second, governance can be understood as a  nor-
mative program based on the ambition to realize and manage political 
change. Third, governance also refers to a critical societal  discourse, 
which is linked to the wider globalization debate. 
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Hazard 
A hazard is a dangerous phenomenon, substance, or human activity 
that may cause harm. The term hazard therefore describes the cause of 
occurring harm, and not a harmful event itself. Hazards manifest in 
harmful events such as  disasters or accidents. 
Household 
In accordance with the official definition used by the Ghana Statistical 
Service, a household (HH) is defined as a person or a group of persons, 
who live together in the same house or compound and share the same 
house-keeping arrangements. Members of a household are not neces-
sarily related, as non-relatives may form part of a household. 
Institution 
An institution is a relatively durable cluster of  normative rules, nar-
ratives, and practices. Institutions are rooted in the dominant yet con-
tested cultural-cognitive order of a given social configuration, and ren-
der stability to a particular form of social hierarchy. Institutions func-
tion trough the promotion of goals and values, and by enabling or con-
straining human behavior. Organizations also qualify as institutions, 
even if their exact properties are subject to debate. 
Institutional Pathways Approach 
A planning approach that combines qualitative and quantitative meth-
ods to determine how  adaptive trajectories are  institutionally em-
bedded and spatially and temporally evolving. 
Mainstreaming 
Mainstreaming refers to a top-down sociopolitical process that seeks 
to  normalize certain policy objectives, narratives or  discourses in 
and across societies, bureaucracies and organizations, including the 
media. 
xiv 
Normativity 
The term normativity refers to cognitive-cultural constructions of real-
ity that exist prior to the arrival of the individual into this world, and 
with which the individual necessarily engages during processes of so-
cialization. This means that the way in which individuals understand 
each other in an intersubjective manner is a direct consequence of the 
normative worldview of the collective in which they are socialized. A 
normative worldview consists of conceptual systems according to 
which the 'true' and 'false' are separated, and specific effects of power 
are attached to the true. While there is still human agency and choice 
concerning these concepts, for instance in the case of contestation and 
rejection, normative systems are surprisingly resilient. Thus, norms 
function as social ordering principles. Group-based inequalities and 
the unequal distribution of power and resources require justification 
and maintenance through normative regimes of 'truth'. 
Reform 
Reform refers to the goal of improving particular attributes of a given 
reference system without altering its fundamental properties. In the 
context of  adaptation, the notion of reform is used to describe 
incremental responses to actual or expected  climate change and 
variability. Reformist adaptation neither advocates for the status quo 
nor endorses fundamental systemic or paradigmatic change. 
Resilience 
Resilience refers to an ideal state of current or future adaptiveness. 
Risk 
The umbrella term risk describes the likelihood of incurring harm or a 
damage potential that may result from a potential threat. Risk is the 
product of  hazards,  vulnerability,  exposure and  adaptation. 
More technical definitions see risk as objectively quantifiable, while 
more critical definitions understand the notion of risk as a  normative 
xv 
social construct and as a potential driver of  depoliticization. Percep-
tions of risk differ among various actors and interest groups, and ac-
cording to their socio-cultural backgrounds. 
Transformation 
Transformation alludes to a shift in the fundamental attributes of a sys-
tem or society, often based on altered  norms, goals, paradigms or 
values. Transformations can occur in technological, socio-ecological, 
biogeochemical, or financial systems, and in regulatory or political re-
gimes. The notion of transformation also includes the opportunity that 
 adaptation presents to graduate from a given state of systemically 
produced  vulnerability to a new and better system. Transformation 
differs from  adjustment and incremental  reform due to its focus 
on fundamental systemic change. 
Transition 
Transition refers to a dynamic process as opposed to an outcome or a 
goal and denotes the incremental alteration of systemic or social prop-
erties. The final outcome of a transition process may be  adjustment, 
 reform, or  transformation. In the worst case, a transition process 
may even lead to regression or business-as-usual. 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is the degree (severity, frequency or magnitude) to which 
an element at  risk is likely to experience harm. Thus, it refers to a 
propensity or susceptibility to suffer harm or loss and is typically as-
sociated with a wide range of biogeochemical, technological, social, 
political, cultural, economic and  institutional characteristics. 
Disclaimer: For better readability, no citations are provided in this glossary. However, 
some of the definitions therein contain ideas and formulations that are not solely those 
of the author. When used in the main text, all definitions are supported with appro-
priate sources. 
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DEPARTURES 
An Adjustment Project Gone Wrong 
Police in the Upper East Region have allegedly shot dead, one man at Vea in the 
Bongo district, while protecting a contractor doing some maintenance works on 
the Vea Irrigation Dam, from angry protestors from the community.  
 (Joy News, Ghana, FEB 6-2013) 
On February 6, 2013, a group of construction workers commenced 
planned maintenance work on the Vea irrigation dam in the Upper 
East Region of Ghana. On the same day, a young man named Azaare 
Aniah, a well-known community leader and student at the Winneba 
College of Education, died when he was struck by a bullet fired from 
a police officer’s gun, while he was participating in a protest march 
against the construction works. Several other people were wounded 
and arrested as police sought to disperse the rally.
The protest march hardly came as a surprise, since the rocks that 
were selected as raw materials for the maintenance works were per-
ceived to belong to a traditional shrine and abode for ancestral spi-
rits. Organized protests against the blasting of the rocks had already 
erupted in 2012 and 2013, when construction workers were repeated-
ly denied access to the rocks by concerned residents and the mem-
bers of a local youth group.  
The earth priest, or tindaana of Vea quickly emerged as a figurehead 
for the protest movement, due to his role as a traditional authority 
and custodian of the land. In organizing the protests, he claimed to 
act on behalf of the people’s spiritual and cultural needs, given such 
'blatant disregard' of traditional values by the contractor and the 
state authorities who had commissioned the blasting of the rocks. 
2   CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
News about the tragic death of Azaare Aniah had only reached me 
when I was preparing for the final months of my field research in 
Ghana’s northern savanna zone. During a short conversation over the 
telephone, a colleague of mine informed me that a relatively unknown 
group calling themselves 'the youth of Vea' had published an open let-
ter on a major Ghanaian news website, accusing members of the local 
police force of 'brutish murder'. When I came to read the letter during 
the following week, I gradually learned more about the circumstances 
that ultimately led to the death of Azaare Aniah. The open letter, which 
was published on the internet shortly after the shooting, stated that:  
The shooting and killing of the late Azaare Aniah took place under 
superior orders rather than professional incompetence as some of 
them want us to believe (…) The police and the contractor may suc-
ceed in blasting the land because they are using weapons which give 
them power over the people but what the police must know is that 
they are sowing seeds for conflicts between the people of Vea and 
their chief which has a very high tendency of escalating into sectional 
community war (Ghana Web 2013, n. pag.).1 
At first, I did not make a connection between my research on climate 
change adaptation and the controversy surrounding the blasting of the 
local shrine. It was only after some weeks that I came to realize the 
significance of the event: while I was revisiting a draft document of the 
National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) that had just been released by 
1 The institution of chieftaincy in Ghana dates back to pre-colonial times and is offi-
cially enshrined in the Ghanaian constitution of 1992, Article 270 (1), and the Chief-
taincy Act 759 of 2008. The chief, also referred to as naba in the Upper East Region of 
Ghana, is considered the customary ruler of a traditional area who, hailing from the 
appropriate family and lineage, has been validly elected and enstooled, enskinned or 
installed in accordance with customary law. The chieftaincy system is organized in a 
hierarchical manner and headed by so-called paramount chiefs. In addition to their tra-
ditional role, most chiefs entertain close ties to government and development organi-
zations. 
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the government, I realized that infrastructural adjustment was pro-
moted as key adaptation policy response by a variety of political ac-
tors.2 However, in light of the violent incident in Vea, it became readily 
apparent that cultural and political questions surrounding the imple-
mentation of adjustment interventions were oversimplified or ne-
glected in most accounts of adaptation policy and planning. Thus, I 
eventually decided to further investigate the events preceding the 
community protests on February 6, 2013. 
In the beginning of 2013, I had already worked in northern Ghana for 
more than half a year. Thus, I was well aware of the complaints about 
the bad state of the Vea dam that had been raised by local residents. In 
fact, the bad condition of the Vea irrigation facilities had been an issue 
of contention among local farmers for many decades (see England 
1995). The Vea dam was gradually built between 1965 and 1980 for 
multiple purposes such as dry season farming, small-scale fisheries 
and the provision of drinking water. It had ever since served as an     
important source of livelihood for the people in the surrounding towns 
and villages. Yet no major rehabilitation work had taken place since 
the completion of the dam in the 1980s. This situation naturally led to 
a slow erosion of the dam’s walls and resulted in the siltation and sub-
sequent blockage of irrigation canals and drainage systems. As a con-
sequence, many small-scale farmers had to abandon their farmlands, 
or had to resort to resource intensive motor pump irrigation in the     
upland areas of the irrigation scheme. 
At first, political attempts to resolve these long-standing grievances 
seemed promising, especially in view of successful negotiations be-
tween the government of Ghana and several international donor agen-
cies. In 2004, a considerable grant was expedited under the World 
Bank-led Urban Water Project in order to increase access to improved 
water supplies. As an integral part of the project, infrastructural ad-
justment work on water supply dams and weirs was supported with 
                                                          
2 See NCCP 2013, p. vi; Ghana Goes for Green Growth 2010, p. 12; IPCC 2014b, p. 86. 
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$5 million by the Nordic Development Fund (NDF). According to     
media reports, $2 million of the total NDF funding were specifically 
allocated for the rehabilitation of the Vea dam.3  
Construction work at Vea officially began in 2010, when a firm named 
Eunitack Services Ltd. was awarded a service contract by the Ghanaian 
government. However, in 2012 – halfway into the project – an open 
dispute broke out between the tindaana of Vea and the contractor who 
claimed that blasting the rocks of the local shrine was unavoidable to 
complete the rehabilitation works. As disputes over the religious site 
became more prevalent, media reports stated that the earth priest had 
supposedly asked the contractor to either stop attempts at destroying 
the cultural heritage of the community, or "face the wrath of his deities 
and the youth of the area" (Daily Guide 2012, n. pag.). 
At this point, however, a memorandum of understanding had already 
been signed between the chief of Vea and the contractor. Further de-
tails of the memorandum only became public as the project manager 
of Eunitack Services Ltd. alleged in an interview that compensation for 
the use of the rocks had been paid to the chief:  
We even went to the Chief of Vea … and he asked that we pay him 
some compensation. We have paid him and provided money to per-
form all the required customary rites. We have met all the conditions 
they asked for including employing the youth of the community to 
work with us so as to enable them earn some income, we have initi-
ated measures to remedy any possible damage that may result from 
the project work. We have also pledged and indeed put in place 
measures to replenish any portion of the land that may be affected by 
the project since we would be blasting some rocks to use for the work, 
yet after meeting all these conditions the work has come to a halt be-
cause of the tindaana (Daily Guide 2012, n. pag.).  
                                                          
3 Taken from project statistics published by the World Bank (2004, p. 7). Also see Daily 
Guide 2012. 
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While I discussed the memorandum during an interview with staff of 
the Vea irrigation facilities, it was mentioned that Eunitack Services 
Ltd. had apparently transferred a considerable sum of money to the 
account of the chief before attempting to access the rocks.4 I was also 
told that unconfirmed allegations had apparently been made by local 
residents who lived close to the shrine, and who claimed that compen-
sation payments had never reached them. 
In the meantime, maintenance work on the Vea dam had been delayed  
considerably and the Regional Coordinating Council had come under 
increased public pressure. Government authorities were called upon 
by concerned citizens to intervene politically with the hope of prevent-
ing project funds from being returned to international donors. The lo-
cal press reported that several mediation efforts by the Regional Secu-
rity Council of the Upper East Region (REGSEC) and the paramount 
chief of the Bongo traditional area had been to no avail, because the         
tindaana of Vea would stubbornly refuse to "pacify the gods" (Ghana 
News Agency 2013a, n. pag.).  
The tindaana and his followers immediately rejected these press reports 
and continued their opposition, claiming that they had suggested other 
rocks in the vicinity of the dam, including those from a nearby quarry.5 
These offers were nevertheless deemed unacceptable by the Regional 
Minister and Eunitack Services Ltd., and it was argued that utilizing 
rocks from other sources would incur additional costs and cause fur-
ther delays (Ghana News Agency 2013b, n. pag.). 
 
 
                                                          
4 Field notes: 16 February 2013, Vea town. The responsible company for the manage-
ment of the Vea irrigation scheme is the Irrigation Company of the Upper Region (ICOUR), 
a company owned and financed by the government of Ghana.  
5 Field notes: 18 February 2013, Vea town. 
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Picture 1. Vea Irrigation Dam 
 
© Author, 2013 
 
In spite of ongoing protests, the REGSEC finally ordered Eunitack Ser-
vices Ltd. to resume work on the dam’s walls on January 16, 2013. After 
taking this decision, the chairman of the REGSEC – who also served as 
the acting Upper East Regional Minister at the time – officially an-
nounced to the press that the government had decided to provide se-
curity for the contractor and appealed to members of the Vea commu-
nity, and especially the tindaana, to remain calm and allow the mainte-
nance work to continue. In his press statement the chairman empha-
sized that the decision was solely taken "in the interest of the majority 
of the people in the region who depended on the dam for survival" 
(Ghana News Agency 2013a, n. pag.). He further stated:  
If the dam is not worked on now it will collapse and this will affect 
the people in the entire region greatly. We will also lose the 25 million 
dollars [sic] from Nordic Development Fund (Ghana News Agency 
2013a, n. pag.). 
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The acting minister then publicly warned the people of Vea that "any-
body who would want to mar the process would be dealt with drasti-
cally". He also mourned the "gross disrespect" that the tindaana and his 
followers had allegedly shown for the council, the chief of Vea, and for 
the paramount chief of the Bongo area (Ghana News Agency 2013a, n. 
pag.). In turn, the Vea youth group and other residents heavily criti-
cized the chiefs and the local authorities, including the regional minis-
ter, for supporting the contractor in his attempts to destroy the tradi-
tional shrine without respecting the cultural heritage and constitu-
tional rights of the community. When construction workers finally ar-
rived at the shrine on the morning of February 6, 2013 and begun blast-
ing the sacred rocks under the protection of the local police force, the 
protest erupted during which Azaare Aniah was shot and killed. 
After coming to terms with the tragic death of a young man, one lesson 
that can be learned from these events is that notions of culture and     
religion can become highly politicized. In fact, they are often used as 
supportive arguments in power struggles over material and symbolic 
resources such as financial flows related to development projects and 
the 'traditional' leadership roles of local chiefs or earth priests. In the 
northern savanna zone this conflict-ridden situation is further aggra-
vated, since the societies of the region "continue to organize their lives 
and the use of land around the institution of the (…) earth priests" 
whereas "the chiefs no longer respect the position of the earth priest 
and, in general, (…) indigenous methods of dispute resolution are be-
ing ignored" (UNDP 2012, pp. x and 56). As the Vea case illustrates, 
there are still considerable tensions between earth priests and chiefs 
concerning usufruct rights, allodial rights and land ownership. These 
unresolved tensions have the potential to stall even so-called 'bottom-
up' processes, mainly because the tindaanas – who have often compro-
mised with the chiefs in the past over issues of community develop-
ment – now wish to "re-assert their rights as landowners" (Awedoba 
2010, p. 98).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
8                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
Customs related to the earth thus have to be placed in a wider political 
context in northern Ghana. Traditional leaders enter in various com-
plex relationships with the bureaucratic state, whereas state authorities 
and politicians frequently seek to align themselves with coalitions of 
traditional leaders to advance their own strategic priorities. For exam-
ple, since the majority of the population in Vea is of Christian faith 
(79.5 percent) – as opposed to a minority of traditional worshippers 
(14.9 percent) – tactics to politicize religious matters have been repeat-
edly employed by a coalition between the state administration, the 
contractor and the chief to outmaneuver political opponents.6 Espe-
cially the portrayal of traditionalists as backward people who allegedly 
cling to "outmoded customs which could impede on development in 
the region and the country as a whole" fell on fertile ground among 
many followers of Christianity and Islam, who frequently frown upon 
traditional practices (Ghana News Agency 2013b, n. pag.). 
Statements that conflict resolution capacities in the region are fairly 
high based on community solidarity and the influence of traditional 
leaders such as chiefs and earth priests thus have to be considered su-
perficial at best, and outright risky at worst, depending on the concrete 
policy and planning context (compare, for instance, Nanedo et al. 2014, 
p. 18-20).  
We may then ask what became of the rehabilitation of the Vea dam? In 
late 2014, ten years after the contract for the Urban Water Project had 
been signed, and almost five years after rehabilitation works in Vea 
had officially begun, the managing director of ICOUR had to reveal to 
the press that the Vea irrigation project needed to be shut down, since 
the dam infrastructure was in a bad condition and the lake on the verge 
of drying up. This detrimental outcome of the rehabilitation process 
aggravated existing livelihood challenges and negatively affected dry 
                                                          
6 Taken from official records kept at the palace of the chief in Vea. All numbers are 
based on a community survey conducted by the University for Development Studies 
(UDS, Tamale) in 2008/2009. The study indicates a total population of 6.714. 
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season farming as well as food security in the region. Hence it has be-
come painfully clear that a thorough knowledge of complex institu-
tional and cultural settings is an absolute necessity to avoid prolonged 
social conflicts which may potentially stall the implementation of pro-
posed adaptation measures. This applies even to situations where pos-
itive sentiments toward infrastructural adjustment projects might pre-
vail among the population, and 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' policy     
approaches are pursued in tandem. 
 
 
 
 
Exploring the Linkages Between Climate Change Adaptation              
and Institutional Transformation 
The year 2015 has been called a crucial year for both, Africa’s develop-
ment and climate change action. On the one hand, the year has seen a 
political paradigm shift toward 'transformative' development in the 
debate on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). On 
the other hand, adaptation has been heralded as a key component for 
responses to climate change in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris Confer-
ence of the UNFCCC. In view of the paradigm shift toward transform-
ative development, scientists and practitioners have been quick to note 
that development and climate change adaptation should not be re-
garded as two separate political issues. The key link between the two 
political agendas – transformative development and climate change 
adaptation – is the need to finance and implement socially just and en-
vironmentally sustainable responses to social as well as environmental 
pressures in a way that will benefit the most vulnerable countries. In 
particular, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 stresses the need to "trans-
form regional and continental institutions and the manner in which we 
do business, so as to effectively lead and drive the agenda for transfor-
mation" and enable African countries to implement their own localized 
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visions of adaptation plans, systems and structures (African Union 
2014, p. 19). 
But how can such integrated and 'transformative' adaptation responses 
be implemented in practice? What kind of adaptation policy mix will 
be required to support institutional transformation at the national and 
sub-national levels? Moreover, how can growth-oriented economic de-
velopment strategies be implemented in coherence with a transforma-
tive agenda that emphasizes accountability, environmental sustaina-
bility and social justice? Focusing on the case of Ghana, and by com-
bining a pathways perspective with insights from critical institutional 
theory, risk assessment and discourse analysis, this study engages with 
these pertinent questions – theoretically as well as empirically. 
In Ghana, climate change adaptation is now officially 'mainstreamed' 
into development planning at different levels of government, while 
policy translation into local contexts is still limited in scope. Thus far, 
the key entry points for the implementation of adaptation actions are 
market-based interventions as well as infrastructure improvement, 
disaster risk reduction and natural resource management with a focus 
on agriculture. However, beyond the thin veneer of official policy nar-
ratives and sporadic project interventions, adaptation largely takes 
place in the form of autonomous livelihood adaptations by rural farm-
ing households and often disenfranchised peri-urban and urban pop-
ulations who are confronted with multiple social and environmental 
stressors. In sum, a major knowledge gap persists on how complex and 
politicized institutional settings are shaping autonomous livelihood 
adaptations in Ghana. As the case study on the rehabilitation of the 
Vea dam has illustrated, there is indeed "much more to politics than 
the formal arrangements for representation, decision making and pol-
icy implementation" (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 1). 
In other words, the richness and diversity of institutional life cannot be 
limited to specific legal and managerial processes, as institutions also 
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express diverse values, traditions, worldviews, beliefs and socio-polit-
ical norms. These interrelated aspects of institutional life are neverthe-
less seldom considered – let alone systematically explored – in more 
conventional adaptation studies and risk assessments. While institu-
tional life generally spawns much diversity, there is still a tendency in 
adaptation theory and practice to exclusively focus on organizational 
and managerial processes related to the state administration and inter-
national development agencies. Institutional life is then primarily per-
ceived through the lens of bureaucratic tasks such as risk assessment, 
risk reduction, coordination, prioritization, and information manage-
ment (see Foti et al. 2011). 
While these organizational tasks are certainly important, the findings 
of the preliminary case study demonstrate that there is an urgent need 
to better comprehend how institutions interact across scales, space and 
time to mediate and/or produce risk in the social sphere. Concomi-
tantly, under conditions of deep uncertainty, when we are faced with 
questions that we "have not posed but which are imposed on us, faced 
with situations that do not let themselves be staged in the laboratory 
because they integrate an ill-defined number of interrelated variables", 
making reliable predictions about future adaptation scenarios or 'path-
ways' becomes an increasingly daunting task (Stengers 2000, p. 158).  
Thus, given the need for more integrated and forward-looking re-
search that lays emphasis on the institutional and structural aspects of 
adaptation, I will develop and empirically test an institutional path-
ways approach that sets out to systematically explore the social produc-
tion of risk – materially and discursively – to inform adaptation policy 
scenarios. This includes the question of how organizations themselves 
can adapt to rapidly changing environmental and social conditions, 
and how they are prepared to flexibly respond to emerging livelihood 
risks that are likely to become more pronounced in the near future. 
12   CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
In accordance with this overarching objective, the study is structured 
into five parts. At the outset, the introductory chapter presents the his-
torical and natural science background for the development of adapta-
tion policies in Ghana and critically explores conceptual state-of-the-
art debates in the fields of climate change adaptation, disaster risk re-
duction (DRR) and vulnerability research. By systematically relating 
conceptual debates to each other, theoretical and empirical gaps in re-
search on climate change adaptation in Ghana will be identified. 
In the second chapter, I set out to systematically address the identified 
research gaps by developing a 'transformative' approach to institu-
tional theory and analysis. To develop such a novel transformative per-
spective on the institutional dimension of social life – a perspective that 
is not only able to account for the social production of risk but is also 
cognizant of the more-than-human dimension of ethics (e.g. animals and 
the living environment) – I will combine a critical reading of institu-
tional theory with a sociology of knowledge approach to discourse. 
Engaging in such a broad and complex theoretical endeavor arguably 
requires a critical re-evaluation of the various normative strands that 
have evolved in social and institutional theory. From an empirical per-
spective, I argue that developing a transformative approach to institu-
tional analysis necessitates a strong focus on cultural-cognitive, nor-
mative and discursive processes of meaning-making on the one hand, 
and the concrete materiality of landscapes and resource flows on the 
other. Based on these ontological and epistemological reflections, I pre-
sent an integrated framework for institutional analysis that contains 
empirical methods, detailed research questions and a brief descrip-
tion of the selected field sites. Four possible institutional pathway 
scenarios will serve as analytical points of reference to map the emer-
ging political debate on climate change adaptation. These scenarios 
are: (1) adjustment, (2) reform, (3) transformation and, as a counter-
factual scenario, (4) business-as-usual.  
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Chapter three then marks the beginning of the empirical discussion, 
and proceeds to explore how climate change adaptation is perceived 
and discursively framed by adaptation experts and practitioners at dif-
ferent levels of government. In applying select methods offered by the 
Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD), the key goal 
is to better understand how contested views of risk and vulnerability 
shape the implementation of adaptation policies in Ghana. Here, the 
four adaptation policy scenarios will serve as analytical points of ref-
erence to map the linkages between different normative visions of ad-
aptation and expert perceptions of risk. 
In the fourth chapter, the empirical findings of the discourse analysis 
will be tested against the background of a structured risk assessment 
to illuminate the differences as well as the similarities between mana-
gerial discourses of risk and observed local vulnerabilities. Assuming 
that discourses about adaptation and risk do not readily translate into 
material and policy outcomes, the primary goal of the fourth chapter 
is to better understand the role of institutions as mediating factors be-
tween climate-related hazards and human well-being. 
To this end, a quantitative risk analysis (n=484 HH) in both, rural and 
urban areas of the Vea Catchment has been combined with qualitative 
research tools. The overall selection of field sites allowed for a direct 
comparison between different farming and irrigation practices as well 
as between small-scale subsistence farmers, commercial farmers, and 
non-farm households.7 Moreover, since the portfolio of livelihood ac-
tivities in the research area has become moderately diverse over time, 
it was possible to analyze risk distribution, both spatially and socially, 
among rural and urban populations with diversified sources of in-
come. The following field sites in the Vea Catchment have been visited: 
Vea-Gunga, Zaare Amoabisi, Namoo-Akunka and Yikene Adohbisi 
                                                          
7 Occasionally, subsistence farmers in the area are also called sub-subsistence farmers, as 
their farm produce is largely insufficient to sustain a family throughout the year. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
14                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
(rural); Bolgatanga-Sawaaba and Bolgatanga-Damweo (urban); as well 
as the Vea irrigation project (rural, commercial farming). 
The fifth chapter then compares the study findings to the four institu-
tional pathway scenarios of (1) adjustment, (2) reform, (3) transfor-
mation, and (4) business-as-usual. 
 
 Figure 1. Methodology  
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    CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The introductory chapter presents the natural science base for cli-
mate-related research in Ghana. It also illustrates how adaptation 
policy has developed historically in the country and describes the 
organizational architecture that is related to this cross-cutting policy 
domain. Proceeding from the basic assumption that contested narra-
tives about nature-society relations, modernity and risk implicate 
different models of human development under climate change, the 
chapter offers an introduction of key concepts such as adaptation, 
disaster risk management and vulnerability. The chapter concludes 
by reviewing the most pertinent criticisms of the adaptation concept 
that are currently discussed in the interdisciplinary literature on cli-
mate change adaptation and development. 
 
 
Research Background 
his study is carried out as part of the West African Science Service 
Center on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use (WASCAL).      
WASCAL is a regional international organization under the Economic 
Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and partially funded 
by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). 
Since 2012, the organization is exploring new pathways to enhance the       
adaptiveness of human and environmental systems in West Africa 
against the backdrop of climate change and increased variability. 
WASCAL is organized around three main components: the Compe-
tence Center for climate-related information and research services in 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, the Core Research Program, and the 
Graduate Studies Program.  
Ten West African countries and various German and African research 
institutions cooperate in the WASCAL framework, including the Cen-
ter for Development Research (ZEF) in Bonn, Germany. 
T 
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Map 1. WASCAL Partner Countries 
 
Source: WASCAL Project 
The main WASCAL research area is the Sudanian savanna belt of West 
Africa, which is seen as the "potential breadbasket" of the region (WAS-
CAL 2012). Under Work Package 4.4. of the WASCAL Core Research 
Program (Politics of Adaptation), the study explores the political and    
institutional aspects of climate change adaptation in Ghana. 
 
Map 2. WASCAL Research Area in the West Sudanian savanna belt  
•  Benin 
•  Burkina Faso 
•  Côte d‘Ivoire 
•  Gambia 
•  Ghana  
•  Mali 
•  Niger 
•  Nigeria 
•  Sénégal 
•  Togo 
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Climate Change in Ghana:   
The Natural Science Base 
Ghana is a unitary democratic republic located in West Africa, between 
latitudes 4.5°N and 11.5°N and longitude 3.5°W and 1.3°E (GoG 2011). 
The country is divided into three major climatic zones: the West Suda-
nian savanna belt in the northern part of the country; the tropical forest 
zone in the south-west; and the Accra planes that lie in the coastal areas 
of the south. The research area in the northeast is characterized by an 
unimodal climate with a rainy season that runs from May to October, 
and a long dry season for the rest of the year, with hardly any rainfall 
(Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly 2010, GoG 2011). Precipitation pat-
terns during the rainy season are often erratic and therefore hardly pre-
dictable, whereas the dry season brings strong 'harmattan' trade 
winds.  
Empirical evidence for climate change in Ghana is commonly related 
to rising temperatures and increases in climate variability. While avail-
able statistical data show no clear signs of a long-term shift in precipi-
tation patterns or the onset of the rainy season, there is evidence to 
suggest that dry spells during the rainy season have increased (Riede 
et al. 2016). Extreme weather events such as storm surges, heavy rain-
fall and flooding also occur regularly in the country. However, these 
extreme events are not easily attributable to long-term climate change 
and may well be related to climatic variability (Dietz et al. 2004, Arku 
2012, p. 353). There is, for example, no clear indication that extreme 
rainfall events in Ghana have either increased or decreased since the 
1960s, and climate change projections, especially for future precipita-
tion, remain highly uncertain (Stanturf et al. 2011, p. 1-2). 
Nevertheless, there is still ample evidence to suggest that climate 
change has already become a reality in Ghana, as historical data for the 
period from 1960-2000 indicate "a progressive and discernible rise in 
temperature " (EPA 2007, p. 5).  
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More specifically, it can be said that the mean annual temperature in 
the West Sudanian savanna zone of Ghana increased from 28.1ºC in 
the year 1960 to 29.0ºC in the year 2000 (GoG 2011, p. 121, World Bank 
2011, p. 4). Future climate scenarios based on historical weather data 
confirm these trends and predict a continuous rise in temperature with 
an average increase of 0.6ºC, 2.0ºC and 3.9ºC by the year 2020, 2050 and 
2080 respectively (EPA 2007, p. 5). This is more than 1½ times the 
global average rate (Tachie-Obeng et al. 2010, p. 2). At the same time, 
an average decline in rainfall of 2.8 percent by 2020, 10.9 percent by 
2050 and 18.6 percent by 2080 is predicted for all agroecological zones 
of the country (EPA 2007, p. 6). Regarding the decline in rainfall there 
are, however, some caveats. A general decline in rainfall has been re-
ported throughout West Africa over the past 50 years and may, in the 
long term, be attributable to a southward shift in the seasonal migra-
tion of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (Weldeab et al. 2007, 
Owusu and Waylen 2009).  
Bearing in mind the scarcity of data for future climate scenarios, it can 
be concluded that changes in the intra-seasonal variability of rainfall 
will have the most severe impact on peoples’ livelihoods and food se-
curity, for they negatively affect the production of both cash and staple 
crops (Yaro 2013a). Moreover, while meteorological data for the region 
confirm that dry spells are becoming more frequent and intense during 
the planting season, it is important to keep in mind that a simplistic 
relationship between environmental factors and human vulnerability 
should not be assumed. A close investigation of the complex interplay 
between environmental, political, social, institutional, cultural, techno-
logical, and economic root causes of vulnerability is therefore required 
to assess individual adaptation needs. The following section paves the 
way for such an integrated assessment by providing an overview of 
the historical development of climate change adaptation policy in 
Ghana, and by charting the organizational architecture that is related 
to this cross-cutting policy domain. 
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A Brief Political History of Climate                   
Change Adaptation in Ghana:                   
As a result of Ghana’s long-standing involvement in the international 
climate regime, dating back to the ratification of the UNFCCC in Sep-
tember 1995, awareness for climate change has been gradually rising 
among Ghanaian decision makers at all administrative levels and 
across sectors. The empirical findings of the study support this overall 
trend based on the personal statements of nearly fifty scientists, devel-
opment specialists, government professionals and opinion leaders 
who unequivocally agreed to the fact that climate change has already 
become a reality in Ghana. All of the interviewees, young urban pro-
fessionals as well as village elders in rural areas, noticed an observable 
change in precipitation during the rainy season. 
Depending on the individual case, there are certainly reasons for doubt 
with respect to these perceptions, mostly because of the ways in which 
international development discourses are adopted into local political 
contexts and filled with new meanings (see Eguavoen et al. 2015, Egua-
voen and Schraven 2013, p. 214). Yet these broad statements about cli-
mate change are at least indicative of the fact that the relationship be-
tween human well-being and the environment is a common topic in a 
country that is located in one of the harshest and most complex climatic 
regions of the world. In particular, the northern savanna zone of Ghana 
is characterized by high climatic variability, high levels of poverty and 
population growth, as well as low levels of food and nutrition security 
(Armah et al. 2011).  
Overall, more than 80 percent of the disasters occurring in Ghana are 
considered to be climate-related, while many households depend on 
rainfed agriculture for their livelihoods (NCCP 2013, p. 31). These en-
vironmental trends and conditions present a considerable challenge 
for the economy as well as for human well-being and social service de-
20   CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
livery. However, it has to be considered that these severe weather con-
ditions are not new to West Africa, or to Ghana in particular. Farmers 
are traditionally experts in livelihood adaptation and possess a de-
tailed knowledge about changes in environmental conditions such as 
rainfall patterns, recurring drought periods, and soil quality. What is 
indeed new is that the adaptive capacities of agricultural households 
are largely insufficient to withstand the shocks that result from the 
strong convergence of increasing socioeconomic, institutional and en-
vironmental pressures (Yaro 2010). As a result, farm households have 
little options for income diversification and struggle with food and 
livelihood insecurity as they are often forced to use most of their pro-
ductive assets during the lean season (Nkegbe and Kuunibe 2014).  
In view of these challenges, it is clear that the driving force behind 
the growing political interest in climate change issues is to increase 
the security and well-being of the populace and to attract additional 
funding to finance Ghana’s adaptation and development needs. In 
the period from 1995 to 2010 the country received a total amount of 
240 million US $ for climate change related activities, of which 28.5 
million were allocated for adaptation, and 126.4 million for low 
carbon growth (Würtenberger et al. 2011, p. 13). Still, climate change 
remains a formidable challenge for Ghana’s predominantly agrarian 
economy. It is a strongly held belief among administrative authorities 
and politicians that climate change may jeopardize food security as 
well as development gains in climate-sensitive sectors such as cocoa 
production, tourism, forestry, and hydro-electric power generation 
(EPA 2007). It is also widely recognized that climate change threatens 
to propel internal migration to urban centers, increase health risks, 
and place additional pressures on institutions and resources. Further-
more, it is expected that additional expenditures for disrupted value 
chains, emergency relief and post-disaster rehabilitation will sig-
nificantly reduce the potential for economic growth and the funds 
available for poverty reduction or environmental rehabilitation. 
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Therefore, to improve environmental governance and natural resource 
management, and to facilitate organizational reforms as well as capac-
ity building, the Government of Ghana (GoG) cooperated with inter-
national development partners such as the World Bank to establish the 
Natural Resources and Environmental Governance (NREG) program in 
2008. NREG serves as a mechanism for technical assistance and multi-
donor budget support in the natural resources and environment sector. 
The Ghanaian government supervises the implementation of the pro-
gram and controls the release of funds to the responsible sector agen-
cies. Higher-level oversight of the NREG program is entrusted to the 
Environmental and Natural Resources Advisory Council (ENRAC) 
that meets under the chairmanship of the Vice President of the Repub-
lic of Ghana. Furthermore, the Ghana Environmental Conventions Co-
ordinating Authority (GECCA) has been established as a coordinating 
entity for activities that are carried out under the three Rio Conven-
tions (UNFCCC, UNCCD, CBD) and other multilateral environmen-
tal agreements. 
The two main organizations responsible for the development and 
monitoring of climate change policies in Ghana are the Ministry of En-
vironment, Science, Technology and Innovation (MESTI) and its subsidiary 
body, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). According to its 
mandate, the MESTI also collaborates with several other institutions8
to ensure that climate change is mainstreamed into all facets of devel-
opment planning, as outlined in the Medium-Term National Develop-
ment Policy Framework, Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda 
2010-2013 (GSGDA I 2010). This important policy document frames cli-
mate change primarily as an issue of development. It also underlines 
8 These institutions include the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP), 
the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), the Ministry of Local Gov-
ernment, Rural Development and Environment (MLGRDE), the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MOFA), the Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMet), the National Disaster 
Management Organization (NADMO), the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 
and the Ministry of Health, among others. 
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the need to harmonize policies across sectors in order to reduce cli-
mate-related risks and build resilience. Furthermore, guidelines for the 
Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) have been 
released by the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC 
2013) to coordinate the implementation of the Ghana Shared Growth 
and Development Agenda until 2017 (GSGDA II 2014). 
The political process of developing a climate change policy framework 
for Ghana began in 2008, when the MESTI established the National  
Climate Change Committee (NCCC). One year later, in 2009, the min-
istry started an inofficial stakeholder consultation for the creation of a 
National Climate Change Policy (NCCP). The main outcome of this con-
sultation was the Ghana Goes for Green Growth (2010) document that of-
ficially set the stage for the climate change policy process. Ghana Goes 
for Green Growth was the result of numerous meetings between aca-
demic consultants, the donor and business communities, civil society 
organizations, the media, traditional as well as religious leaders, and a 
gender group. After the document was finally released in November 
2010, another series of consultations, meetings and workshops started, 
this time with the explicit goal to develop a national climate change 
policy framework under the mandate of the NCCC. The institutions 
and people (several thousand) who were involved in these consulta-
tions included the staff and management of the MESTI as well as other 
related public sector MDAs (Ministries, Departments and Agencies). 
Involved in the consultative process were, again, also the media, civil 
society groups and community-based organizations, the National 
House of Chiefs, the private sector and the donor community, interna-
tional and faith-based organizations in Ghana, as well as academic in-
stitutions and the Ghanaian parliament. The Ghana Goes for Green 
Growth document can thus be seen as a political 'trial balloon' to initiate 
an inclusive public debate on the new climate policy. When the official 
NCCP consultation process finally came to an end, academic consult-
ants at the University of Ghana pulled together the comments that had 
been made at various meetings, and issued the zero draft of the NCCP 
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for validation in 2012. The final version of the policy was officially 
launched in July 2014. It prioritizes five programme areas:  
Policy Area 1 Agriculture and Food Security 
Policy Area 2 Disaster Preparedness and Response 
Policy Area 3 Natural Resource Management 
Policy Area 4 Equitable Social Development 
Policy Area 5 Energy, Industrial and Infrastructural Development 
Besides the NCCP process, efforts were also made on behalf of the gov-
ernment to mainstream climate change adaptation into development 
and disaster management plans, and to build organizational and tech-
nical capacities for the implementation of national adaptation actions. 
Prior to the development of the NCCP in 2006, the EPA initiated a na-
tional adaptation policy process as part of the Netherlands Climate As-
sistance Project (NCAP). This process resulted in the release of the Na-
tional Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) in 2010. The adapta-
tion policy process was also financially supported by the Danish gov-
ernment through the Climate Change and Development Programme – 
Adapting by Reducing Vulnerability (CC-DARE). From 2009-2010, the 
CC-DARE initiative was jointly implemented by the Ghanaian govern-
ment, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). An official guide-
book on 'integrating climate change and disaster risk into national develop-
ment, policies and planning' has been issued by CC-DARE in 2010. Gov-
ernment activities in the field of disaster management also include the 
preparation of Disaster Management Plans at the national, regional 
and district levels (GFDRR 2009). Moreover, in response to the United 
Nations recommendations under the Hyogo Framework for Action, 
the National Disaster Management Organization of Ghana (NADMO) 
established a national, and several subnational platforms for disaster 
risk management (DRM). These platforms are comprised of govern-
ment officials, staff members of international organizations as well as 
representatives from academia and the private sector. Their official 
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mandate is to implement disaster management policies with the sup-
port of Technical Advisory Committees for the identification, monitor-
ing and assessment of hazards. In reality, however, the institutional 
capacity of NADMO to forecast and monitor hazards and to provide 
mechanisms for preparedness, early warning and early response is 
limited at all levels. Especially the devastating flood events that hit the 
northern part of Ghana in 2007 and 2009 have revealed considerable 
problems with respect to the coordination of disaster management, 
disaster relief efforts and capacity/vulnerability assessments. Hence 
joint training programs were carried out by NADMO and the EPA in 
2010. The goal was to build the capacity of MMDAs with regard to dis-
aster risk reduction and the mainstreaming of climate change adapta-
tion. This was done in the areas of budgeting, planning and designing 
of structural works as well as implementation. However, the findings 
presented in this study confirm that there are still serious challenges 
regarding insufficient institutional capacities for disaster risk manage-
ment that warrant further attention. 
In summary, the table below outlines the historical process that led to 
the establishment of the NCCP in 2013, and highlights the most im-
portant policy initiatives with regard of climate change adaptation and 
disaster risk management to date.  
Table 1. Historical Outline of Adaptation Policy Processes in Ghana 
1995 Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) 
2000 Ghana’s First National Communication to the UNFCCC 
2003  Netherlands Climate Assistance Programme (NCAP) Ghana – Phase I 
and II: in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the National Development Planning Commission (until 2008)  
2008 
 
 
Creation of the National Climate Change Committee by the Ministry  
of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation (MESTI) 
Start of the Natural Resources and Environmental Governance (NREG) 
sector budget support mechanism (ongoing) 
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2008 To support the NREG process, the civil society support mechanism 
Kasa ("speak out" in Twi) is instituted (ongoing) 
2009  
 
First round of (inofficial) stakeholder consultations on climate change 
policy initiated by the MESTI; strong involvement of the University of 
Ghana in the consultation process 
Joint initiative by UNEP, UNDP and the Danish Government in           
cooperation with the EPA: Climate Change and Development –         
Adapting by Reducing Vulnerability (CC-DARE) (until 2010) 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CARE International Ghana starts implementing the Adaptation Learn-
ing Programme for Africa (ALP) in cooperation with local civil society 
partners and government institutions. The programme is financially 
supported by the UK, Finland, Austria, and Denmark (ongoing) 
UNDP Ghana starts implementing the Africa Adaptation Programme 
(AAP): "Developing capacity and financing options for mainstreaming 
climate change adaptation in Ghana, with a focus on early-warning 
systems" (until 2012) 
National Climate Change Committee is officially mandated to initiate  
a process for the development of a National Climate Change Policy 
(NCCP) 
Finalization of the "Ghana goes for Green Growth" document as a      
basis for further debate 
Second round of stakeholder consultations for the development             
of the NCCP  
Final version of the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 
(NCCAS) released by CC-DARE and the EPA 
Official Guidebook on Integrating Climate Change and Disaster Risk 
Reduction into National Development, Policies and Planning in Ghana 
released by CC-DARE, the EPA, the NDPC and NADMO 
2011 Ghana’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC 
2012 Circulation of the NCCP (Zero Draft) for finalization and subsequent 
ratification by the parliament   
2013 Completion of the NCCP document  
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With the release of the NCCP and in light of the high-level political 
support it received, Ghana has now made considerable headway in 
promoting adaptation domestically. However, it is still questionable 
whether the political momentum that has been generated through the 
release of the NCCP in 2014 can be sustained in the long term. For the 
NCCP to become more than an act of symbolic politics requires strong 
political leadership and enabling institutional structures for decentral-
ized implementation efforts in the five main policy areas. However, it 
is precisely in this area where policy analysts have so far painted a ra-
ther unflattering picture. Cameron (2011, p. 22), for instance, refers to 
adaptation policy in Ghana as an "externally driven agenda" that lacks 
real political ownership. Conversely, Sarpong and Anyidoho (2012, p. 
9) perceive this external influence as the result of low research capacity, 
especially  
related to adaptation strategies, because domestic climate change     
actors (…) do not have the expertise and funds or (in the case of the 
government, the commitment) to produce relevant and usable know-
ledge. 
Thus, the crucial question that needs to be raised is whether the release 
of the NCCP will change these dynamics and facilitate the local imple-
mentation of adaptation actions. At least with regard to the provision 
of 'relevant and usable knowledge' such an assumption would cer-
tainly be premature, as the NCCP merely provides a broad summary 
of existing scientific knowledge and is meant to serve as a roadmap for 
policy coordination in the five main policy areas. However, the imple-
mentation of particular adaptation actions requires highly specialized 
knowledge as well as technical coordination and expertise at the sub-
national level. As I will illustrate in this study, there are still reasons 
for concern in both of these areas. With respect to political will and 
agenda ownership, the overall picture is rather mixed as well. At the 
level of national party politics there is still an observable lack of politi-
cal determination and domestic pressure from constituencies to take 
climate change issues more seriously. So far, the NCCC has not been 
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able to champion climate change publicly, and to serve as a policy hub 
for climate change-related issues in Ghana.  
Overall, the reasons for this political neglect of climate change adapta-
tion are likely to be found in the dynamics of the international climate 
negotiations. There is a clear sense of political disillusionment among 
African negotiators concerning the UNFCCC mantra of 'common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (Article 3). 
Considering the scale of the challenge ahead, it is evident that decisive 
climate change action requires adequate financing and that adaptation 
will be costly.  
However, most African countries, including Ghana, have thus far con-
tributed very little to causing climate change, and yet they have to bear 
the brunt of the burden. As a result, there have been repeated attempts 
by African policy makers and activists to push industrialized countries 
to honor their commitments under the UNFCCC, financial and other-
wise. This means holding industrialized countries accountable for cap-
italizing funding schemes that have thus far remained largely under-
funded, for example the Least-Developed Countries Fund, the Adap-
tation Fund, and to some extent, the Green Climate Fund as well.  
Overall, the release of much-needed adaptation money is slow, domes-
tic absorption capacities in Africa are generally low, and available ad-
aptation funds are pathetically insufficient to meet the complex chal-
lenges faced by African countries. This situation has led to considera-
ble irritations among African policy makers about arduous interna-
tional reporting tasks as well as restrictive accreditation and eligibility 
criteria (Afful-Koomson 2015, p. 375). Within the Ghanaian admin-
istration, it has supposedly even prompted remarks about "mirage 
money" (Cameron 2011, p. 9). Following this line of thought, it is intu-
itive to assume that symptoms such as the lack of political ownership, 
the slow pace of implementation, and the dominance of international 
donors in the field of adaptation policy are directly related to funding 
concerns. Paradoxically, however, it has been demonstrated that pro-
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longed inaction on climate change will result in even greater adapta-
tion costs in the foreseeable future (UNEP 2013, p. 32). Yet public pres-
sure to act on climate change adaptation and mitigation is gradually 
rising in Ghana due to the establishment of the so-called 'Kasa' civil 
society support mechanism under the umbrella of NREG in 2008, and 
as a result of the increased coverage of climate-related issues in the na-
tional news media. Knowledge networks such as the Ghana Climate 
Adaptation Network (G-CAN) and the Sustainable Forestry Manage-
ment Partners of Ghana also contribute to the public agenda-setting 
process, for instance by acting as knowledge brokers between smaller 
and more locally oriented civil society organizations and the state ad-
ministration. Another important role in the public agenda-setting pro-
cess can be attributed to faith-based organizations and customary au-
thorities. Golo and Yaro (2013, p. 282) remark that religious leadership 
is crucial for the implementation of environmental policy in a "de-
voutly religious" country such as Ghana.  
Participatory research in the context of civil society stakeholder meet-
ings prior to the establishment of the NCCP also confirms that – in ad-
dition to academic consultants – donor organizations and develop-
ment agencies such as the World Bank, the United Nations as well as 
CARE International Ghana and Friends of the Earth exert significant 
political influence in the newly emerging Ghanaian adaptation arena, 
particularly with regard to the agenda-setting process at the national 
level of policy making.  
As a starting point for further analysis, the diagram below presents an 
overview of the organizational architecture of climate change adapta-
tion and disaster risk management in Ghana (Figure 1). Based on in-
formation gathered from field research and multiple stakeholder inter-
views that took place from July 2012 until April 2013, it depicts a selec-
tion of institutions that shape human adaptiveness and are deemed to 
be particularly relevant for the implementation of adaptation actions 
and possible future NAPAs (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) 
under the umbrella of the UNFCCC.  
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Figure 2. Organizational Archictecture of Climate Change Adaptation 
and Disaster Risk Reduction in Ghana 
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Climate Change Adaptation as Adjustment, 
Reform and Transformation 
In his seminal work on the economics of climate change, Sir Nicholas 
Stern writes: "Over the next thirty years, substantial climate change is 
already inevitable, since mitigation will have only a minor effect on 
stocks of greenhouse gases in this time frame" (Stern 2006, p. 6). In line 
with this argument, the concept of climate change adaptation is based 
on the recognition that societies will have to respond to the inevitable 
outcomes of anthropogenic climate change, no matter how efficient 
mitigation attempts may be. The inevitability of adaptation is also re-
iterated in the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC’s Working Group 
II, which concludes that "[h]uman and natural systems have a capacity 
to cope with adverse circumstances but, with continuing climate 
change, adaptation will be needed to maintain this capacity" (IPCC 
2014b, p. 838). Given the fact that the adverse effects of climate change 
are already tangible in Ghana, and considering that the negative im-
pacts on water availability, public health and agricultural production 
are predicted to increase in the coming decades, there is little doubt 
that additional adaptation efforts will be required if current develop-
ment goals are not to be jeopardized (IPCC 2014b, p. 75). The following 
sections in this introductory chapter will therefore engage with the sci-
entific repercussions of these very practical challenges. The overall aim 
is to closely review the main ideas behind academic debates in social 
science-related research on adaptation, and to clearly explain im-
portant analytical concepts that revolve around the crucial questions 
of 'how' 'we' should adapt, and 'to what' exactly. 
Initially, a case can be made for the fact that humankind has been 
adapting to a changing climate since the dawn of the species. Similarly, 
it can be emphasized that a wealth of cultural knowledge(s) about       
incremental adaptations exists locally, and that this extensive body of 
indigenous, local, and traditional wisdom must be considered "a major 
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resource for adapting to climate change" (IPCC 2014b, p. 87). What is 
novel about the problem of anthropogenic climate change, however, is 
that current and expected changes in climatic conditions are the direct 
result of human interference with the biosphere, and that these 
changes coalesce with unequally distributed social risks such as pov-
erty and persistent social inequalities. In other words, it is precisely the 
unprecedented combination of social and ecological factors that leads 
to a situation in which the adaptiveness of particular groups, individ-
uals and societies is frequently exceeded. This means that the many 
hardships people face due to particular extreme events such as pro-
longed dry spells or erratic rainfall are never exclusively attributable 
to biogeochemical processes. They result from a complex interplay of 
cultural, social, political, economic and technological factors that make 
individuals and complex social-ecological systems (SES) particularly sus-
ceptible to multiple stressors. Thus, given the substantive overlap in 
recent debates about climate change adaptation and sustainable devel-
opment, it is neither possible nor desirable to clearly separate the re-
lated discourses (see Ayers and Dodman 2010).  
Furthermore, it is clear that synergies between adaptation and devel-
opment policies are not automatically realized, and that further inte-
grative efforts are required. In practice, adaptation is closely connected 
to institutional processes in the areas of disaster risk management, ag-
ricultural policy and natural resource management, while, simultane-
ously, adaptation has become a relevant topic for coastal protection, 
energy production, as well as public health and social protection. This 
interdisciplinary outlook of adaptation as a relatively new field of re-
search and a cross-cutting policy domain is increasingly reflected in 
the social science-related literature. Climate change adaptation is now 
a fast-growing research domain that connects scholars with an interest 
in, for example, development studies, geography, sociology, anthro-
pology, sustainability science, (political) ecology, risk and hazards re-
search as well as urban planning, environmental law, cultural studies, 
and economics. However, research on climate change adaptation is not 
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only a complex endeavor because of the interdisciplinary nature of the 
problems at hand. It is also exceedingly challenging due to the fact that 
climate change itself can be characterized as a wicked problem. The term 
"wicked problem" was popularized by Rittel and Webber (1973) and 
has been applied to describe complex interactions in coupled SES (Fitz-
Gibbon and Mensah 2012, p. 2). Broadly speaking, wicked problems 
defy resolution because they are "ill-formulated, involve uncertainty 
as well as confusing information (…) and promise ramifications for the 
whole system" (or society) under investigation (Ferkany and Whyte 
2012, p. 421). Wicked problems are moreover characterized by enor-
mous circularities, interdependencies and conflicting norms, values, 
and stakeholder interests (Lazarus 2009, p. 1160). As a consequence, 
wicked problems cannot simply be defined and solved in sequential 
steps by different groups of specialists. Instead, each attempt to ad-
dress a particular subset of the overall problem complex may result in 
cascading effects, new uncertainties, or failures. In the context of an-
thropogenic climate change, Levin et al. (2012) have gone one step fur-
ther and suggested to define climate change as a "super wicked" prob-
lem. Super wicked problems display the same features as wicked prob-
lems, although they are characterized by four additional challenges: (1) 
time is running out, (2) those who cause the problem also seek to pro-
vide a solution, (3) the central authority needed to address the problem 
is weak or non-existent, and (4) policy responses discount the future 
irrationally (Levin et al. 2012). This characterization of super wicked 
problems also closely matches the features of so-called post-normal sci-
ence, where "facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and de-
cisions urgent" (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, p. 86). 
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, post-normal or super 
wicked problems often result from human interferences with the 
planet’s ecosystems, and forcefully converge with the challenges 
posed by multidimensional inequalities and vulnerabilities. In the 
wake of the global "risk society" (Beck 2009), and due to the simultane-
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ous occurrence of multiple interdependent crises, a new type of lan-
guage has entered academic debates. Discourses about risk have now 
engrossed our collective imagination against the backdrop of an ad-
vanced modernity that, through its own successes in the fields of         
science and technology, has created largely unprecedented threats 
(WBGU 2011, World Economic Forum 2012, University of Oslo 2013, 
IPCC 2014b). Ulrich Beck comments: 
A core contradiction in contemporary society is the fact that advanced 
modernity, with the aid of its scientific instruments and its mass me-
diated communication, is forced to accord highest priority to the 
mega-threats it itself has generated, although it is clear that it lacks 
the necessary concepts to observe or impute, let alone "manage", them 
adequately – at any rate, not as long as the institutional status quo is 
absolutized and held constant in an ahistorical manner (Beck 2009, p. 
8). 
 
The fragile equilibrium of current world affairs is therefore increas-
ingly characterized by cultural-cognitive hybridity. Global politics has 
moved, as the late James Rosenau famously put it, beyond the disen-
chanting impetus of "late" or "post" modernity into an emergent epoch 
of fragmegration (Rosenau 2003, p. 11). Although fragmegration may 
sound cumbersome as an analytical term, it aptly describes the simul-
taneous dynamics of globalization, centralization and integration on 
the one hand, and localization, decentralization and fragmentation on 
the other, which mark the contested political terrain of 'nature-culture' 
relations at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
But what comes after the bold proclamation of the age of risk, we may 
ask? And what follows after the great postmodern onslaught in the 
fields of social theory and philosophy, especially with regard to the 
necessary re-conceptualization of nature-culture relations in the face of 
anthropogenic environmental change?  
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After postmodern theory has gone to great lengths to deconstruct the 
shaky ideological foundations of western modernity, Enlightenment 
rationality, developmentalism and cultural essentialism, it seems as if 
social theory has once again been struck by inertia. While public de-
bates about transformations in the face of the ecological crisis are still 
focused on the grand narratives of ecological modernization and 
techno-scientific progress, there is a tangible sense of pessimism 
among many critical social theorists concerning the human ability to 
steer or even shape the large-scale societal transformations that will be 
required in the face of climate change (Brooks et al. 2009, Jänicke 2012). 
In fact, grand narratives of social transformation and modernization 
are usually met with a profound disdain by many social theorists, as 
they are seen to represent a neocolonial program of territorialization 
(i.e., the transformation of territories through capitalist development) 
and "cultural imperialism" rooted in Western values or interests (see 
Said 1994, Mbembe 2003, p. 25-26). 
Yet some readers may be doubtful at this point and ask why we should 
consider such a negative view of modernization at all when we talk 
about climate change adaptation in Ghana? Are the most pressing so-
cioeconomic problems – for example poverty and a lack of infrastruc-
tural development – not the exact opposite of what is commonly con-
sidered to be modern? As James Ferguson writes in response to the 
claim that there exists a specifically 'African' modernity: "Many ordi-
nary Africans might scratch their heads at such a claim. As they exam-
ine the decaying infrastructures, non-functioning institutions, and hor-
rific poverty that surround them, they may be more likely to find their 
situation deplorably non-modern" (Ferguson 2006, p. 185). However, a 
cultural critique of modernization in the everyday sense of the term, 
namely as western-style capitalist development, is only part of what 
the concept of modernity implies and how it can be used analytically. 
At first, let me point to the fact that amidst the 'fragmegrative' dynam-
ics of modernity, there is still a concomitance of nonsynchronisms, 
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epitomized by the tópos of the colony. Multiple and contested moder-
nities co-exist in a nonsynchronous fashion and continue to create new 
and metamorphous social spaces. In an African and, more specifically, 
a Ghanaian context, these hybrid cultural phenomena are often de-
scribed through simplified dichotomies: deficiency vs. progress, the 
center vs. the periphery, and simultaneously, the modern vs. the tradi-
tional (i.e. the 'not yet modern') (see Andreasson 2005, Enwezor 2010). 
Contrary to these limiting dichotomies, however, Ernst Bloch (1977, p. 
22) conceives of the nonsynchronous manifestations of modernity in a 
deeper sense when he writes: "Not all people exist in the same now."9  
This is precisely the point where the concept of modernity can help us 
to better understand the hybridity and contested nature of frag-
megrated sociocultural processes which, all too often, seem to be 'out 
of tune'. Today, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is 
spreading even in the most remote rural areas of Ghana, while poverty 
continues to persist in the same places. Meanwhile, "neoliberal" glob-
alization is gradually changing traditional institutions in the northern 
savanna zone, far away from the commercial centers of Accra and Ku-
masi (Yaro 2013b, p. 411). As 'Western' scholars working on climate 
change adaptation, we are therefore – perhaps more than ever – com-
pelled to thoroughly reflect on our own colonial gaze.10 Is it is not im-
portant, we may ask, to question our own paradigms and the ways in 
which the "North American and European PhD student (…) is condi-
tioned and 'professionalized' to then be sent out in 'the field', armed 
with her knowledge, her theory, her method"? (Andreasson 2005, p. 
983). In other words, are culturally simplistic and deficit-centered ap-
proaches to the study of climate change adaptation in the global South 
                                                          
9 In the German original, the concept of nonsynchronism translates into die Ungleich-
zeitigkeit des Gleichzeitigen. 
10 The notion of the colonial gaze refers to the rationalizing, ordering view of the colo-
nizer. The colonized space is seen as essentially 'empty', while the subjects of coloni-
zation are seen as inferior, helpless, and ready for domination (that is, if they do not 
gently disappear into the backdrop of 'nature') (see Nelson 2011, p. 165). 
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not ultimately contributing to the creation of neocolonial subjects at risk, 
mainly characterized by deficits, pathologies and vulnerabilities?  
There are certainly no simple answers to these fundamental epistemo-
logical questions, since most western scientists would probably be 
hard-pressed to give an 'objective' (or unmediated) account of their 
own hybridized culture and knowledge base. However, one possible 
answer to this predicament of sociologists in their role as "professional 
strangers" (Albrecht 1991, p. 285) may be found in the following ex-
cerpt from a speech by the former German President Horst Köhler, ti-
tled "On the impossibility of speaking of Africa". In his speech, Köhler 
asked:  
[A]re we really able to escape our Eurocentric paradigms? Our defi-
nition of Africa can only ever be partial, our interpretation of Africa 
can only ever be distorted, and we have no alternative but to 
acknowledge that our image of Africa says more about us than it does 
about Africa itself. (…) [T]here is an African proverb: 'Beware of the 
naked man who offers you clothes.' And my goodness, we Europeans 
are naked, with our double standards and our comfortable hypocrisy 
vis-à-vis our past and present contribution to Africa’s problems. It is 
high time we regained our credibility. (…) 
What I would like, therefore, is for us to acknowledge the distortion 
in the way the West sees things. To be shaken in our prejudices. Not 
to apply our own yardstick as universal measurement. To learn to un-
derstand Africa in its own context. To turn the irritation and friction 
that entails into a constructive force. To listen, and to listen over and 
over again. And: to put some clothes on (BMBF 2014, pp. 26-31).  
What this reflexive speech could possibly imply is that faithfully rep-
resenting a 'Ghanaian' modernity means to focus on its inclusive and 
exclusive currents as well as its contested nature. 'Authentic' represen-
tation to the extent possible, that is, from an openly contingent per-
spective, thus means to acknowledge the repercussions of the colonial 
past and – at the same time – reflect on the particularities of contem-
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porary Ghanaian life with all its cultural diversity and its inherent con-
tradictions of poverty and affluence. In other words, thinking of pre-
sent-day Ghana without considering colonial legacies is in itself an im-
possibility. However, I argue that as social scientists we must nonethe-
less caution against the tendency to reduce our scholarly field of vision 
to a new, postmodern gaze which seeks to implicitly trace all of the ex-
isting inconsistencies in contemporary Ghanaian society back to exter-
nal interventions or (neo)colonial entanglements. Even if such an ap-
proach may be justified in many (if not most) cases, it should not be-
come the sole analytical lens of social scientific inquiry. 
For example, the case of the Vea dam shows that detrimental outcomes 
of infrastructural adjustment projects cannot simply be reduced to 
Western neocolonialism or developmentalism. The open letter that 
was published by the 'Youth of Vea' in the aftermath of the tragic death 
of Gideon Aniah shows that the intervention as such was not at the 
heart of the dispute. Interestingly, the letter explicitly frames the inter-
vention against the backdrop of progress and stagnation. To be precise, 
it accuses the local law enforcement authorities of portraying the peo-
ple of Vea in a negative light, namely "as a people who are against de-
velopment", while simultaneously pointing to the tendency to "satisfy 
individual selfish interest in the name of development" (Ghana Web 
2013, n. pag.). 
It can thus be said that the overall goal of socioeconomic and infra-
structural improvement was not the main issue of contestation. Of far 
greater importance was the way in which the concept of development 
and notions of traditional culture had been politicized and instrumen-
talized during implementation. Therefore, it is an important task for 
research on climate change adaptation in Ghana to better understand 
the hierarchical nature of institutional settings in which adaptive tra-
jectories unfold. Wise et al. (2014, p. 331) indirectly point to the deci-
sion-related dimension of this analytical gap by noting that 
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… in many cases and particularly in developed-country contexts, re-
search and planning efforts to support adaptation have adopted ap-
proaches based on the assumption that a clearly identifiable rational 
decision maker exists with the mandate to make decisions. 
In other words, to avoid taking risky implementation decisions in the 
future it needs to be explored how norms, discourses and power rela-
tions jointly contribute to the social production of risk. A good starting 
point from which to broach this complex question is to adopt a descrip-
tive reading of climate change adaptation. Instead of simply comparing 
empirical results to normative benchmarks for 'successful' adaptation, 
it has to be considered how adaptation is defined by relevant organi-
zations and groups. To do so, it is necessary to determine how various 
adaptation approaches can be classified and compared according to 
the underlying norms and values which govern them. At first, I will 
engage with this problem by introducing three heuristic categories of 
adaptation that are currently discussed in the interdisciplinary litera-
ture on climate change adaptation and development. Broadly speak-
ing, these categories form the normative bedrock of contemporary 
thinking on what it means to 'successfully' adapt.  
Overall, I distinguish between the following three categories: (1) 'ad-
justment' adaptation (also known as 'incremental', 'coping', 'resilience' 
or 'restoration'); (2) 'reformist' adaptation (also called 'transition', 'tran-
sitional' and 'more substantial' adaptation); and (3) 'transformative' or 
'transformational' adaptation. I consider these categories particularly 
useful from an analytical perspective, since they combine a historical 
perspective rooted in adaptation and hazards research with recent de-
velopments in the literature on resilience and transformation (see Nel-
son et al. 2007, Craig 2010, Moser and Ekstrom 2010, Levine et al. 2011, 
Park et al. 2012, Pelling 2012, Bassett and Fogelman 2013, Palutikof et 
al. 2013, Vermeulen et al. 2013, Pelling et al. 2015). 
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However, it must be borne in mind that the three heuristic categories 
of adaptation only entail ideal types, and that their characteristics are 
by no means mutually exclusive. Put differently, their embedded con-
cepts, discourses and practices may permeate one another, and it may 
not be uncommon to find traces of all three heuristic categories present 
in the same project intervention or policy narrative. Yet, the main value 
in identifying these ideal heuristic categories can be found in the ex-
planatory force they provide in mapping normative poles and discur-
sive standpoints that pattern debates about incremental and more sub-
stantial adaptation options, often with very real material outcomes.  
Finally, an interpretive heuristic approach also presents a more sys-
tematic means of comparing diverse managerial interpretations of    
adaptation to more locally embedded meanings and values. In sum, 
the three heuristic adaptation categories will be defined as follows (for 
comparison, see Schulz and Siriwardane 2015):  
Adjustment adaptation: So-called "adjustment adaptation" classifies cli-
mate change and biogeochemical hazards as the main source of harm 
and proposes different forms of iterative adjustment as a response to 
such threads (Bassett and Fogelman 2013, p. 49). The main goal of ad-
justment adaptation is to return complex SES to a normatively desira-
ble state of equilibrium, and to "maintain business-as-usual develop-
ment paths" under conditions of deep uncertainty (Pelling 2011, p. 140; 
also see Davoudi 2012, p. 301; Palutikof et al. 2013, p. 9). In a conserva-
tive adjustment approach, knowledge and resources are channeled 
downwards through policy "mainstreaming" and by means of "cli-
mate-proofing" socioeconomic development under a wide range of 
possible scenarios (Moore 2012, p. 39; IPCC 2014b, p. 86). Adjustment 
is therefore characterized by the top-down implementation of techno-
logical and managerial solutions guided by state administration, ex-
perts, or social and economic elites (Ayers 2011, p. 85; Bassett and Fo-
gelman 2013, p. 50).  
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Current views of resilience in international development policy also 
lean toward the adjustment approach.11 For example, Brown (2012, p. 
47) points out that the resilience concept is often used in defense of the 
modernist development paradigm, and to promote systemic stability 
for business-as-usual growth models, "quite contrary to the emphasis 
on change" that is commonly attributed to resilience thinking.  
Transformative adaptation: When invoked in its most generalized sense, 
transformation can, on the one hand, imply an unexpected or unin-
tended form of change, often a crisis or regime shift, and on the other 
denote a predesigned or consciously steered outcome (Nelson et al. 
2007, O'Brien 2012). However, it must be asked what meanings the 
term "transformative" carries in the context of climate change adapta-
tion. In essence, deliberate social transformations in response to cli-
mate change imply a fundamental or radical shift at the systemic level 
of complex SES (Nelson et al. 2007, p. 400; Levine et al. 2011, p. 2). 
Changes in agricultural and commodity production processes or be-
havioral changes in human-environmental relations include examples 
of such profound systemic alterations (Kates et al. 2012, Park et al. 2012, 
Vermeulen et al. 2013). Moreover, transformation may also encompass 
fundamental shifts in human interactions. This entails shifts in social 
norms, paradigms, values, beliefs and power relations that affect di-
verse forms of vulnerability and pervade socio-political, economic and 
technological spheres of everyday life (Driessen et al. 2012, IPCC 
2014b). Transformation thus denotes the emergence or prevalence of 
collective action for progressive social change. To initiate social action 
for change, transformative adaptation emphasizes human agency and 
intrinsic forms of motivation, straddling value-based, emotional and 
cognitive realms of communicative action (see O'Brien and Wolf 2010, 
University of Oslo 2013, p. 18). A transformative approach therefore 
would embody visions of fairness, justice and social cooperation to 
                                                          
11 For a more detailed description of the resilience concept, please refer to page 50 of 
this study. 
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push for advances in areas such as intergenerational equity, gender in-
clusiveness and other rights-based claims (Bee et al. 2013, Schlosberg 
2013, Tanner et al. 2015). In the context of knowledge production, trans-
formative adaptation remains embedded the spheres of experimenta-
tion, social entrepreneurship and innovation, together with reflexive 
learning (Biggs et al. 2010, Westley et al. 2011, Wise et al. 2014). 
Reformist adaptation: The 'reformist' approach to adaptation occupies 
the middle ground between adjustment and transformation. The term 
'transition' is often used interchangeably. Characteristically, reformist 
adaptation neither advocates for the political status quo nor endorses 
fundamental, paradigmatic, or systemic change (Pelling 2011, p. 68). 
On the contrary, it concentrates on incremental reforms in prevailing 
socio-political and economic systems through the iterative modifica-
tion of laws, technologies, rules, and decision-making processes. Put 
differently, reformist adaptation may question existing rules and deci-
sion-making processes, but not the normative-cognitive principles and 
asymmetric power relations that govern these very rules (Pelling 2011, 
p. 70). The dominant normative and behavioral paradigms under 
which the reformist approach operates, and which are arguably not 
fundamentally questioned in managerial discourses about climate 
change, are "ecological modernization" and "sustainable development" 
interventions (Blühdorn 2011, p. 38; Bassett and Fogelman 2013, p. 49). 
The production of knowledge still functions within the normative con-
fines of managerial governance and technical "systems thinking", alt-
hough it is sought to be more participatory, inclusive, and geared to-
ward adaptive learning, transition management, and the co-production 
of knowledge (see Pahl-Wostl 2009, Loorbach 2010). Yet, depending on 
its interpretation, the reformist approach may still possess the propen-
sity to vitalize transformative action due to its emphasis on structural 
change and incremental reforms in existing governance regimes. 
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Table 2. Three Heuristic Categories of Climate Change Adaptation 
 Adjustment Reform Transformation 
Change Equilibrium Incremental Systemic 
Knowledge Expert-led Co-production Experimental 
Intervention Top-down Participatory Intrinsic 
 
(Schulz and Siriwardane 2015, p. 10) 
 
Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management 
Apart from different normative interpretations of what it means to 
'successfully' adapt, climate change adaptation is closely linked to a 
variety of cross-cutting policy areas. One of the most important policy 
areas that intersects with climate change adaptation is disaster risk 
management (DRM) (see Hyogo Framework for Action 2005, IPCC 
2012). As in the case of Ghana, disaster risk management strategies and 
policy frameworks are often well established and implemented at dif-
ferent administrative scales to address harmful events such as storms, 
droughts, floods, bushfires and disease outbreaks. It is now widely 
acknowledged that DRM can serve as an appropriate institutional en-
try point for the mainstreaming or practical implementation of adap-
tation actions (see Thomalla et al. 2006, Preston and Stafford-Smith 
2009, Mercer 2010, Jones and Preston 2010). As an umbrella term, dis-
aster risk management has been defined by the IPCC (2012, p. 3) as  
processes for designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies, 
policies, and measures to improve the understanding of disaster risk, 
foster disaster risk reduction and transfer, and promote continuous 
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improvement in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery prac-
tices, with the explicit purpose of increasing human security, well-
being, quality of life, resilience and sustainable development.  
Generally speaking, climate change adaptation and DRM have many 
elements in common, for instance the focus on the consequences of 
complex socio-environmental problems, the communication between 
technical specialists and (potentially) affected individuals, and the 
need to establish institutional processes to link all of these activities 
(Jones and Preston 2010). The National Climate Change Adaptation 
Strategy of Ghana also explicitly connects adaptation and DRM at an 
institutional level by emphasizing the need to mainstream climate 
change and disaster risk reduction into national development plans 
(NCCAS 2010). 
Moreover, climate change adaptation and DRM are directly related to 
the notion of risk. In the broadest sense, risk can be described as the 
likelihood of incurring harm or the probability that some type of injury 
and/or loss would result from a particular harmful event (Crichton 
1999). A disaster might be such a harmful event, and is conceptualized 
as "a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society 
(…) which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to 
cope using its own resources" (UNISDR 2009, p. 9).  
With regard to the question of causality, disruptive or harmful events 
such as disasters are seen to be triggered by hazards. A hazard can be 
defined as "a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or 
condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, 
property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic 
disruption, or environmental damage." (UNISDR 2009, p. 17). In other 
words, a hazard is a potential threat, and not an actual event itself. 
Hazards may manifest in events such as disasters.  
Nevertheless, the UNISDR definition limits "hazards of concern" for 
DRM to "hazards of natural origin and related environmental and  
technological hazards", thereby removing most social causes from the    
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analysis (UNISDR 2009, p. 17). In the following, I will therefore refrain 
from using the exact UNISDR terminology and focus on hazards as the 
causes of occurring harm. 
Overall, it has become sufficiently clear that potential harm is not only 
determined by biogeochemical and technological hazards, for instance 
by climate change and infrastructure failures, but also by the degree of 
"vulnerability" and "exposure" to multiple social hazards, for example 
poverty (IPCC 2012, p. 69). Therefore, I will briefly discuss the concept 
of vulnerability in the following section. 
 
Vulnerability and Barriers to Adaptation 
Vulnerability is a commonly used concept across the natural and social 
sciences and is applied in various disciplines such as ecology, political 
science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, geography, economics, 
public health, hazards research, and development studies. Researchers 
and policy makers therefore need to operate with diverse and often 
contested notions of vulnerability (Füssel 2007). This conceptual diver-
sity is also representative of the fact that vulnerability is a broadly ap-
plicable concept that can serve to address a wide range of research 
problems (Adger 2006, Birkmann 2006, Gallopín 2006, Janssen et al. 
2006). Furthermore, it is evident that the conceptual diversity in vul-
nerability research is related to the fact that numerous possible policy 
responses to different types of vulnerability co-exist (O'Brien et al. 2007, 
Gaillard 2010). 
In risk and hazards research, multi-dimensional notions of vulnerabil-
ity have emerged since the late 1970s. Besides technical and biogeo-
chemical factors, they also include social, physical, political, institu-
tional, cultural-cognitive and economic aspects of vulnerability (Wis-
ner et al. 1994, Birkmann 2006, Eakin and Luers 2006). Vulnerability is 
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therefore considered an important concept for explaining the basic con-
ditions for occurring harm, regardless of the normative implications 
and political difficulties that are related to the exact definition of the 
term. In the context of climate change adaptation and disastrous 
events, vulnerability has been broadly defined as the degree to which 
a coupled SES, or some part of it, is likely to experience harm due to 
exposure to one or multiple hazards (Turner II 2010).  
Put differently, hazards that cause vulnerability may be related to bio-
geochemical factors, human factors, or a combination of both. A more 
specific definition of vulnerability is provided by the United Nations 
University (UNU-EHS), which states that vulnerability is   
the intrinsic and dynamic feature of an element at risk (community, 
region, state, infrastructure, environment etc.) that determines the   
expected damage/harm resulting from a given hazardous event and 
is often even affected by the harmful event itself. Vulnerability 
changes continuously over time and is driven by physical, social, eco-
nomic and environmental factors (Thywissen 2006, p. 34).  
In accordance with this technical definition, vulnerability is neither 
easily nor directly measurable. It is complex, site-specific and the pa-
rameters that determine vulnerability change over time. Vulnerability 
is therefore linked to the complex interplay between different hazards, 
scales, and SES dynamics. Furthermore, there is robust evidence and 
high agreement among scholars concerning the fact that vulnerability 
is essentially socially constructed, and that it can be seen as the out-
come of failed "development" policies and processes, for example "en-
vironmental mismanagement, demographic changes, rapid and un-
planned urbanization, and the scarcity of livelihood options for the 
poor" (IPCC 2012, p. 70). 
However, the exact causal relationship between hazards and vulnera-
bility is not always immediately obvious. For instance, we may think 
of poverty as a hazard that causes vulnerability in relation to another 
hazard, for example extreme weather events. If causality is constructed 
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in such a way, the severity or magnitude of poverty determines the 
degree of vulnerability to, say, storms and floods. Vice versa, we may 
also define extreme weather events as the root causes of poverty, since 
storms and floods often lead to the destruction of assets. In this case, it 
is the frequency, severity or magnitude of extreme weather events that 
determines vulnerability to poverty.  
We must therefore conclude that the concept of vulnerability cannot 
be understood properly without relating it to at least one hazard, and 
without carefully assessing multiple possible causalities. Of course, we 
could also go one step further and introduce a third or fourth hazard 
into the equation. In this case, the situation becomes even more com-
plex. Consider for instance a situation which Michael R. Carter (2010, 
n. pag.) calls the "same old story about risk": households in the periph-
ery are experiencing recurring drought which results in widespread 
crop failure and causes household assets to fall below a critical thresh-
old. Simultaneously, correlated risks are undercutting rural financial 
market development. Households are then caught up in a poverty trap, 
and are unable to recover. This dynamic over time creates ever grow-
ing numbers of food aid dependent people, and is likely to perpetuate 
poverty across generations.  
This example still remains relatively simple, as we have not even con-
sidered individual perceptions, norms, culture, power and the wider 
institutional or economic landscape. It nonetheless serves to illustrate 
that hazards and vulnerability need to be evaluated in relation to each 
other. Moreover, it shows that the root causes of vulnerability are be-
coming more difficult to determine over time and across generations. 
A multi-hazard approach is therefore essential, for it is practically impos-
sible to fully understand vulnerability by looking at single hazards or 
scales in isolation. Bearing in mind the 'what' and 'how' of adaptation, 
the corresponding question about the nature of vulnerability is: "Who 
adapts to what, how, and why?"  
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As we shall see throughout this study, the dichotomy between the how 
of adaptation and the why of vulnerability is one of the most defining 
conceptual relationships in adaptation research and practice. 
Picture 2. Drought Impacts on Crops in Northern Ghana 
 
Recurring drought causes uninsured harvest losses near Bolgatanga, Northern Ghana. 
© Author, 2013 
In sum, the reciprocal relationship between vulnerability and adapta-
tion may be described as follows: 
One [vulnerability] is focused on generation of risk and the other   
[adaptation] on response to it. Analytically, adaptive capacity is the 
converse of vulnerability, the ability and inability to avoid risk – they 
are shaped by the same factors (Ribot 2011, p. 1161; emphasis added).  
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Concerning the use of the term 'adaptive capacity', it is nonetheless 
crucial to recall its negative connotations. Gaillard (2010, p. 220) aptly 
summarizes these connotations by pointing out that, indeed, "highly 
vulnerable communities may display a large array of capacities." Yet, 
they may be vulnerable as a result of structural or contextual factors 
that are not of their own making. Consequently, I will refrain from us-
ing the term adaptive capacity, and use the more encompassing and 
neutral expression adaptiveness instead. By using the term adaptive-
ness, I refer to the dynamic and relational status of a system, group or 
person that connotes the ability (adaptiveness) or the inability (vulner-
ability) to avoid particular risks. In line with this relational definition, 
I look at adaptation as an iterative social process that aims to simulta-
neously reduce risk and increase the ability to avoid risk. 
For the purposes of this inquiry, the notion of 'risk' will be defined as 
the product of hazards, vulnerability, exposure and adaptation (Table 3). 
This holistic conceptualization of risk avoids precisely the error of 
"placing the risk in the hazard" or placing risk "within the climate ra-
ther than society" (Ribot 2011, p. 1160). Furthermore, it captures the 
multifaceted nature of risk as well as its reciprocal relationship with 
vulnerability, adaptiveness and place (i.e. the exposure to hazards).  
In the interdisciplinary adaptation literature, both the ability (adap-
tiveness) as well as the inability (vulnerability) to avoid risks are gen-
erally perceived through the lens of adaptation barriers.12 When ap-
plied to an institutional context, the concept of barriers typically refers 
to organizational or managerial impediments, including limitations re-
garding technological capabilities, technology development, and tech-
nology transfer (Agrawal 2010, Olhoff 2015). Institutional barriers are 
broadly discussed in the context of adaptation financing and govern-
ance; organizational coordination and planning; social learning and ca-
pacity building; as well as decision making under uncertainty (for a 
                                                          
12 See Adger et al. 2009, Amundsen et al. 2010, Burch 2010, Moser and Ekstrom 2010, 
Nielsen and Reenberg 2010, Storbjörk 2010, Jones and Boyd 2011, Sietz et al. 2011. 
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summary see Wise et al. 2014). Moreover, IPCC Working Group II sug-
gests that adaptation barriers are "closely linked to cultural norms and 
societal values" and that the existence of barriers requires "transforma-
tional change (…) for sustainable development in a changing climate" 
(IPCC 2014b, p. 89).  
At the same time, it has been acknowledged that adaptation barriers 
are partly "rooted in culture and cognition" (O'Brien 2012, p. 671). This 
aspect has lately been at the heart of more locally oriented risk man-
agement approaches which seek to explore how psychological, cogni-
tive and emotional factors "lead to systematic biases in (…) appraisals 
of risks, self-efficacy, and the benefits and costs of action" (Granderson 
2014, p. 56).  
 
Table 3. Key Theoretical Concepts  
Risk  
 
The likelihood of occurring harm or a damage 
potential (the product of hazards, vulnerability,   
exposure and adaptation) 
 
Hazard  The cause of occurring harm 
Vulnerability 
 
The degree (severity, frequency or magnitude) 
to which an element at risk is likely to experi-
ence harm due to one or multiple hazards 
 
Exposure 
 
Denotes whether a territory is exposed to one or 
multiple hazards, whereby to be exposed does 
not mean to be vulnerable 
 
Adaptation                             
 
An iterative social process that aims to simulta-
neously reduce risk and increase the ability to 
avoid risk (adaptiveness). Adaptation can be      
reactive or proactive and may be construed as 
adjustment, reform or transformation 
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Adaptation                             
IPCC definition 
 
Adjustment in natural or human systems in     
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli 
or their effects, which moderates harm or ex-
ploits beneficial opportunities 
 
Barriers 
Factors that decrease adaptiveness and the       
individual or collective ability to avoid risk  
Disaster  
A harmful, large-scale event that is socially      
disruptive and overwhelms adaptiveness 
Resilience An ideal state of current or future adaptiveness  
 
 
Lastly, this introductory section would not be complete without taking 
into account the concept of resilience. In ecology, the idea of resilience 
has been developed by C.S. Holling in the early 1970s as a theory of 
complex adaptive systems (see Holling 1973). At its most basic level, 
resilience is rooted in the notion that humans depend on ecological 
systems for their survival and continuously influence the ecosystems 
in which they live from the local to global scale. When compared to 
research on climate change adaptation, resilience thinking neverthe-
less implies a slightly different analytical focus. Although definitions 
may vary across disciplines, resilience thinking is mainly concerned 
with ecosystem management and service provision, as well as large-
scale interactions in coupled SES (Turner II 2010). What renders resili-
ence thinking less suitable for application in the social sciences is its 
inherent indifference concerning questions of agency, power and con-
flict (Olsson et al. 2015). Among other things, resilience thinking has 
been regarded as "technocratic and managerialist" (Brown 2012, p. 47), 
"contested" (Tanner et al. 2015, p. 23), "depoliticized" (Cannon and Mül-
ler-Mahn 2010, p. 626) and insufficient in its current form to address 
the challenges of deliberate social transformations.  
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For the purposes of this study, resilience will therefore be understood 
as an ideal state of current or future adaptiveness, and not be used as 
an explicit analytical lens. 
This conceptual preference does not imply, however, that research on 
climate change adaptation has been exempt from scholarly critique 
(see Ribot 2011, O'Brien 2012). Especially the concept of community-
based adaptation (CBA) has been the focus of various criticisms since it 
has been first introduced into the adaptation policy debate in 2006 
(Girot et al. 2012, p. 7). Broadly speaking, the focus of CBA activities 
rests on the local linkages between adaptation, development and dis-
aster risk reduction. The main idea that underpins notions of CBA is 
that local communities should take the lead in transforming adaptation 
barriers that reproduce vulnerability and poverty.  
However, what has been repeatedly pointed out by scholars is the fact 
that mainstream CBA projects tend to rely on stereotypical develop-
ment "buzzwords and fuzzwords" such as community participation, 
rights-based approaches and empowerment, all of which have come 
under increased scrutiny for their narrow application, homogenizing 
tendencies as well as their apolitical and neoliberal overtones of indi-
vidualized responsibility (for a comprehensive overview, see Cornwall 
and Eade 2010).  
In view of these recurring criticisms, some of which even date back to 
the 1970s (see Bassett and Fogelman 2013, p. 43), it seems warranted to 
carefully consider the implications for adaptation research and prac-
tice. After all, it has to be kept in mind that such scorching criticisms 
hardly exist in a political vacuum. In fact, they are closely linked to 
broader debates about the "post-political" condition and depoliticized 
nature of contemporary climate change governance (see, for example, 
Swyngedouw 2010, Blühdorn 2011).  
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The Adaptation Concept and its Critique  
The state machinery has policies, but no politics. (Ferguson 1990, p. 66) 
By failing to acknowledge the political and governance context, much thinking about 
adaptation policy in Africa is unrealistic, and much donor activity is likely to have little 
effect. (Lockwood, 2013, p. 647) 
Processes of depoliticization have been studied for several decades by 
political scientists, sociologists and development scholars (see Haines 
1979, Ferguson 1990, Kenis and Lievens 2014). Views on the normative 
connotations and societal root causes of depoliticization differ pro-
foundly, although the concept is occasionally portrayed in a rather 
positive way in public policy debates (Flinders and Wood 2014). De-
politicization is then understood as an instrument for consensus-build-
ing in exceedingly politicized public arenas, or as a shield against rad-
ical populism, nationalism, and short-term political interference moti-
vated by vested interests (Fawcett and Marsh 2014). Nevertheless, it 
must be acknowledged that depoliticization is cast in an overwhelm-
ingly negative light in recent debates on environmental politics. 
In order to outline the possible negative impacts of depoliticization, I 
will first return to the three categories of adjustment, reformist and 
transformative adaptation that I have introduced earlier on. These heu-
ristic categories can be applied to illustrate how different causal expla-
nations of risk and vulnerability are used in theory and practice. For 
example, in their analysis of "the climate change concept in the adap-
tation literature" Bassett and Fogelman (2013, p. 50) demonstrate that 
there is an observable tendency in the reports of the IPCC and four 
major climate change journals to conceptualize adaptation as "adjust-
ment to climate stimuli" and to identify biogeochemical hazards as the 
main source of risk and vulnerability.  
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Out of the 558 articles that were surveyed by the authors, 70 percent 
fell into the "adjustment" category, 27 percent were identified as "re-
formist", and only 3 percent qualified as "transformative" (Bassett and 
Fogelman 2013, p. 50). Arguably, this normative bias still affects adap-
tation policy and practice, since international donor agencies continue 
to focus their adaptation efforts on infrastructural adjustment and 
"what might be termed the more 'manageable' manifestations of cli-
mate change, namely, changes in seasonal and inter-annual variability 
(for example, in rainfall), and in the frequency and severity of extremes 
such as droughts, storms and floods" (Brooks et al. 2009, p. 752). In 
comparison, less attention is given to asymmetric power relations and 
the wider sociocultural and political context of adaptation – at least 
beyond the narrow scope of managerial governance arrangements.  
The introductory case study has underscored the dangers that such a 
narrow analytical approach might pose for implementation. Unfortu-
nately, however, the Vea case is not an exception. Drawing on evidence 
from the Kenyan drylands, Eriksen and Lind (2009) illustrate how ad-
aptation interventions can in fact exacerbate human vulnerability to 
climatic phenomena if existing imbalances in the distribution of power 
and resources are not taken into account. The authors conclude that a 
critical assessment of vested interests and asymmetric power relations 
is a necessary prerequisite for the socially equitable implementation of 
adaptation measures. These findings are also in line with recent case 
studies investigating adaptation interventions in Brazil, Ghana, 
Mozambique, the United States, and Nepal (Nelson and Finan 2009, 
Venot et al. 2011, Artur and Hilhorst 2012, McEvoy and Wilder 2012, 
Coirolo and Rahman 2014).  
This means that, as a result of apolitical approaches which tend to 
downplay the wider sociopolitical repercussions of environmental 
change, notions of adaptation and resilience are in danger of becoming 
mere technocratic concepts, driven by the naturalization of risk and, 
therefore, the depoliticization of human-nature relationships.  
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Naturalizing risk means succumbing to environmental determinism 
by adopting an analytical perspective which (1) emphasizes responses 
to environmental phenomena and thus diverts attention from the social 
root causes of vulnerability and anthropogenic climate change, (2) in-
dividualizes responsibility by explaining vulnerability as the result of 
indeterminate systemic processes or irresistible fate, and (3) depoliti-
cizes adaptation by assuming that SES are governed by clearly identi-
fiable, benevolent and neutral institutions (Bassett and Fogelman 2013, 
p. 50; also see Ribot 2011, Wise et al. 2014).  
According to Swyngedouw (2010, p. 227), such an apolitical and nar-
row managerial interpretation of environmental issues is politically 
enforced and discursively justified by a "regime of environmental gov-
ernance that revolves around consensus, agreement, participatory ne-
gotiation of different interests and technocratic expert management." 
In a similar fashion, Stephan et al. (2014, p. 70) perceive the depoliticiz-
ing effects of the international environmental governance regime to be 
rooted in "counter-strategies which seek to conceal the contingency of 
reality, sew the gaps in hegemonic discourses and channel dislocations 
in such a way that fundamental social structures remain untouched."  
As political ecologists have repeatedly argued, studying the depoliti-
cization of climate change adaptation thus implies to carefully assess 
the political implications of nature-culture relations, and to focus on 
the multiple ways in which "ecological phenomena are 'socialized' and 
social phenomena 'ecologized' " (Fairhead and Leach 1996, p. 8). How-
ever, there is an ongoing debate among social theorists as to whether 
depoliticization is actually the result of a conscious and ideologically 
motivated "policy of depoliticization" (Bourdieu 2002, p. 31) or a mere 
symptom of the exact opposite trend, the postmodern "end of ideol-
ogy" that gives rise to a pragmatic managerial paradigm among deci-
sion makers, and thus leads to a "functional dissociation of ideology 
and practical politics" (Himmelstrand 1962, p. 89).  
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Leaving further details aside, what follows from this paradoxical situ-
ation is a question of almost ontological quality. How can social struc-
tures be deliberately transformed to avoid dangerous climate change, 
while operating within the confines of the same ideological paradigms 
and normative reference systems that have produced these problems 
in the first place? Can we, as a popular saying goes, drive out the devil 
with Beelzebub? Certainly, there are no silver bullets and easy-to-im-
plement solutions for these major political challenges and deep-seated 
institutional gridlocks. It has been suggested, however, that "a new sci-
ence on deliberate transformation is needed to both complement and 
supplement current research on adaptation" (O'Brien 2012, p. 668). 
In light of the strong political implications of social transformations 
under climate change, it is nonetheless remarkable that political scien-
tists have thus far been "largely absent" from the interdisciplinary ad-
aptation debate (Javeline 2014, p. 421). This staggering lack of engage-
ment is perplexing, given that the institutional school of thought in po-
litical science has much to say about the deeper normative and struc-
tural aspects of systemic transformations.  
 
One possible reason for this notable absence and/or disinterest of po-
litical scientists may be found in the managerial, state-centric and le-
galistic outlook of institutional thinking, which has made it notori-
ously difficult to engage in interdisciplinary exchanges with less struc-
turally inclined fields of research. However, while earlier theoretical 
debates in institutional theory have been mired by endless conceptual 
quibbles, there is now a strong tendency to reconcile different branches 
of institutional analysis and examine three 'modes of constraint' which 
shape human behavior. These modes are defined as rules, narratives, 
and practices (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 200). What is particularly 
interesting in this regard is the fact that institutional theory does not 
simply look at these constraints in isolation, but focuses on how they 
  
 
 
 
 
 
56                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
interact with each other to establish dynamic power relations and me-
diate new governmentalities.13  
Another interesting aspect of institutional theory is the prominent role 
that is given to norms and normativity. Institutions, from a normative 
perspective, may "confirm dominant world views, uphold existing re-
lations of authority and channel routinized everyday actions to repro-
duce inequalities" (Cleaver 2012, p. 85). In other words, adaptation is 
not merely a response to changing climatic conditions as the environ-
mentally deterministic reading of the concept suggests. It is also a di-
rect response to normative and political discourses that are translated 
into particular social contexts. For instance, policy mainstreaming is not 
as straightforward as it may seem, especially in the long term, as it re-
quires ownership and the interpretation of an externally devised polit-
ical agenda by a wide range of political actors. This leaves considerable 
room for interpretation as to what exactly should be mainstreamed at 
different levels if the umbrella term of adaptation is invoked. Further-
more, it is evident that the translation of the international adaptation 
agenda does not simply take place at the official level of policy making, 
but also at the level of local implementation. Focusing on organiza-
tional structures of the state administration while ignoring the agency 
of local institutional systems and individual actors would be a grave 
                                                          
13 The term governmentality is mainly associated with the writings of Michel Foucault. 
In its broadest sense, the term is used to denote discursive and social practices that 
result in the normalization of social identities and behaviors (conducts), through the en-
actment of governmental techniques. Governmentality therefore describes deep-
seated material and socio-cognitive influences of governing power. Auditing, surveil-
lance, monitoring and the co-production of socially engrained narratives about 'em-
powerment', 'duty' and 'freedom of choice' are seen as dominant tropes that produce 
a pervasive mentality of self-regulation among the public. A diversity of literature on 
'neoliberal rationalities' and sustainable development therefore draws on governmen-
tality as a concept that patterns civic discipline, compliance and consensus. However, 
research in the field has also been critiqued for hindering "productive conversations 
across the academic/practitioner divide", and for insufficiently addressing "how new 
governmentalities were mediated and translated by state actors, or how they were     
refused, inhabited or reworked by those they summoned" (Newman 2013, p. 19). 
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mistake. Especially in circumstances where multiple layers of custom-
ary and bureaucratic institutions co-exist, as it is the case in Ghana, 
people naturally turn to those institutions that are most likely to cater 
to their interests. Without necessarily implying an instrumental ration-
ality, this phenomenon of "forum shopping" (Benda-Beckmann 1981) 
means that new organizational and regulative structures are fre-
quently diverted from their intended use and renegotiated in local 
power sharing arrangements. Similar processes of creative politicking 
are also behind the logic of institutional bricolage. The notion of brico-
lage refers to a situation in which people "draw on existing formulae 
(styles of thinking, models of cause and effect, social norms, and sanc-
tioned social roles and relationships) to patch or piece together institu-
tions in response to changing situations" (Cleaver 2012, p. 45). The of-
ten transient institutional arrangements which are set up by donor-
funded projects are likely to further reinforce these converging tenden-
cies. As soon as new institutional arrangements are introduced, for ex-
ample in the form of development initiatives, management committees 
or marketing schemes, they are naturalized into existing social orders 
and often diverted from their intended purpose through subliminal re-
lations of power (De Sardan 2008; 2009, also see Eguavoen 2008 for an 
example from the Ghanaian water sector).  
Thus, Lockwood (2013, p. 648) warns that even a "large increase in cli-
mate finance may have a perverse effect" as long as institutional re-
forms are neglected in business-as-usual scenarios. Such business-as-
usual approach, he argues, would sustain "political systems that un-
dermine the capacity of states to build adaptive capacity" (Lockwood 
2013, p. 648). Consequently, it may not be realistic (or even desirable) 
to consider win-win situations as the only possible outcome of trans-
formative processes. Alan Atkisson (2010, p. 215) concedes 
When systems change – even in ways that you think are clearly       
positive – some people may experience a gain and others experience 
a loss: 'win-win solutions' are something of a rarity in the real world. 
And people do not like to lose.  
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Seen through the lens of political realism, the current state of affairs 
thus requires scholars with an interest in transformative adaptation to 
seriously engage with communication issues and the widening "sci-
ence-policy gap" (Moser 2010). It needs to be clearly communicated 
that research on transformation and institutional power effects does 
not automatically equal unproductive finger pointing or political 
blame shifting. Similarly, it must be clear that transformative adapta-
tion is neither a purely academic concept, nor simply a paternalizing 
criminalization of Africa, cloaked in discussions about new structural 
transformations and good governance principles. What the transform-
ative approach aims to do, instead, is adding an important explanatory 
layer to the relatively narrow debate on the politics of adaptation, in-
asmuch as it helps to refocus attention on the people who are directly 
affected by climate change, and the very institutions, discourses and 
normative paradigms that contribute to the current politics of unsustain-
ability. What the term "politics of unsustainability" suggests, quite 
simply, is to redirect our analytical focus to the structures and "socio-
cultural norms underpinning all ecopolitics" (Blühdorn 2011, p. 34).  
However, perceiving obstacles to structural change as being produced 
by an "anti-development" mindset, as Lockwood (2013, p. 656) argues, 
may not be entirely helpful in this regard. Not only does such an ex-
planation ignore decades of research in postcolonial studies and post-
development theory that have profoundly challenged dominant mod-
ernist and developmentalist paradigms. It also implies that clientelism 
and rent-seeking behavior may be attributable to a specifically 'Afri-
can' mentality. Accepting this flawed idea of social reality means to 
advance an apolitical understanding of adaptation by neglecting the 
effects of colonial legacies, globalized markets, policy failures and in-
tra-communal power relations, and ultimately, by putting the blame 
on culture and individuals. However, such a sweeping generalization 
of culture should be taken with a pinch of salt, bearing in mind that the 
"traditional" cultural institution of modern Ghanaian chieftaincy, for 
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example, is actually an artifact of colonial rule (see Lentz 2013, p. 176).14 
Yet, criticizing culturalist clichés about so-called "traditional" institu-
tions does not necessarily mean to discard the fact that in some cases 
specific cultural practices are indeed sustaining patronage politics and 
elite capture, as Yaro (2013b) demonstrates for the case of northern 
Ghana. Consequently, it is of vital importance to carefully consider 
what is actually implied when notions of culture, mentality and tradi-
tion are invoked in a political and scientific context. 
Another important implication of these findings is to address unequal 
power relations in a constructive and more precise manner, and to ex-
plore what it could mean to 'bring the political back' into the study of 
adaptive processes. After all, this is a task that political science should 
be uniquely equipped to perform. Thus, building on earlier work that 
has examined the links between power and adaptation, I will maintain 
a strong emphasis on institutional dynamics, while focusing more 
clearly on the normative aspects and discursive formulation of risk and 
vulnerability. 
The Social Construction of Risk: Whiter Territorialization?  
Thus far, I have presented the natural science background for research 
on climate change and increased variability in Ghana. In this context, I 
have demonstrated that strong evidence points to the fact that climate 
change is already a reality in Ghana, and that adaptation will be an 
inevitable process if the foundations for human well-being are not to 
be jeopardized. I have also argued that several uncertainties about the 
future scale and impact of climate change in Ghana persist, and that a 
                                                          
14 Here, I refer to the institution of administrative chieftaincy, which emerged during 
the colonial era. "Administrative chieftaincy" adopted the symbols of the heterogene-
ous political structures of the pre-colonial era to legitimize its role an agent of the co-
lonial state (De Sardan 2009, p. 10-11). Nevertheless, despite existing criticisms, con-
temporary Ghanaian chieftaincy is still a popular institution and an essential part of 
Ghanaian heritage and culture. 
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simplistic relationship between environmental factors and human vul-
nerability should not be assumed. Subsequently, I have presented a 
brief history of adaptation policy in Ghana and introduced the most 
influential political actors and organizations which shape the newly 
emerging adaptation 'arena' in the country. I have also outlined key 
debates and concepts in the fields of adaptation, DRM and vulnerabil-
ity research. By relating these strands of research to each other in a sys-
tematic manner, I have identified several analytical gaps and short-
comings that require further scholarly attention.  
First, the gap analysis reveals that an engagement with the conditions 
of advanced modernity is essential to avoid a reification of the 'colonial 
gaze' and a simplistic understanding of the dynamic institutional land-
scape in which human adaptation and development take shape. Sec-
ond, I have argued that the social conditions of advanced modernity 
are best explained by converging processes of fragmegration and hy-
bridization. Generally speaking, the idea of fragmegration connotes 
simultaneous and interrelated processes of fragmentation and integra-
tion, for example cultural, economic, technological, political, spatial 
and temporal. Taken together, these interrelated processes define a po-
litical shift from a primarily state-centric model of sovereign power to 
more dispersed forms of decentralized and networked politics or "gov-
ernance" (see Rosenau 2003). Eventually, the concept of fragmegration 
also closely mirrors the inherent contradictions, ambiguities, complex-
ities, and uncertainties that post-normal science needs to account for in 
the face of climate change.  
The notion of hybridity, by contrast, alludes to the fact that clear-cut 
distinctions between the pure realm of 'primordial' nature and the so-
cial sphere need to be fundamentally reconsidered from an ontological 
as well as an epistemological perspective. Or, to put it more simply, 
"the history of society-nature mixing is much more dynamic and ex-
pansive than we previously thought" (Rudy and White 2014, p. 129; 
also see White and Wilbert 2009). Under these circumstances, it is clear 
that essentialist ideas about fixed and place-bound cultures as well as 
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simplistic dichotomies between the 'traditional' and the 'modern' are 
impossible to uphold. Exploring processes of hybridization, I argue, 
warrants new forms of theoretical thinking that go beyond the simple 
statement that there has always been a "trend to blend" various cul-
tures, the social and the natural, the natural and the technological, and 
so forth (Kraidy 2005, p. 75).  
Therefore, in order to turn the notion of hybridity into a descriptive-
analytical concept that can be used to examine adaptive processes, I 
suggest to understand hybridization as being driven by broader pro-
cesses of territorialization. Territorialization refers to the transformation 
of territories through processes of social signification on the one hand, 
and concrete material and technological appropriation on the other 
(Rebotier 2012).15 This means that social territories are shaped by the 
way we speak about them, for instance in terms of property rights or 
place-based 'riskiness', while territories are simultaneously construc-
ted through processes of material appropriation, for example through 
cultivation, demarcation, physical infrastructure, etc. 
These concurrent processes of social signification and material appro-
priation ultimately converge in the institutional organization of territori-
ality. Institutions like the state and/or other authorities define territo-
ries in both material and significatory terms, for example by simulta-
neously claiming a land title and fencing off a particular piece of land, 
or by regulating digital flows of capital which produce tangible mate-
rial outcomes. This differentiated view helps maintaining a strong fo-
cus on place that is required for field-based research, while pointing to 
the fact that the institutional organization of territoriality is at the same 
time defined and mediated by hybrid forms of social signification and 
materiality that transcend time and place.  
                                                          
15 The term social signification refers to cultural-cognitive, normative and discursive 
frames of meaning-making in a social context. 
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Assuming that unmediated or 'natural' risk does not exist, and hat ad-
aptation and risk are significantly shaped by the institutional organi-
zation of territoriality, three major theoretical questions will demand 
further attention. It needs to be systematically assessed how (1) domi-
nant policy discourses shape risk perceptions and interventions; how 
(2) power relations influence adaptive processes across scales; and how 
(3) norms, discourses and power relations jointly contribute to the pro-
duction of subjects at risk. 
The first analytical challenge that follows from the above questions is 
to identify strands in institutional theory that can be applied to explore 
the 'messy' institutional organization of territoriality in everyday life. 
In particular, this means to develop a theoretical approach to institu-
tional analysis that is able to account for the hybrid relationships be-
tween cultural-cognitive, normative and discursive frames of mean-
ing-making (i.e. processes of social signification) on the one hand, and 
the concrete materiality of landscapes and resource flows (i.e. environ-
mental, financial, technological and infrastructural factors) on the 
other. The second analytical challenge is that current epistemological 
and ontological assumptions about human-nature relationships will 
have to be significantly reworked in the face of anthropogenic environ-
mental change (see Hulme 2009, O'Brien 2012, Weisser et al. 2014).  
However, as it has been previously argued that perceptions, values 
and norms are not essential categories, because "social standards of ac-
ceptability are shifting over time", and that adaptation and ecopolitics 
cannot (or, ironically, ought not) be "normative" (Rebotier 2010, p. 6; 
Kenis and Lievens 2014, p. 533), further conceptual clarifications are 
needed.  
In the following chapter, I will therefore explain in greater detail why 
I am convinced that a novel definition of normative sociology is an on-
tological and epistemological necessity and, indeed, a prerequisite to 
explore the social production of risk. 
 
 
  CHAPTER TWO: 
THEORIES & METHODS OF                  
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
The overall aim of this chapter is to engage with current theories of 
institutional analysis, discourse analysis and power to render them 
suitable for application in the context of a multi-hazard risk assess-
ment. The chapter is broadly structured into five sections. Section 
one identifies strands of social theory that are particularly conducive 
to exploring how institutions mediate adaptive processes. Section 
two engages with questions of power and normativity through an 
ethical and philosophical lens to better understand how power rela-
tions shape adaptive processes. The third section summarizes three 
analytical concepts of power that are well-suited to reconcile diverse 
taxonomies in institutional and discourse analysis. The fourth sec-
tion, then, embeds the institutional question in a concrete assess-
ment context by drawing on the notion of institutional adaptation 
pathways. Section five summarizes the theoretical findings and pre-
sents an overarching analytical framework. The framework includes 
empirical methods, research questions and a brief description of the 
selected field sites.  
 
 
 
In the following section, I seek to elucidate how notions of 'institutions' 
and 'normativity' are used in sociological theory. Arguably, this is a 
Herculean task, mostly because of the sheer diversity of institutional 
perspectives in the social sciences. As a consequence, I do not intend 
this review to be fully exhaustive. What I will do instead is focus on 
strands of institutional theory that I consider most relevant with regard 
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to their analytical and methodological implications for the question of 
how institutions influence and mediate adaptive processes and risks. 
The theories that are discussed in the first section are mostly derived 
from two complementary bodies of literature: the so-called new insti-
tutionalism (NI), which also includes New Institutional Economics (NIE), 
and scholarship concerned with the institutional dimensions of envi-
ronmental change.16 By tracing the sociological origins of these diverse 
strands of research, I ultimately seek to illustrate that questions about 
the emergence of power effects and normative behavior are, indeed, at 
the very heart of the adaptation challenge.  
 
 
 
Normativity and Institutional                               
Theory in the Social Sciences 
In his article "What Are Institutions?" Geoffrey M. Hodgson revisits 
one of the fundamental challenges of institutional theory, namely to 
establish a common definition of the term institution. Establishing a 
standard definition, Hodgson argues, is potentially possible and 
should be a prerequisite before conducting empirical and theoretical 
analyses of how particular institutions function (Hodgson 2006, p. 1). 
At the heart of Hodgson’s definition of institutions is the idea that in-
stitutions are social rule-systems (Hodgson 2006, p. 2). Similar ideas 
have also been put forward by other scholars of NIE, such as Douglass 
North, who defines institutions as "the rules of the game in a society 
                                                          
16    Scholarship focusing on the institutional dimensions of environmental change can 
be found in a variety of subdisciplines, for instance in adaptation research, vulnerabil-
ity and resilience research as well as in political geography, critical theory, develop-
ment research, political ecology, and institutional anthropology.  
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or, more formally, (...) the humanly devised constraints that shape hu-
man interaction" (North 1990, p. 3).17 
In light of these definitions, and taking into account the centrality of 
the word rule, several questions come to mind. How exactly does a 
rule-system function? How can rule-following behavior be explained, 
and what exactly motivates people to individually or collectively fol-
low or disobey particular rules? And last but not least, what is meant 
by the game and who plays it? 
Regarding the latter question, Elinor Ostrom eloquently points to the 
fact that "we cannot communicate effectively if signs used by one 
scholar in a field have different referents than the same sign used by 
another scholar in the same field. As scholars, we are in our own game 
situation –  a language generating game " (Ostrom 1986, p. 4).  
Arguably, this game has been played extensively by many scholars of 
institutional theory who study the nature of institutions and social or-
ganization, and see themselves as followers of the new institutionalism 
(March and Olsen 1984). According to Ensminger (1998, p. 774), the 
new institutionalism "is the study of how institutions affect the behav-
ior of individuals and how individual behavior affects the evolution of 
institutions; pivotal to these relations is the role of incentives." Gener-
ally, the body of scholarship that constitutes the NI is highly diverse 
and encompasses different strands of institutionalist thinking such as 
(1) organizational or sociological institutionalism, (2) rational choice 
institutionalism, (3) empirical institutionalism, (4) historical institu-
                                                          
17 The interdisciplinary approach of New Institutional Economics (NIE) analyzes the 
influence of institutions on economic processes and performance. It takes the transac-
tion as the primary unit of analysis (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p. 4). NIE builds on, 
modifies, and extends neoclassical theory, while abandoning neoclassical assumptions 
about the instrumental rationality of human beings (North 1995). Instead, NIE as-
sumes that humans face multiple risks and uncertainties related to unforeseen events 
and outcomes (Ménard and Shirley 2008, p. 1). As a consequence, NIE asserts that in-
stitutions are formed to reduce uncertainty in human exchange (North 1995).  
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tionalism, (5) international institutionalism, (6) and discursive institu-
tionalism.18 Considering the analytical goal of this study, namely to in-
vestigate institutional influences on adaptive processes, two strands of 
institutionalist thinking are deemed particularly suitable and will 
therefore be discussed in greater detail below: organizational or socio-
logical institutionalism, and discursive institutionalism. 
Organizational or sociological institutionalism is one of the oldest and 
most developed branches of the so-called new institutionalism(s). It 
emerged as a subfield of organization theory in the late 1970s, when 
much of the pioneering work was done by Stanford sociologists such 
as Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Lynne G. Zucker (1977), who por-
trayed management theory and practice as myth and symbol, and 
started to investigate the social construction of rationalized organizing 
principles (Dobbin 1994, p. 117). This constructivist perspective on in-
stitutional theory is firmly rooted in the social phenomenology of Al-
fred Schütz as well as in Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s seminal 
work on "The Social Construction of Reality" (1966). According to this 
perspective, institutions are seen as "subjective social phenomena that 
are derived from experience rather than objective natural phenomena 
that are revealed through experience" (Dobbin 1994, p. 122). In other 
words, it is assumed that objective, unmediated or non-normative re-
presentations of institutions do not exist. Representations are always 
contingent upon social contexts and the ways in which we, as individ-
uals, make use of our language. As a result, institutional settings are 
                                                          
18 In addition to the six major categories, other strands of institutionalist research such 
as feminist institutionalism, world polity institutionalism, and normative institutionalism  
exist. However, I consider it useful to integrate the normative approach into the 
broader category of organizational or sociological institutionalism. This is because I 
understand "normative" institutionalism (as defined by Peters 2012, p. 27) to be part of 
the same intellectual tradition that stands behind the organizational or sociological 
strand of NI. Moreover, discursive institutionalism is sometimes referred to as "construc-
tivist" institutionalism. This categorization may potentially lead to confusion, since the 
(older) strand of sociological institutionalism is also firmly rooted in the constructivist 
tradition. 
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perceived to be permanently changing according to the way in which 
we assign meaning to them through shared definitions of reality and 
fill them with life through our interactions and shared social practices. 
Following this tradition, contemporary work associated with organi-
zational or sociological institutionalism is primarily concerned with 
processes of institutionalization, symbolic aspects of social behavior 
and the dynamics between (and within) organizations. Sociological in-
stitutionalism explores how institutions emerge and change, and aims 
to study the functioning and structures of institutions with reference 
to the values, culture, norms and expectations of their social environ-
ment. In doing so, it also builds on normative sociological theories that 
have been developed by structural functionalists such as Émile Durk-
heim, who referred to sociology as the "science of institutions, their 
genesis, and their functioning" (Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 45), as well 
as Talcott Parsons, who described "normative orientation" as a neces-
sary condition for every consistent action and social order (Parsons 
1937, p. 44). Structural functionalism, defined as a subfield of normative 
sociology, provides a relatively straightforward account of human be-
havior that is in some aspects similar to the approach taken by New 
Institutional Economics.19  This approach is based on the assumption 
that human beings … 
depend on some means to drastically reduce a situation’s complexity, 
i.e. a way to systematize its components into one meaningful order, 
thereby abstracting from some components as being irrelevant. From 
this stems the importance of mental models, or schemas, in which the 
cultural meaning of typical situations is embodied, and which are     
activated upon entering a situation (Kroneberg 2006, p. 4).  
This idea of human behavior is also an integral part of the action theo-
ries in the Mead-Blumer tradition of the so-called symbolic interaction-
                                                          
19 The term normative sociology is often used to describe research in social philosophy 
that is either focused on the assertion or rejection of ethical norms. I will use the term 
in a broader sense, as referring to sociological research on norms and normativity.    
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ism according to which individuals "interactively construct the mean-
ing of an undefined situation by sending and interpreting significant 
symbols" (Kroneberg 2006, p. 4).  
An alternative position in normative sociology, namely that human be-
ings exercise different degrees of rationality, originates from the work 
of Max Weber. Weber essentially assumes that human beings rarely 
engage in means-end rational action and seldom weight action alter-
natives and their expected consequences against one another (Krone-
berg 2006, p. 7). Quite on the contrary, social actions are often influ-
enced by habitual, affectual, and traditional factors. However, aside 
from his famous typology of action, Weber portrays the rationalization 
and institutionalization of the social sphere as the inescapable fate of 
modern societies, exemplified by the "iron cage"20 of the bureaucratic 
state administration which embodies the highest structural form of ra-
tionality (Weber [1930] 2005, p. 123). Indeed, Max Weber’s conceptions 
of the sovereign state may be regarded as partially outdated in view of 
recent discussions around global governance, failed states, and the rise 
of legitimate agency beyond the state (Schulz 2011, p. 23). His concern 
about social stratification and the ability of modern bureaucracies to 
accumulate power and authority nonetheless remains a rallying point 
for critical thought in the social sciences. Max Weber, although he 
never made an explicit attempt to develop a general theory of institu-
tions, consequently describes rationalized and bureaucratic admin-
istration as "domination through knowledge" (Weber 1978, p. 
225).  
Karl Marx, another famous representative of the normative approach 
to sociology, also sought to analyze human history with reference to 
knowledge, power and social stratification, but based on the notion of 
class conflict. Contrary to functionalists such as Durkheim and Par-
sons, who see societal outcomes as the result of shared (cultural) values 
                                                          
20 The English translation "iron cage" is not very precise, since Weber originally uses 
the expression "stahlhartes Gehäuse" (a shell as hard as steel). For a detailed discussion 
of the analytical implications see: Baehr 2001. 
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and differentiated norms, the Marxian approach to normative sociol-
ogy proceeds on the assumption that the capitalist system is ultimately 
self-defeatist and repressive, and that it can only be overcome through 
a united working class by means of self-emancipation and revolution-
ary struggle. Thus, in comparison to the functionalist mode of expla-
nation, Marxism subscribes to a fundamentally different interpretation 
of normative and institutionalized behavior, which is based on the 
analysis of labor, capitalism and class consciousness. 
Arguably, this remarkable diversity of sociological approaches to nor-
mative analysis can be traced back to the fact that numerous norms, 
rules, and institutions pervade every aspect of social life. Following 
this line of thought, it becomes readily apparent why scholarly interest 
in institutions cuts across various disciplines such as political science, 
sociology, anthropology, law, psychology, organizational studies and 
economics, just to name a few. The great variety of approaches may 
also be related to the relativist notion that finding a definition of the 
term institution "is not an issue of right or wrong; it depends on the 
purpose of the analysis" (Aoki 2001, p. 10). Accordingly, the rise of var-
ious strands of institutionalism may reflect the tendency of individual 
scholars to apply their own disciplinary views about the nature of hu-
man behavior to the study of institutionalization and institutional evo-
lution. Essentially, scholars in this tradition share the common interest 
of exploring and describing the relationship between institutions and 
individuals vis-à-vis the notion of agency, although they generally dif-
fer in their thematic focus as well as their theoretical understanding of 
what a social institution or 'the political' actually is. As a result of this 
internal diversity, institutional theory is often accused of lacking a uni-
fying empirical theory of institutions that is not only falsifiable, but 
also able to explain why scholars should concentrate on institutions as 
an analytical category, instead of "simply looking at rule-based behav-
ior, or the impact of particular rules or norms" (Peters 2012, pp. 91-92).  
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Implicitly, Geoffrey M. Hodgson adopts this critical view in his at-
tempt to define institutions. As mentioned in the beginning of this sec-
tion, Hodgson’s argument is based on the idea that institutions are es-
sentially social rule-systems, and that they should be studied as such. 
Furthermore, he states that contrastive usages of terms such as 'insti-
tutions', 'rules', 'conventions' and 'organizations' are not necessarily 
criterial. Instead, Hodgson assumes that these terms are just sympto-
matic of essential properties (social genotypes) of the basic concepts that 
undergird them (Hodgson 2006, p. 18). Such social genotypes are, for 
instance, included in the general understanding of institutions as "sys-
tems of established and embedded social rules that structure social in-
teractions" (Hodgson 2006, p. 18). Human language, monetary sys-
tems, legal frameworks, table manners as well as systems of weights 
and measures can thus be considered institutions (Hodgson 2006, p. 2).  
Nevertheless, two important questions have to be answered in the con-
text of Hodgson’s approach to institutions, namely how social rule-sys-
tems structure social interactions, and how they are established and 
embedded. To answer these important questions, it is crucial to look at 
the way in which Hodgson configures his definition of rules. Initially, 
he defines rules as "socially transmitted and customary normative in-
junctions or immanently normative dispositions, that in circumstances 
X do Y" (Hodgson 2006, p. 18). This complex definition alludes to the 
idea that rules cannot perpetuate themselves directly, but replicate 
through social mechanisms. Rules are not simply the result of inherited 
genes or instincts, but embedded in shared habits of thought and be-
havior and therefore socially transmitted (Hodgson 2006, p. 3). Argua-
bly, rules can emerge as norms of behavior, social conventions, or legal 
rules. According to Hodgson’s definition of rules, the category of cus-
tomary normative rules is especially important for assessing the relation 
between rules and legal frameworks. Hodgson points out that for new 
laws to become rules, they have to become customary, since there are 
also examples of laws that are widely ignored and have not acquired 
the customary or dispositional status of a rule (Hodgson 2006, p. 6). He 
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then brings forward the argument that "[i]gnored laws are not rules" 
(Hodgson 2006, p. 6). At the same time, he portraits rules as immanently 
normative if normative issues arise as soon as a particular rule is con-
tested or critically analyzed. 
The functioning of institutions, as Hodgson concludes, is therefore di-
rectly related to the psychological mechanism of habituation. The social 
acquisition of habits (or habituation) can be characterized as an exam-
ple for one of the aforementioned social genotypes. Thus, habituation  
is a key element for Hodgson to understand how and why institutions 
structure social interactions, and how and why they are established 
and embedded in social life. Habits are conceptualized as "the consti-
tutive material of institutions, providing them with enhanced durabil-
ity, power, and normative authority" (Hodgson 2006, p. 7). Therefore, 
habituation "is the psychological mechanism that forms the basis of 
much rule-following behavior" and occurs when individuals uncon-
sciously conform to the behavioral norms of their society (Hodgson 2006, 
p. 7).  
Hodgson also discusses the controversial distinction between institu-
tions and organizations as well as between 'formal' and 'informal' in-
stitutions. Especially Douglass North’s influential formulations of 
these terms are criticized for being incomplete and misleading. Hodg-
son finds that their ambiguous use created much confusion and sug-
gests to define an organization as a special type of institution involving 
membership, sovereignty, and chains of command delineating respon-
sibilities (Hodgson 2006, p. 18).21 Regarding the distinction between 
"formal" and "informal" institutions, Hodgson stresses the need to ei-
ther abandon these words entirely or at least to use them with extreme 
care. He further proposes that "[i]t may be best to use more precise 
terms such as legal, nonlegal, and explicit instead" (Hodgson 2006, p. 13).  
                                                          
21 Recent social phenomena such as virtual collectives (e. g. Anonymous) make it in-
creasingly problematic to maintain that organizations are necessarily tied to a certain 
location and defined by hierarchies, budgets, and legal status. 
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Other typologies of institutions are also discussed by Hodgson, includ-
ing the difference between self-organizing and other institutions, and 
the differences in degrees of sensitivity to varying personality types of 
the agents involved in particular institutions. Here, Hodgson tries to 
avoid overgeneralizations concerning the nature of institutions, and 
emphasizes that it would be a mistake to suggest that all institutions 
are self-organizing. He claims to have shown "that some institutional 
rules require other institutions for their enforcement" (Hodgson 2006, 
p. 18). Moreover, Hodgson argues that one would be equally mistaken 
to conceptualize all institutions as insensitive to the personalities or 
psychologies of the people involved. This, according to Hodgson, 
would "lead to the further error of conflating individuals into the insti-
tutional structure, where the interplay of both is required to under-
stand how institutions are formed and sustained" (Hodgson 2006, p. 
19).  
In the course of his argumentation, Hodgson nevertheless avoids to 
define the exact difference between 'rules' and 'norms' or 'normative' 
behavior, which is implicit in his definition of rules and institutions. 
Similarly, his aforementioned definition of 'habit' and 'habituation' in-
cludes the term 'normative authority', which is also left unexplained. 
By only rushing through some attempts to distinguish between habit-
uation, norms/normativity and rules, and by only briefly mentioning 
the related difficulties, Hodgson leaves the reader rather confused 
about the fact that he seemingly does not perceive a major difference 
between these terms, while, at the same time, he uses 'normative' as a 
distinct category in his definitions of rules, habits, and institutions.  
In light of these conceptual vacuities, another attempt to structure the 
various strands of institutionalism and institutional theory has been 
made by William R. Scott (1995). Scott proposes to distinguish between 
three analytical perspectives on institutional order. These perspectives 
are regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive.  
Scott sees the regulative perspective as the one being related to rule-
setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities, while the normative 
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perspective is focused on the prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory 
aspects of social life; the cultural-cognitive perspective, in turn, de-
scribes the "shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social re-
ality and the frames though which meaning is made" (Scott 2008, p. 
428). Scott also readily acknowledges that, in practice, these perspec-
tives are often overlapping. Moreover, he states that the cultural-cog-
nitive perspective, in particular, correlates with "the deeper founda-
tions of institutional forms (…) the infrastructure on which not only 
beliefs, but norms and rules rest" (Scott 2008, p. 429, also see Green-
wood et al. 2008, p. 15). Indeed, Scott’s three perspectives (or 'pillars') 
have become one of the most influential contributions to institutional 
theory in recent years. However, it seems as if Scott’s categorization 
has just opened up another Pandora’s box of conceptual difficulties. 
The biggest problem is perhaps to explain the emergence of norma-
tivity out of the relationship between culture and cognition. Assuming 
that agency, power, and discourse are reintroduced into the debate and 
that essentialist views of culture are inherently problematic, this con-
ceptual puzzle certainly demands further clarification. 
Meanwhile, mostly as a result of the poststructuralist turn in political 
science, the new institutionalism has been fiercely criticized for under-
valuing the agency of actors in processes of institutional change. The 
main thrust of this critique was directed at "stop-go models" of change 
that were unable to incorporate the dynamic interplay between social 
interactions, institutional constraints and contextual factors (Lowndes 
and Roberts 2013, p. 129-130). Yet it is fair to say that this rather static 
view of institutional change has been considerably revised in recent 
years. Concerning the relationship between agency, power and insti-
tutional change, the 'revised' institutionalist position may be summa-
rized as follows: 
Institutionalists never assume that institutions and power have 
reached an equilibrium, explaining institutional change does not pre-
sent a problem. Institutions do not determine behavior, they simply 
provide a context for actions that helps us to understand why actors 
make the choices that they do. Facing the same sets of institutional 
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hurdles, self-reflective actors can make creative decisions about how 
to proceed. Thus, institutions – even when defined in the broadest 
sense – neither mold human perceptions to such an extent that            
individuals are incapable of recognizing competing definitions of 
identity and interest nor do they force human action along a single 
track (Immergut 1998, p. 26). 
It is nonetheless true that an understanding of discursive ele-
ments "as distinct from rationalist interests, path-dependent history, 
and cultural framing" is a relatively new phenomenon in institutional 
theory (Schmidt 2010, p. 3). From an institutionalist perspective, schol-
arly interest in ideas and discourses mostly came with the motivation 
to study how particular discourses create relationships and channel 
"authority through the articulation of norms" (Brown 2006, p. 71). In 
other words, discourse analysis is seen as an ideal instrument to assess 
instances of normative change, ambiguity, and contestation. Moreo-
ver, discourse analysis is perceived as a well-suited method to explore 
processes of (de)politicization and the normative underpinnings of 
policies and practices. However, combining ideas of discourse analysis 
and normative sociology still poses serious conceptual challenges. The 
main challenge is to find an answer to the question of what drives in-
stitutional dynamics. Should institutions themselves be at the heart of 
our explanations as mainstream institutional theory proposes, or is it 
perhaps more rewarding to focus on ideational change instead, as the 
discursive approach suggests? 
Following the lead of Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p. 134), I argue that 
social theorists would be well advised to guard against the tendency 
to perceive institutions as "empty vessels in which ideas can be 
poured" and to downplay the constraining effects that institutions may 
have upon "the adoption of ideas or the (…) shaping of behavior". In 
other words, institutions do not simply function as ideational 'contain-
ers' for political entrepreneurs who wield and yield discursive power. 
They also structure the context in which ideas emerge. Furthermore, it 
follows from the above that the notion of an idea, in a Platonic sense 
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(tópos noētós), appears to be rather elusive. Empirically speaking, ideas 
are hardly traceable, unless they are mediated by cognitive interpreta-
tions according to which meaning ('truth') is created and specific im-
pulses for inaction or action ('ought') are given. An 'ought', however, 
does not necessarily need to be a 'moral ought'. This means that ideas 
are inherently normative, but not in the sense of 'moral truth'. Ideas are 
seen as "causal beliefs" (Béland and Cox 2011, p. 3). Thus, when we 
consider hierarchies of causal beliefs, another empirical problem oc-
curs. How do we assess, for instance, which ideas ultimately trigger 
specific decisions or actions?  
From a normative point of view, this problem can be largely avoided 
by arguing that it is not of primary importance to study whether ideas 
have an effect or not, but to consider how power and normative orders 
affect the ways in which ideas are expressed and discourses conveyed 
(contrary to Schmidt 2010, p. 21). At first sight, it is therefore essential 
to employ a theoretical approach that addresses the respective weak-
nesses of both, structuralist and discursive taxonomies.  
In this analysis, I will follow Keller (2011, p. 48) in defining discourses 
as "performative statement practices which constitute reality orders 
and also produce power effects in a conflict-ridden network of social 
actors (…) and knowledge systems". Adopting this approach means to 
adopt a critical and situational logic, according to which 'truth' is cre-
ated through shared normative definitions of reality, but not inde-
pendent of power relations and material, social, political, cultural and 
historical circumstances and practices.  
Furthermore, to gain a clearer analytical perspective on institutional 
theory, I suggest to turn to the concept of normativity itself. Norma-
tivity, on the one hand, governs meaning and presupposes the fact that 
social structures, practices, and symbolic meanings are intrinsically 
value laden. Norms, on the other hand, are conceived as cognitive 
meaning-making devices and are therefore socially transmitted. They 
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gain validity by virtue of their repetition and performativity in con-
texts of social interaction (Bicchieri 2006, p. 2). Institutions, then, are 
seen to encapsulate divergent normative interpretations of human be-
havior (O'Riordan and Jordan 1999, p. 81). Quite clearly, we experience 
in our everyday lives that normative meanings exist at the core of every 
institution. Their transient stability or propensities for change, how-
ever, are mediated by less visible and relational influences of power, 
alongside indirect and manifold ways in which these dynamics are 
sustained (Cleaver 2012, p. 22). As Kothari (2001, pp. 144-145) argues, 
meanings are shaped by "strategies of normalization" through a multi-
tude of everyday processes such as codification, classification, repre-
sentation, performativity, and self-surveillance.  
Nevertheless, in view of these complex social processes, and since the 
overall goal of this chapter is to combine discursive with normative 
taxonomies, a more structured engagement with the philosophical di-
mension of normativity is required. Overall, it has become clear that 
discursive and normative approaches in the social sciences operate 
with fundamentally different epistemologies and ontologies. To be 
able to link the concept of normativity to recent accounts of cognition, 
power and discourse, I consider it necessary to move beyond binary 
oppositions that are commonly associated with the notion of norma-
tivity, such as 'prescriptive' and 'descriptive' research. I also maintain 
that a more thorough engagement with the ethical dimensions of na-
ture-society relations is in fact a prerequisite for a transformative ap-
proach to adaptation, since our normative and ontological interpreta-
tions of 'nature' and its riskiness have profound ethical implications for 
adaptation research and practice. 
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Toward Transformative Politics: Normative 
Sociology and the Question of Ethics  
 
Now, sociology is (…) trying to become a superscience, the science that explains all 
others. But how could it escape the very disqualification it brings on the other sciences? 
(Stengers 2000, p. 2-3)  
[E]ntire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are 
learning the hard way that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, 
unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of language, that 
we always speak from a particular standpoint, and so on, while dangerous extremists 
are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence 
that could save our lives. (…) Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming 
is a fact whether you like it or not? (…) The critic is not the one who debunks, but the 
one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of 
the naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather. 
The critic is not the one who alternates haphazardly between antifetishism and posi-
tivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by Goya, but the one for whom, if something 
is constructed, then it means it is fragile and thus in great need of care and caution. 
(Latour 2004, p. 227; 246) 
In the beginning of the new millennium, Paul R. Brass wrote a journal 
article titled "Foucault steals political science". In his article, Brass 
(2000, p. 2) argues that "the subject matter of what has been tradition-
ally considered central to the discipline, namely, power and govern-
ment, has been stolen by Foucault while central trends in the discipline 
as a whole have departed markedly from serious engagement with 
those topics." It is clear that even sixteen years later, it is hardly imagi-
nable for political scientists and institutional theorists to avoid regular 
forays into Foucauldian territory. Foucauldian notions of power and 
'normal vs. pathological', 'dispositif', 'governmentality' and 'discourse' 
are common features of social science research with a political outlook. 
This 'Foucauldian imperative' nevertheless raises specific theoretical 
questions that need to be considered before combining normative so-
ciology with ideational or discursive approaches. Bearing in mind the 
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call to 'bring the political back' into research on climate change adap-
tation, the crucial point is to understand more thoroughly how power 
and resistance play out in practice.  
Before engaging with this problem, however, I would like to clarify 
what I mean by the term normative sociology. As previously mentioned, 
the notion of normative sociology is typically associated with theories 
of structural functionalism and the work of seminal sociologist Talcott 
Parsons. For most social theorists, this implies mechanistic rigidity and 
a Parsonian overemphasis on the unity of culture and the structural 
constraints of society. In other words, normative sociology is consid-
ered a relic of the past. Rational choice theory, "in responding to the 
'over-socialized' individual of Parsonian sociology, has gone to the po-
lar extreme and proposed (…) an individual that is judged to be 'mal-
functioning' when he or she fails to act as a 'norm-free' rationalist" 
(Shilling and Mellor 2001, p. 180).  
Meso-level theory, in turn, has largely sought to avoid these polarized 
debates about the nature of normativity by defining norms as the "en-
actment of negotiated meanings" (Fine 2001, p. 139). Adopting such a 
practice-based view of normativity, however, comes with its own set 
of conceptual difficulties. Initially, it needs to be considered that nor-
mativity is not only about the subjective enactment and negotiation of 
norms, but also about the cognitive order of society (Strydom 2013). A 
practice-based view of normativity which identifies the individual as 
the sole "source and center of psychological experiences" undervalues 
the fact that normative systems and communities precede individual 
knowledge (Moghaddam 2010, p. 465). To put it in a different way, it 
is important to realize that intersubjective normative knowledge exists 
prior to the individual internalization of this knowledge, logically as 
well as ontogenetically, thus rendering norms the basic form of social 
facts (Sinha 2009, Bianchin 2015).  
Nevertheless, cognitive order is not generated by norms alone, as indi-
viduals possess the innate capacity to question and transcend shared 
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normative standards. In light of such contingent conditions, cognitive 
order does not simply imply a rigid either/or distinction between epis-
temic objectivism and constructivism. Quite to the contrary, it accen-
tuates those higher-order cognitive and emotional abilities that are 
learned in social interactions, and mediated through culturally shaped 
narratives and systems of symbolic representation. These learned 
higher-order abilities structure the formation of our normative cogni-
tion, making culture and normative cognition mutually constitutive, 
and allowing individuals to understand, apply or reject normative con-
cepts (see, for instance Jensen 2013, Deacon 2014).  
The crux of the matter is that ontological, epistemological, and ethical 
questions arise as soon as, meanings are negotiated, concepts are intro-
duced, and behavior is regulated in a social context. As a result of our 
human ability for ethical reasoning, we are constantly faced with the 
potentiality of our actions and the burden of moral choice. Normative 
sociology, in this sense, "is logically inescapable because we need to 
rationally defend either advocating moral norms or else refusing to do 
so" (Sztybel 2009, p. 86). 
To be more precise at this point, it may be prudent to note that these 
initial insights about norms and moral behavior do not preclude the 
distinction between normative and empirical arguments in the social 
sciences. For the sake of greater clarity of the argument, it is indeed 
considered necessary to maintain this distinction, while acknowledg-
ing that "integrating facts and values in the same work does not entail 
their conflation" (Gerring and Yesnowitz 2006, p. 121). Applying nor-
mative sociology in the context of anthropogenic climate change, then, 
requires us to distinguish between two analytical approaches to norms 
and facticity. By accentuating the differences as well as the similarities 
between these two approaches, I shall hope to convince the reader that 
philosophy and social theory are all but irrelevant for real-life con-
cerns, and that the problem of climate change adaptation demands a 
more thorough engagement with ethical questions. Therefore, let me 
begin by briefly introducing the two approaches. 
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According to the first approach, which I refer to as the postmodern ap-
proach to normativity, norms are seen as socially constructed, subjec-
tive, and historically instituted.22 This is to say, norms are contingent 
social facts or obligations which gain validity only in relation to self-
referential systems of language. Moreover, the postmodern position 
holds that normativity is expressed through totalizing systems of 
thought. Examples for such totalizing systems of thought are supposed 
to be found in the grand meta-narratives of Enlightenment rationality 
and linear historical progress. Studying normativity in accordance 
with the postmodern approach, therefore, means to 'work backwards' 
to uncover the contingent nature of all normative orientations. Argua-
bly, this can be achieved by engaging in an archaeology/genealogy of 
power and knowledge, based on reflexivity and deconstruction.  
In philosophy, postmodern thought proceeds from the Spinozian and 
Nietzschean tradition, advocating for a metaphysics and ontology of 
immanence and difference. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, postmodern philosophy can thus be described as a gesture 
of resistance against the "univocity of meaning", "epistemic certainty", 
and essentialist concepts of identity. Veritable traces of this intellectual 
tradition can be found in the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Der-
rida, in the feminist critique of Donna Haraway, and notably, in the 
philosophical writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.23  
The second approach to normativity which I consider to be of vital im-
portance for this study is rooted in Hegelian philosophy and a cogni-
tivist reading of contemporary critical theory. This approach, based in 
the key concept of immanent transcendence   24, perceives the immanent 
and transcendent – or actual and potential – dimensions of the social 
                                                          
22 Here I use the umbrella term 'postmodern' to designate a poststructuralist and post-
phenomenological orientation in philosophy and social theory. 
23 This selection of 'postmodern' theorists is evidently non-exhaustive. 
24 The concept of immanent transcendence holds that transcendence (God, the One,  
the Absolute, the Other, depending on the scholarly interpretation) is experienced in 
and through physical actuality, but at the same time irreducible to it.  
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world as mutually constituting. What is particularly relevant about 
this weak naturalistic view of a "situated reason" (Strydom 2011, p. 69) 
is that it reaches beyond postmodern ideas of immanent ethical evalu-
ation, which are either fundamentally opposed to universal standards 
of 'morality', 'essence' and 'truth', or conceive of these transcendental 
'absolutes' as proto-totalitarian. However, when combined with the 
anti-normative tenets of a self-proclaimed value-free science, this post-
modern eclipse of ideal absolutes for the sake of liberal pluralism 
makes for a peculiar (post-)political alliance, as I shall discuss later in 
this section. 
What is important for now, however, is the tendency in postmodern 
ethics to reject the existence of a universal, pre-social (transcendental), 
and non-contingent sphere whose potentiality sustains all the contin-
gencies of created reality. In other words, by removing universality 
from the meta-ethical discourse, postmodern ethics runs the risk of de-
priving the human imagination of a transcendental, unfulfilled soci-
ocultural potential which is materially embodied in the cognitive order 
of society.25 Contrary to this sentiment, I argue that the transformative 
enactment and radicalization of this unfulfilled evolutionary potential 
vis-à-vis the historical sediments of institutional life and time-depend-
ent moral judgement is the very essence of political movement. At-
tempts to reject normative universals by pandering to the slippery 
slope of anti-foundationalist and anti-realist rhetoric must therefore be 
regarded as a straw man debate. Overall, social theory has to maintain 
a strong focus on normativity, as it "needs to provide a normative 
                                                          
25 The immanent transcendence of the cognitive order, seen through a Hegelian lens, 
means that "we are embodied beyond our individuality, which is to say our identities 
as persons are not simply identical with our identities as bodies: we are embodied in 
language and social institutions, which means there can be a meaningful distinction 
between me and my body, and we are informed by autonomous rationality (which we 
might call 'mind' proper), which means there can be a meaningful distinction between 
terms that define our finite perspectives and those finite perspectives themselves" 
(Russon 2015 on Hegel’s 'Philosophy of Mind', p. 55-56; emphasis in the original).   
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framework able to distinguish between the emancipatory and the re-
pressive potentials of human reality" (Susen 2009, p. 105). A postmod-
ern epistemological nihilism which seeks to unveil the hegemonic, con-
tingent and totalizing nature of normative universals is, therefore, in 
itself … 
merely a naïve form of foundationalism insofar as it will always posit 
a privileged determiner without being able to justify that privilege 
[and thus] undermines its own ability to make any normative evalu-
ations at all – not only with respect to the now-common pretense that 
all universal claims (that is, universally) conceal a particular content 
(or constitute a hegemonic stand-in) but even with respect to the very 
forms of domination it otherwise wishes to criticize (Kisner 2008, p. 
9) 
Thus, to preclude accusations of both ethical nihilism and crypto-nor-
mativism, postmodern skepticism posits historically and culturally 
contingent discursive engagement as the only valid perspective from 
which meaningful questions about ethical life can be raised. In other 
words, what unites the diverse intellectual branches of postmodern-
ism, postphenomenology and poststructuralism is the desire to avoid 
an absolutist approach toward ethical justification, and to recast the 
ethical question in ontological terms. Much of this thinking stands in 
the direct tradition of Theodor Adorno, Jacques Derrida and Emman-
uel Lévinas, whereas the latter describes the face-to-face encounter and 
conversation with the other as "the ethical model of relationships par 
excellence" (Madison and Fairbairn 1999, p. 4).  
Yet, to put it rather polemically, if we fully embrace this ethical 
principle shouldn’t we have simply conversed more thoroughly with 
the murderers in Auschwitz to convince them of their hideous wrong-
doing? Quite obviously, this seems to be an absurd foundation for ap-
plied ethics. Strangely enough, this ethical model is put forward by an 
eminent Jewish scholar and survivor of the Shoah. At a second glance, 
this initial contradiction may nonetheless point us to a deeper insight 
that implicitly links the Lévinasian tradition of ethical reasoning with 
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Hegelian philosophy and contemporary critical theory. To further ex-
plicate this connection we may quote Jean-Luc Nancy (1991, p. 35; em-
phasis added) who states that "the concentration camp (...) is in essence 
the will to destroy community. But even in the camp itself, undoubt-
edly, community never entirely ceases to resist this will. Community, 
is, in a sense, resistance itself: namely, resistance to immanence." In line 
with an interpretation offered by Mathew Abbott (2012, p. 28), we may 
further assume that resistance to immanence does not mean that "hu-
manity is indestructible; it says there is something inhuman in it that 
remains. It is not identity, which can be destroyed, but the impersonal 
core of singularity." Derrida himself speaks of this impersonal singu-
larity as the undeconstructability of justice, which he separates from the 
deconstructability of droit, authority, legitimacy (Derrida 1990, p. 945; 
also see Zlomislić 2007, p. 250; Hoy 2004, p. 186). According to Derrida, 
an ethical call to justice is placed on us only through the singular en-
counter of the immanent 'I' with the radical transcendence of the 'oth-
er'. What is interesting in this regard is that there is neither reciprocity 
nor community assumed in this encounter between the 'I' and the 'oth-
er' (or the immanent and the transcendent). Their relationship is con-
ceptualized in merely passive terms – "Nothing prevents the ethical 
treatment of the other as other from sinking into mere indifference" 
(Kruger 2011, p. 207; emphasis added).  
From a Hegelian perspective, the concept of undeconstructable justice 
thus fails to describe what is really at stake in the realm of ethical life.26 
While ethics according Lévinas and Derrida assume that a call for jus-
tice is placed on the subject through its transcendent relationship with 
the radically other, the Hegelian position, by contrast, postulates that 
                                                          
26 Before engaging in this debate, it is warranted to caution against a postmodern car-
icature of Hegel as a philosopher of 'Absolute Knowing' whose syncretizing dialectic 
and rational subject is the arch enemy of all ontological difference and plurality. Not 
only is this picture of Hegel fundamentally distorted, it also hinders a productive en-
gagement between Hegelian and postmodern though. For a summary of these com-
mon misrepresentations see Houle and Vernon 2013.  
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justice has to be thought in relation to a dialectical rupture in/of imma-
nence itself. Following Slavoj Žižek’s interpretation of Hegelian phi-
losophy, this rupture is based in the fact that there is no "ontological 
guarantee or foundation" of ethics and justice in the "a priori Void of 
Being" (2008, p. 187). In other words, the ideal of justice must produce 
dialectical difference and contradiction, because it involves the act of 
judging – the split of the Hegelian 'concept' – which immanently moves 
historical transformations (Nuzzo 2012, p. 11). Žižek remarks that … 
the endless postponement of the arrival of a fully moral universe is 
not just an effect of the gap between the purity of the Ideal and the 
empirical circumstances which prevent its full actualization, it is        
located in this Ideal itself, inscribing a contradiction (…) into its very 
heart (Žižek 2014, p. 33). 
This is precisely the reason why Hegelian philosophy cautions against 
ambiguous claims that assert the 'undeconstructability' of justice. For 
Hegel, "it is only within the institutional structures of ethical life that 
anything like the claims of morality can be pursued and realized" 
(Speight 2008, p. 78). In other words, because "history and (...) human 
subjectivity (…) are constantly transforming themselves", it is only in 
relation to dynamic institutional structures that ethical life fully realizes 
itself (Lumsden 2013, p. 135).  
However, while this philosophical recourse to the foundations of mod-
ern and postmodern ethics seems to be rather abstract at first, it be-
comes immediately relevant when we speak of climate justice and risk. 
This view is also supported by the fifth IPCC Assessment Report which 
clearly states that "[i]ssues of equity, justice, and fairness arise with re-
spect to mitigation and adaptation," and that "[m]any areas of climate 
policy-making involve value judgements and ethical considerations" 
(IPCC 2014a, p. 5). For instance, if we perceive problems such as cli-
mate change, biodiversity loss and nitrogenization through the lens of 
'planetary boundaries' – that is, potentially dangerous thresholds and 
tipping points in socio-ecological systems and the biosphere – we also 
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need to consider how these boundaries are defined as a result of nor-
mative and ethical judgements. This definitional problem is explicitly 
acknowledged by natural scientists working on planetary boundaries, 
notably by Rockström et al. (2009, p. 5, Fig. 3), who summarize the cri-
teria and process for the definition and identification of planetary 
boundaries as follows: 
Although current scientific understanding underpins the analysis of 
the existence, location, and nature of thresholds, normative judge-
ments influence the definition and the position of planetary bounda-
ries: 
 The selection of planetary boundaries emerges from the         
definition of what constitutes unacceptable human-induced 
global environmental change. 
 The position of a planetary boundary is a function of the de-
gree of risk a community is willing to take (…) 
 The position is furthermore a function of the social and eco-
logical resilience of the impacted societies (…) 
 Boundaries are identified for processes where the time 
needed to trigger an abrupt or irreversible change is within 
an 'ethical time horizon' – a timeframe (i) short enough to in-
fluence today’s decisions yet long enough to provide a basis 
for sustainability over many generations to come, and (ii) 
within which decisions taken can influence whether or not 
the estimated threshold is crossed. 
This example shows that climate change presents us with a unique nor-
mative challenge due to the fact that its consequences over time are 
largely unpredictable, and that the actual and potential costs of inac-
tion are high for affected individuals as well as for future generations. 
The way in which these normative and adaptive challenges ought to 
be addressed from an ethical perspective is nonetheless a point of con-
tention.  
In the context of climate change adaptation, I therefore distinguish be-
tween three major types of normative ethics. The first approach is so-
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called ethical consequentialism or utilitarianism. In decision making and 
risk management, consequentialism implies an ex-ante orientation to-
ward anticipated outcomes. The core principle of consequentialist eth-
ics is to 'optimize' the negative consequences of individual and collec-
tive actions based on economic aggregation and cost-benefit analyses. 
While this approach is mostly associated with mitigation efforts, it also 
plays an important role with regard to the reduction of potential harm, 
loss, and damage. The consequentialist approach nonetheless fails to 
deliver for several reasons. The first reason is that it is deemed possible 
within the utilitarian paradigm to evaluate and compare negative out-
comes in monetary terms. That is, by means of simple aggregation 
(summation). The second reason is that the consequentialist paradigm 
standardizes human behavior by postulating that human beings seek 
to maximize their benefits and simply take decisions based on instru-
mental rationality.  
Why are these assumptions problematic? On the one hand, it is 
not ethically justifiable to measure the value of a human life in mone-
tary terms, to compare these values to each other, and to arrive at a 
conclusion about the value of a human life based on principles of eco-
nomic utility maximization. Unmitigated consequentialism or utilitar-
ianism may thus lead to a situation in which the death of a certain num-
ber of individuals (here we may also substitute the word death with 
property damage or injury) is deemed justifiable based on a rational 
cost-benefit analysis (Nida-Rümelin et al. 2012, p. 150). On the other 
hand, it needs to be acknowledged that rule-systems and individual 
orientations are based on a variety of normative and cultural values, 
and not simply on principles of rationality and utility maximization 
(Jamieson 2012, p. 190). Lastly, it is important to stress that ethical con-
sequentialism is likely to result in maladaptive outcomes under condi-
tions of deep uncertainty, either due to the erroneous prioritization of 
resource ('welfare') allocation, or because of the impossibility to ac-
count for the full range of consequences that particular actions might 
yield. Here, I will not even delve into the ethical question by which 
standards particular outcomes would qualify as 'good' and for whom. 
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As long as the workings of the global economic system are not even 
fully understood without taking climate change into account, it is in-
deed "almost unimaginable to suppose that we could aggregate the di-
verse impacts of global climate change in such a way as to dictate pol-
icy responses" (Jamieson 2012, p. 192). 
In light of these severe limitations, an alternative approach to adapta-
tion is to act in accordance with the precautionary principle. The precau-
tionary principle states that under conditions of deep uncertainty, the 
best possible way to act is to minimize those risks which are potentially 
most harmful (the 'known unknowns'). When faced with the problem 
of adaptation and sustainable development, however, acting in accord-
ance with the precautionary principle does not offer any tangible ad-
vantages over classical cost-benefit analyses (Nida-Rümelin et al. 2012, 
p. 122). On the contrary, applying the precautionary principle as a 
standard procedure for adaptation planning entails the danger of cas-
cading failure due to a selective focus on particular risks (target risks), 
and the negligence of countervailing risks and systemic effects.  
Yet, on account of the fact that the total elimination of risk is an impos-
sibility, and that single approaches to climate change adaptation are 
not feasible, today’s standard response is to employ an expert-centered 
and scenario-based model of risk evaluation and planning, based on 
"iterative risk management" (IPCC 2014b, p. 9). As I have outlined be-
fore, however, the crucial problem is that defining planetary bounda-
ries and social risks under conditions of deep uncertainty depends on 
the normative (value-based) interpretation of models and projections. 
Although these methods are useful to reduce uncertainty and can be 
seen as relatively reliable tools for scenario planning, it is clear that 
quantitative approaches and predictive models also need to grossly 
simplify causalities, sociopolitical and economic processes, and com-
plex 'nature/culture' relations. In light of the demand for further social 
science research in this field, the International Social Science Council 
(ISSC) concludes that in (…) 
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inter-disciplinary global change research, the focus has fallen sharply 
on the social sciences, with natural scientists, sponsors and funders 
alike calling for more social science, better social science and, very 
importantly, for more attention to global change challenges from 
mainstream social science disciplines. For the most part, these calls 
are driven by the simple recognition that if the fundamental causes 
and consequences of global change are social, then so must the solu-
tions be (Hackmann and St. Clair 2012, p. 9).  
When looking at climate change adaptation through a social lens, how-
ever, we are confronted with a collective action dilemma par excel-
lence. This means that adaptation has to be regarded as a problem of 
deontological ethics as well. Deontological (duty-based) ethics, at least 
in their most extreme interpretation, proceed from a given set of 'abso-
lute' normative values that are not to be compromised, regardless of the 
consequences that such actions may yield. In a strict deontological 
sense, this means to accept that certain acts should always be seen as 
morally wrong, even if they may prevent a greater evil to be commit-
ted. Various deontic principles are enshrined in national constitutions, 
legal systems, and a wide variety of international treaties and agree-
ments. Their actual interpretation is, nonetheless, characterized by 
great cultural and normative differences, for example in the case of 
women’s rights, labor rights, civic freedoms, and so on.  
In the case of climate change, the key deontic principle is already at the 
heart of the UNFCCC and encapsulated in the commitment of all par-
ties to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations "at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate sys-
tem" (UNFCCC 1992, p. 9). Furthermore, the need for adaptive action 
is based on the conclusion that "[o]ver the next thirty years, substantial 
climate change is already inevitable, since mitigation will have only a 
minor effect on stocks of greenhouse gases in this time frame" (Stern 
2006, p. 6). In view of this unsettling situation, and given the fact that 
the real occurrence of dangerous climate change has been repeatedly 
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stressed in the five IPCC reports, it must be concluded that ethical prin-
ciples – whether they are based on consequentialist ethics, non-conse-
quentialist ethics, or a mixture of both – have become secondary in im-
portance, especially compared to realist accounts of an institutionally 
sustained politics of unsustainability. 
To further illustrate how the normative primacy of realpolitik also ap-
plies to other deontic principles that are relevant for adaptation, let us 
briefly turn to the example of human rights. Here, even proponents of 
this approach are apt to concede that appealing to ambiguous univer-
sal standards such as human rights is a bold political venture. Whether 
human rights-based approaches are defined in a positive way (the af-
firmation of rights) or in a negative way (the violation of rights) seems 
to be of secondary importance in this context. Slavoj Žižek (2005, p. 
128) remarks:  
What the 'human rights of Third World suffering victims' effectively 
means today, in the predominant discourse, is the right of Western 
powers themselves to intervene politically, economically, culturally 
and militarily in the Third World countries of their choice, in the 
name of defending human rights. 
In sum, it is certainly justified to read Žižek’s example about 
the inversion of human rights not only as a political statement about 
interventionism, but also as an ethical argument. His example ex-
presses the view that ethical norms can, and should not, be taken at 
face value. Normative statements contain already, and this is where 
Žižek follows Hegel, their very own distortion. This means that human 
rights are not simply distorted or pushed to the margins by exterior 
forces who breach or undermine them. Invoking ideal universals such 
as human rights as a foundation for normative ethics is already an am-
biguous act in itself, precisely because human rights have to be politi-
cally and legally interpreted and enforced.  
Obviously, this ambiguity does not imply that human rights are to be 
rejected eo ipso; nor does it mean to say that the International Bill of 
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Human Rights is of no value, or that the International Criminal Court 
should be abolished. But it certainly means to bear in mind that human 
rights are in practice a limited legal and political instrument. Human 
rights are factually not universal, because they are selectively applied. 
Defining human rights as a solid foundation to solve collective action 
problems such as climate change can therefore only be regarded as a 
highly optimistic political and cultural endeavor. At the same time, it 
is important to note that the political appropriation of human rights 
has not only been criticized by neo-Marxist public intellectuals. The 
notion of human rights, and especially of human rights law, has in fact 
been attacked by scholars from a variety of disciplines. Human rights 
discourses have come under considerable scrutiny for their paternaliz-
ing and neocolonial implications, their distortion through bureaucra-
cies and institutions, and their negligence of the non-human dimen-
sion of ethical life, for example in the case of animal rights and envi-
ronmental ethics (see Mutua 2002, Dembour 2010, Singer 2013).  
These concerns have lately been taken up by the advocates of a non-
anthropocentric approach to ethics and axiology. Vivid imageries of 
technonatures, transhumanism and posthumanism have become increas-
ingly influential in the ethical debate on the fluid boundaries between 
nature, technology and humanity in the 21st century. Posthumanism, 
in particular, posits that property boundaries between (and chrono-
topes of) nature and culture are fundamentally blurred by processes of 
"cyborganization" and geoengineering, resulting in a fast-tracked hy-
bridization of biological life, nature and technology (Cooper and Law 
1995, Luke 2009). Most prominently, Donna Haraway refers to the in-
troduction of her famous cyborg  metaphor into social theory as an act 
of "blasphemy" (Haraway 1991, p. 149). Haraway’s provocative meta-
phor of the human machine relativizes the fixedness and uniqueness 
of the human subject experience as well as the spiritual value of Nature 
by postulating Nature-as-virtuality. But more interestingly, and per-
haps unwittingly, the cyborg metaphor has also gained renewed sali-
ence due to the discussion about the boundaries between nature and 
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culture in times of anthropogenic climate change. Newer strands of 
posthumanism, for example, are suggesting to extend our ethical re-
sponsibility beyond our own species, and to reconfigure our moral per-
ception of anthropocentrism, animal rights, the environment, identity 
politics, corporeality, and so forth (Hobden 2014, pp. 175-177).  
It is precisely at this crossroads between sociology, ethics and politics 
where critical theory reminds us to ask ourselves how discourses about 
humanism vs. posthumanism and immanence vs. transcendence may po-
tentially result in new forms of exploitation. Yet, for critical theory to 
be relevant, so I argue, it does not necessarily have to be linked to a 
normative or political perspective such as humanism, environmental-
ism, or Marxism. Its critical approach is already justified by the observ-
able difference between the articulation of explicit normative claims 
such as 'ethical responsibility', and the implicit moral and political am-
biguity of these claims. Thus, under conditions of anthropogenic cli-
mate change, it seems indeed justified to remain critical of the posthu-
manist suggestion to erase "a perceived ontological dualism between 
human and non-human nature" (Hobden 2014, p. 175).  
Broadly speaking, it is clear that the ethical debate about posthuman-
ism now takes place against the backdrop of the so-called Anthropo-
cene, a term that has been popularized by the Nobel Prize-winning at-
mospheric chemist Paul J. Crutzen. In short, the notion of the Anthro-
pocene implies that the "human dominance of biological, chemical and 
geological processes on Earth (…) is already an undeniable reality" 
(Crutzen and Schwägerl 2011, n. pag.). The contentious aspect with re-
gard to the erasure of an ontological difference between human and 
non-human nature is, therefore, ultimately a question of political re-
sponsibility. In view of posthumanist claims to extend our ethical re-
sponsibility and to include the environment as well as other species 
into our ethical considerations, we may simply have to realize that hu-
mans are already fully responsible in the Anthropocene. What is more 
relevant, so it seems, is to ask who currently exercises this responsibil-
ity, and how. We ('humanity') are certainly not all equally responsible. 
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Simultaneously, however, while debates about the ethical implications 
of posthumanism continue, we are reminded that the push  
… to humanize capitalism and its neo-liberal project is having effect. 
In this new scenario, we must be evermore vigilant of the institutional 
arrangements and the colonial entanglements (Walsh 2010, p. 20;    
emphasis added). 
As a matter of political dialectics, 'humanizing' the socio-technological 
systems of neoliberalism does not necessarily imply that transnational 
corporations are launching a charm offensive against the average citi-
zen. Humanizing the in-humane tenets of capitalism such as environ-
mental destruction, unbridled fossil fuel exploitation or rising social 
inequalities may as well be achieved through a gradual de-humaniza-
tion of social theory.27 In this regard, posthumanism stands accused of 
reducing "humans to the status of animals or machines in an instru-
mental, anti-humanist and potentially biologistic or technocratic way 
that could erect new fascist forms of domination" (Fuchs 2009, p. 275). 
The question that naturally follows is: "On what grounds, if 
any, can these stark accusations be justified?"  
Posthumanist arguments in ethics and politics are certainly too diverse 
to subsume them under one major paradigm. However, what can be 
said about the posthumanist line of reasoning is that it emphasizes on-
tology, the Nietzschean 're-valuation of all values' to forge new ethical 
and political coalitions under a pluralist banner. Placing these hyper-
                                                          
27 It is well understood that the alleged boundaries between nature, technology and 
humanity have been rather fluid even before our ancestors used the first stone tools 
and wore animal skins to keep themselves warm. What I am specifically concerned 
with, however, are the ethical and sociopolitical implications of the widely proclaimed 
'Anthropocene', not only in terms of the consequences that arise from changes in the 
Earth System, but also in relation to the human impact on the Earth system. In short, I 
advocate for an engaged ethics which focuses on the agency of technologies, nature-
culture relationships, and the formation of particular technologies and technology 
clusters through concrete social interactions. At the heart of this engagement is the 
question of what constitutes the essence of 'human-nature' relations in the 21st century. 
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ethical demands at the heart of the posthumanist argument, and ele-
vating an abstract non-human totality to a non-foundation of ethics, I 
claim, results in ethical arbitrariness based on systems thinking and 
empty, crypto-humanist rhetoric. Despite occasional claims to the con-
trary, posthumanism is still focused on the opaque subject experience 
of becoming; it is "centerless", "complex", "nomadic", and governed by 
the abstract paradigm of "bio-genetic capitalism" (see Braidotti 2013). 
One might also say, the posthuman world is governed by anxiety. In-
stead of furthering emancipatory attempts, I posit, posthumanist the-
ory is still caught up in the atomism of the self-alienated and desire-
driven postmodern subject. Instead of countervailing the depoliticiz-
ing tenets of a 'fragmegrated' and 'hybridized' modernity, it reifies 
them conceptually. The political and ethical way forward, however, is 
ironically described as a return to source – that is, to a "cosmopolitan 
neo-humanism" (Braidotti 2013, p. 17). It seems we can’t let go after all. 
Nevertheless, if posthumanist philosophy and even human rights are 
inherently ambiguous and prone to being misused, we may ask: What 
are we left with? What are the ethical alternatives? In line with the 
opening quote by Bruno Latour, I am convinced that a good critic is 
the one who assumes that if something is constructed, it is fragile and 
thus in great need of care and caution. And indeed, it seems as if our 
ethical sense of being-in-the-world is increasingly fragile and hence in 
great need of care and caution, while under climate change "our past 
is now racing toward us from the future" (Rose 2013, p. 7). 
Here, we may briefly return to my earlier point about the significance 
of normative ambiguity in research on planetary boundaries. Overall, 
I claim that the mediation of the human experience qua technology, 
power and ecology necessitates to refocus our scientific attention on 
the sphere of the political, and especially on questions of political on-
tology and ethics. In this sense, I agree with some of the basic tenets of 
critical posthumanism. Political ontology, on the one hand, can be de-
fined as the "external ground in relation to which ethical and political 
life gain their sense of what is right" (White 2000, p. 6). At the same 
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time, political ontology has to be regarded as "the study of the political 
stakes of the question of being" (Abbott 2012, p. 24). This turns political 
ontology into a good starting point for debates about transformative 
politics and ethics. 
 
* * * 
 
So how can we introduce a transformative element into our political 
considerations? To begin with, it is clear that Foucauldian thinking and 
postmodern philosophy have certainly enriched the debate on the na-
ture of the political in the 21st century. Deleuzian philosophy, in partic-
ular, because of its emphasis on becoming, desire, virtuality and mul-
tiplicity, has been an attractive choice for many scholars focusing on 
ecology, modernity, capitalism and the political aspects of the digital 
age. Yet, values are strangely absent in a postmodern, 'nomadic' world, 
where everything is becoming, desire, movement, communication, 
stock and flow. In a truly Nietzschean tradition, Deleuzian philosophy 
claims "to live well is to fully express one’s power; that is: to go to the 
limits of your own potential rather than look for non-empirical, trans-
cendent standards to live by" (Jackson 2010, p. 32).28  
But what does this mean for the way we look at, for instance, climate 
change and risk? If 'values' are seen as purely immanent in Deleuzian 
philosophy, we have to ask whether nature in itself has no spiritual 
value at all? Is it only subject to the values we inscribe to it? Is nature, 
in a postmodern-subjectivist sense, only subject to our geoengineering 
because we perceive it as indeterminate, ambiguous, and risky? 
                                                          
28 For Deleuze, immanent evaluation (as compared to transcendental judgement) means 
to evaluate forces according to two Nietzschean categories: active and reactive. The 
Deleuzian de-valuation of moral truth, in other words, is the direct result of a Nie-
tzschean approach to metaphysics (see Zepke 2005, p. 245). 
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In a recent article titled "What's Wrong with Science and Technology 
Studies?" Nicholas Maxwell (2014, pp. 1; 11) engages with this meta-
physical debate by acknowledging that … 
we need a new kind of science which subjects problematic aims – 
problematic assumptions inherent in these aims – to sustained imag-
inative and critical scrutiny as an integral part of science itself (…) 
science cannot proceed without making a very substantial and highly 
problematic metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of the uni-
verse. 
In other words, instead of arguing over the irreducible 'Hegelian gap' 
we may simply have to accept our constant attempts to close it.29 In 
order to do so, however, it is necessary to develop a transformative 
political and ethical imagination. Given the understandable reluctance 
to embrace grand societal narratives in an academic context, this ap-
pears to be an idea that many social theorists are highly uncomfortable 
with. Yet a mainstream political consensus slowly begins to emerge 
around the overarching paradigm of "transformation" (WBGU 2011, 
World Economic Forum 2012, Future Earth 2013, IPCC 2014b). And in-
deed, fulfilling the transformative task in the face of climate change 
requires us to extend our ethical responsibilities across territorial, gen-
erational and species barriers. In this context, the ISSC proposes that 
research on climate change, amongst other things, should focus on … 
issues of institutional reform, new institutional design and the build-
ing – at different levels – of structures to enable dialogue across     
competing interests, values and worldviews and under conditions of 
continued uncertainty (Hackmann and St. Clair 2012, p. 20). 
                                                          
29 The notion of the 'Hegelian gap' refers to the radical negativity of subjectivity,            
including "a dimension of violence, conflict, or antagonism that cannot be eliminated 
in historical and socio-political experience" (Sinnerbrink 2008, p. 10).  
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In light of this recommendation, I intent to widen the narrow interpre-
tation of normative sociology by understanding it as an interdiscipli-
nary field of research that is concerned with the question of how norms 
and normativity emerge, change and function; and not, and that is how 
it is often understood, a strand of sociology that is inherently prescrip-
tive. A purely prescriptive reading of normativity is not deemed suita-
ble for this inquiry, as it seeks to formulate, for instance, what adapta-
tion should be like. A descriptive account of normativity, by contrast, 
does not immediately compare empirical findings to normative bench-
marks such as 'optimal' or 'successful' adaptation. First of all, it aims  
to study the multiple (path)ways in which normativity is expressed, 
and to examine the power effects that are related to these expressions. 
In other words, it tries to study what norms are like (and why) – and 
not what they should be like (Schulz and Siriwardane 2015, p. 14). 
With these differences in mind, the view gets a little murkier if we turn 
to a purely philosophical perspective on normativity. Is a non-norma-
tive/non-prescriptive form of social scientific inquiry even thinkable? 
To settle the aforementioned theoretical discussions right away, I will 
rest my considerations on a few premises. 
In a controversial discussion between philosopher Jürgen Habermas 
and social theorist Niklas Luhmann, the question was raised whether 
sociology had to contain a moral component and utopian view of soci-
ety (freedom from domination), or whether it had to describe society 
based on a solely functional premise (Eder 1973). While Luhmann ar-
gued that the first can only be achieved at the cost of the latter, I tend 
to side with Zygmunt Bauman (2000, p. 216) in this argument, by as-
suming that … 
there is no choice between 'engaged' and 'neutral' ways of doing        
sociology. A non-committal sociology is an impossibility. Seeking a 
morally neutral stance among the many brands of sociology practiced 
today, brands stretching all the way from the outspokenly libertarian 
to the staunchly communitarian, would be a vain effort. Sociologists 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO  97 
 
may deny or forget the 'world-view' effects of their work, and the im-
pact of that view on human singular or joint actions, only at the ex-
pense of forfeiting that responsibility of choice which every other    
human being faces daily. The job of sociology is to see to it that the 
choices are genuinely free, and that they remain so, increasingly so, 
for the duration of humanity. 
Consequently, we need to deliberate which ethical and normative con-
cepts may guarantee such freedom of choice. From a human rights per-
spective, this means to acknowledge that under climate change "de-
fending the rights of some people or generations will mean hindering 
those of others" (Jamieson and Di Paola 2014, p. 110). Considering the 
sphere of the political, it means to realize that governing adaptation 
has tangible power effects, and that the principle of free choice may 
give rise to new governmentalities which could pass off market fail-
ures as individual or environmental risk. Unfortunately, this confronts 
us with another theoretical problem. If domination, in a Foucauldian 
sense, "is never complete, never total, never full saturating of the social 
order" (Brown 2006, p. 71), is there reason to believe that there is – at 
least to some extent – no escape from tyranny either? 
A possible way to approach this problem is to consult the literature on 
hegemony. Theorists such as Antonio Gramsci, Jacques Lacan, Ernesto 
Laclau, Chantal Mouffe – and later, Slavoj Žižek, have engaged with 
the concept of hegemony and its implications. In the case of climate 
politics, hegemony is essentially seen to function through the discur-
sive invocation of an antagonistic outside, for example an impending 
climate "apocalypse" (Swyngedouw 2010, p. 218). What is important to 
understand with regard to this antagonistic outside is that it is seen as 
an empty signifier in hegemony theory (Stephan et al. 2014, p. 67).30 
Empty signifiers are precisely 'empty', because they are either norma-
tively ambiguous or completely devoid of any political meaning. In the 
                                                          
30 The concept of the empty signifier originates from the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
who initially used the term 'floating signifier'. However, both terms are often used 
interchangeably. 
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words of French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss ([1950] 1987, p. 
55) empty signifiers "represent an indeterminate value of significa-
tion". In this sense, empty signifiers function precisely in accordance 
with the key principle of depoliticization that has been identified by 
James Ferguson (1990, p. 66) in his seminal work on the Anti-Politics 
Machine, in which he states that the "state machinery has policies, but 
no politics". For example, empty signifiers such as the global fight 
against climate change may be appropriated by powerful actors and 
serve as a 'trojan horse' to legitimize a wide variety of policy interven-
tions, while largely avoiding to engage with the contested and local-
ized dynamics of politics proper. 
Moreover, it follows from these debates that empty signifiers such as 
the global fight against climate change may render particular processes 
governable at a distance. Governing at a distance involves control over 
commodity processes, discourses, human bodies and the 'shadow of 
hierarchy' (i.e. legislative and executive decisions). Yet, since the pro-
cess of governing also implies a continuous struggle for emancipation 
and repoliticization, hegemony must be regarded as a political project 
that can never be fully completed. 
Cultural theorist Scott Lash nevertheless assumes that we have already 
arrived in a posthegemonic age. Lash (2007, p. 75) concludes:  
Indeed, in the hegemonic order, politics was once confined to a set of 
more or less clearly defined institutions. After hegemony and the 
meltdown of the classic institutions and their regime of representa-
tion, politics leaks out. The posthegemonic order is not just an era of 
ubiquitous computing and ubiquitous media. It also bequeaths to us 
ubiquitous politics. 
Ubiquitous politics blur the line between facts and values, leaving little 
discursive space for the re-formulation of new values and 'absolutes'. 
A fundamental clash of interests (paradox) is avoided by incorporating 
dissent into the grand managerial consensus. In postpolitical times, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO  99 
 
everything becomes distanced, including ourselves. Everything be-
comes a matter of management. In the end, we will always get the next 
societal transformation, the next change 'we can believe in'. With re-
gard to the continuous struggles between domination and emancipa-
tion, we must imagine our social context and conduct as mutually re-
inforcing, meandering between tunnel vision and peripheral view, be-
tween thesis and antithesis, but without a 'true' synthesis. Hybridity, 
ambiguity and uncertainty (risk) are the results of this "liquid moder-
nity", where the alchemists of society have started to "melt the solids" 
of all social bonds (Bauman 2000, p. 4). In the name of freedom and 
choice, responsibility for economic and structural injustices in liberal 
states is increasingly pushed to the individual, resulting in a growing 
feeling of anomie and alienation among the population. 
However, there is no need to unduly celebrate this postmodern disen-
chantment. Based on the assumption that the individual is fundamen-
tally divided against itself by contradictory desires and identifications, 
Slavoj Žižek offers a synthesis that allows for the continuation of the 
rationalist political project – at least under certain conditions. Žižek 
(2008, p. 237) maintains that authentic politics is "the art of the impossible 
– it changes the very parameters of what is considered 'possible' in the 
existing constellation." Following this transformative line of political 
thought, we might then ask: how is it possible to maintain the authen-
tic character of political exchange and utopian ideas before empty sig-
nifiers may give rise to new forms of hegemonic domination?  
Posing this question at the intersection between ecology, technology 
and society means to first develop an idea of what exactly needs to be 
challenged (politically) when the notion of hegemony is invoked. So-
cial scientists have engaged with this question through the lens of 
"governmentality" (Stephan et al. 2014), "post-politics" (Swyngedouw 
2010), "neoliberalism" (Ferguson 2010, Newman 2013), "the world risk 
society" (Beck 2009), "technonatures" (White and Wilbert 2009), "hy-
bridity" (Rudy and White 2014), "depoliticization" (Kenis and Lievens 
2014) and "critical posthumanism" (Hobden 2014).  
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Given these multiple analytical frames, one of the most pressing chal-
lenges for political scientists is to re-engage with the roots of the disci-
pline, namely the field of political ontology, and to critically examine the 
tacit assumptions that underpin methodological and epistemological 
choices as well as our collective reflections about being-in-the-world in 
a political sense. This could mean, for example, to focus on enabling 
conditions for authentic politics, while at the same time attempting to 
overcome the vexing postmodern disenchantment of social theory that 
currently inhibits necessary interdisciplinary exchange about the col-
lective goals and ethical principles of social transformations under cli-
mate change.  
However, one of the main lessons that can be drawn from a theoretical 
engagement with poststructuralism and postmodernism is that ideo-
logical hegemony, for example in the form of 'post-political' or 'neolib-
eral' appropriations, can never assume the form of an all-encompass-
ing zeitgeist.31 Put differently, social behavior is never completely nor-
malized under a dominant ideological paradigm. Thus, while being 
faced with a multiplicity of totalizing narratives about the effects of 
ideological hegemony, it is of paramount importance to move beyond 
the assumption that political narratives, discourses, ideas and tech-
niques for governing 'at a distance' (i.e. governmentalities) readily trans-
late into a particular set of desired societal outcomes. In reality, such 
attempts are typically mediated, diverted, hybridized, and distorted 
by diverse interests, market processes, local and transnational institu-
tional arrangements, the physical environment, and complex processes 
                                                          
31 Accordingly, I do not seek to advance a simplistic picture of neoliberalism as an all-
encompassing rhetorical symbol for cultural critique, or a monolithic ideological par-
adigm for globalized 'free-market' fundamentalism. Instead, in using the term neolib-
eral in the context of environmental politics, I am advocating for a nuanced under-
standing of  neoliberalism as a way to organize territoriality through institutional pro-
cesses that advance the commodification of the natural environment in line with elite 
financial interests (e.g. through the patenting of plant genetic resources and the logic 
of ecosystem services) on the one hand, and the promotion of neocolonial forms of 
knowledge production and political subject formation on the other. 
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of affect and social signification. Explaining the politics of adaptation 
through a single paradigm such as governmentality, neoliberalism or 
depoliticization therefore remains inadvertently limiting. To invoke 
Abraham Kaplan, we may call this the law of the instrument: give a small 
boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs 
(hegemonic) pounding. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of hegemonic control cannot simply be 
dismissed by asking: "When has humanity as a whole even undertaken 
– let alone controlled, still less achieved – any single explicitly and     
collectively deliberate end?" (Stirling 2014, p. 7). "Why hasn’t it?" is 
what we may ask instead, if we wish to speak of hegemony. 
 
* * * 
 
When applying these political insights to the Ghanaian context, it can 
be concluded that the overarching paradigm of climate change adap-
tation has arrived in Ghanaian politics, and that there is increasing 
competition for its interpretation and implementation. Moreover, it is 
evident that government decentralization, privatization and structural 
adjustment programs have been part and parcel of externally pre-
scribed donor agendas in Ghana since the 1980s. Evidently, these ide-
ological influences continue to have a lasting effect on agricultural pol-
icy and economic development today, albeit in the form of more "sub-
tle, bottom-up donor-guided mechanisms" (Mawuko-Yevugah 2014, p. 
87). The rapid spread of ICT and tendencies to privatize land markets 
can even be observed in remote rural areas, where "globalization rede-
fines local institutions of access to resources and realigns cultures in 
tandem with global production and consumption" (Yaro 2013b, p. 423). 
These factors indicate that the notion of liquid modernity has come to 
play an important role in Ghanaian society today, and that it will be-
come increasingly important in the foreseeable future, especially un-
der conditions of accelerating urbanization. However, while the term 
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liquid modernity may serve as a thought-provoking hyperbole to think 
about unequal socioeconomic exchange and the shift from government 
to 'governance', it is clear that normative social structures and com-
mand-and-control policies have not been entirely 'liquefied'.  
At this point, it is the main task of empirical research to draw the final 
links between theory and practice. On the one hand, it needs to be as-
certained what exactly occurs when supposedly hegemonic paradigms 
such as climate change adaptation and market-oriented policies are 
translated into local development contexts. On the other, it is crucial to 
determine how social interactions and contrasting normative interpre-
tations of reality are mediated by institutions, power relations, priori-
ties, and positionalities. 
To recapitulate, we have seen that it is impossible to discuss the issue 
of climate change for very long, without arriving at the conclusion that 
its root causes are fundamentally related to questions of ethics, politi-
cal ontology, and political economy. Yet, defining climate change as 
essentially political also means to acknowledge that, under conditions 
of post-normal science, climate change as such cannot be pinned down 
unless our focus of attention is placed on transforming the cultural-
cognitive, normative and socioeconomic conditions as well as the in-
stitutional path-dependencies which generate the problem. A manage-
rial and state-centric frame of reference which refers to the politics of 
adaptation primarily in terms of the "costs, benefits, and potential ef-
fectiveness" of (top-down) decision making (see, for instance, Javeline 
2014, p. 424) thus fails to consider the asymmetric and contested power 
relations which "shield the essentially unsustainable network of devel-
opmental technics behind each nation and in every market" from real 
accountability, transparency, and social responsibility (Luke 2005, p. 
236). 
From an analytical perspective, it is therefore important to realize that 
concepts such as transformation and adaptation are inevitably empty 
signifiers, since socioeconomic and political matters of concern and 
calls for collective action always have to be imbued with normative 
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and, therefore, socially contested meanings (Schulz and Siriwardane 
2015). It is precisely with these contingencies in mind, that I will now 
turn to the concept of power. In the following section, I will briefly in-
troduce three concepts of power that I consider most useful for deter-
mining how institutional structures produce subjects at risk by mediat-
ing or expressing asymmetric social relations.  
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Three Types of Power  
Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are 
endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society. – Michel Foucault 
What it lies in our power to do, it lies in our power not to do. – Aristotle 
Power has often been referred to as an "overburdened" term, arguably 
taken to mean everything and nothing (Sayer 2012, p. 179). In discuss-
ing the "poverty of power", Gaventa (2003, p. 12) draws attention to the 
fact that despite a vast corpus of development-related literature that 
explicitly engages with power, the concept is rarely "defined or ad-
dressed or used in a coherent manner." In part, this ambiguity arises 
from the fact that the forms and exercise of power can either be theo-
rized as being mainly agency centered (i.e., the property of power) or 
described as unwittingly created, facilitated, and constrained by stra-
tegic relations, social structures, and institutionalized human actions 
(i.e., the potential of power).  
Gaventa (2003, p. 3) further argues that Foucault has arguably been "the 
most influential theorist of power of the late twentieth century", not 
just in germinating "a new genre of analysis", but also in eliciting a lit-
any of critique. In the context of institutional change, however, a Fou-
cauldian understanding of power may help decenter the structured-
ness of institutions in terms of their formal characteristics and proper-
ties such as class composition and patterns of behavior, specifically by 
shifting the analytical focus to the devices, concepts, meanings, values, 
and micropractices that characterize institutions and render them un-
stable (Bevir 1999, p. 352). In a Foucauldian sense, the main concern is 
not in who or what exercises power, to what degree or from where, but 
on how power is exercised, in what contexts or conditions, and to what 
effects (Rossi 2007, Gallagher 2008). Power, in this light, is seen as in-
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trinsically productive because it creates subjects, which makes a Fou-
cauldian analysis particularly relevant in interrogating projects of nor-
mativity. If power – discursive and otherwise – is seen to be based on 
the "multi-faceted subjectification and subject production by social 
norms and practices" (Brown 2006, p. 67), it also needs to be acknowl-
edged that institutions and power relations are not necessarily synony-
mous with adaptation 'barriers' and 'modes of constraint'. Understand-
ing institutional power as both, enabling and constraining can help us 
to define and assess 'articulations' of political questions, that is prob-
lem definitions, grievance framings, and the explicit or implicit expres-
sion of normative goals. Nevertheless, the post-Foucauldian impasse 
in locating power is inherently problematic, given the Foucauldian 
conceptualization of power and resistance as being ubiquitous, dis-
persed, and quotidian (Gallagher 2008, Sayer 2012). 
Among more recent attempts to operationalize concepts of power in 
everyday practice, the so-called power matrix has been presented as a 
tool that helps categorize power into three interrelated forms: visible, 
hidden, and invisible (Pantazidou 2012, p. 17). Unfortunately, this ty-
pology reveals little about the relationality of power, particularly in 
terms of the flows and exchanges that determine social change. Invisi-
ble power, through its shaping of meanings and values is perhaps the 
category of power most relevant to exploring normative assumptions 
inherent to particular adaptation approaches. In a purist Foucauldian 
sense, however, efforts at 'unmasking' relations of power must always 
remain partial.  
Overall, re-introducing critical realist notions of causality, emergence 
and structure to Foucauldian conceptions of power may offer a way 
out of this gridlock (Sayer 2012). In avoiding a totalizing either-or po-
sition on whether power is generated, possessed, or wielded, on the 
one hand, or, fluid, relational, and decentered, on the other, the focus 
on relationality presupposes the existence of causation. Arguably, then, 
the tracing of causal articulations in their multiplicity is requisite to 
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understanding adaptive processes at a more profound or 'deeper' level, 
that is by analyzing shifts in normative meanings. Power analysis, in 
other words, does not simply focus on exploring subjects and sources 
of power. Instead, it attempts to chart the relational flow of power and 
its normative implications for change. Thus, to incorporate notions of 
relationality, causality and normativity into a broader conceptualiza-
tion of power, I distinguish between (1) power as a discourse, (2) 
power as the institutional organization of territoriality, and (3) power 
as an event. These three manifestations of the power/risk conundrum 
will then be used as conceptual lenses through which institutional life 
and the sociopolitical dimension of risk can be assessed.  
 
 
Creating Subjects at Risk: Power as a Discourse  
To study the discursive dimension of power, I will draw on the so-
called Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) which 
has been developed by Reiner Keller. SKAD combines social macro 
theories of discourse that are rooted in the work of Michel Foucault, 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe with the sociology of knowledge 
tradition that is commonly associated with the work of Peter L. Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann (Keller 2005, p. 2).32 According to SKAD, the 
notion of discourse refers to "performative statement practices which 
constitute reality orders and also produce power effects in a conflict-
ridden network of social actors, institutional dispositifs, and know-
ledge systems" (Keller 2011, p. 48). Due to the complexity of this defi-
nition, I will briefly contextualize the conceptual background of SKAD, 
before I discuss how it can be operationalized to assess notions of 
power and risk.  
                                                          
32 Although Reiner Keller distances himself (and SKAD) from the hegemony theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe in his later writings (see Keller 2011, p. 47), I consider it analytically 
fruitful to maintain a critical relationship between the two traditions. 
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The 'sociology of knowledge' approach of Peter L. Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann, which is underpinning the SKAD perspective, is firmly 
rooted in the early tradition of sociological institutionalism and nor-
mative sociology. In their seminal work on the "Social Construction of 
Reality", Berger and Luckmann (1966) specifically draw on the Mead-
Blumer tradition of symbolic interactionism to illustrate how represen-
tations of 'objective' and 'subjective' reality are constructed through the 
interplay between ideational and material processes. In this sense, 
SKAD is not only highly compatible with the cognitivist interpretation 
of normative sociology that I have outlined earlier in this chapter – 
rooted in the cognitive order of society and a naturalistic-dialectical view 
of a "situated reason" (Strydom 2011, p. 69; Keller 2011, p. 50). It is also 
well suited to explore the institutional dimensions of these social or-
dering principles.  
However, what has arguably been neglected in the Berger and Luck-
mann tradition of sociological institutionalism is the development of a 
specific theory of power and discourse (Keller 2011, p. 46). Therefore, 
SKAD draws on the work of Michel Foucault as a starting point for a 
deeper exploration of the relationship between power and contested 
discursive practices. In particular, the focus of SKAD rests on the 
"analysis of symbolic order on institutional and organizational levels 
and arenas as well as the effects of such an ordering in different social 
fields of practice" (Keller 2005, p. 7). In other words, SKAD gives a 
prominent role to "institutions as temporary 'crystallized' or 'frozen 
processes of ordering' (…) which enable and constrain individual 
action", while at the same time assuming "that social actors are not 
puppets on the strings of discourse, but (…) creative agents engaged 
in social power plays and struggles for interpretation" (Keller 2005, p. 
5). Discourses are not simply understood as collections of texts, spee-
ches and pictures, or seen as institutionally embedded 'containers' for 
ideas. Instead, they are defined as productive social and material 
practices which incrementally constitute the subjects they refer to. In 
this respect, discourses can be both, the cause and effect of social 
action. 
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Consequently, in order to better comprehend how determined rela-
tions between discursive articulations and concrete power effects are 
established, SKAD suggests to concentrate on frames of problematiza-
tion (Keller 2011, p. 46). This means to engage in an analysis of discur-
sive-material practices to understand how discourses are used by par-
ticular actors to justify decisions and mobilize social action. We might, 
for instance, think of risk as "the way organizations make sense of their 
environment and act upon it" (Ericson 2007, p. 11). In the context of 
adaptation, risk has become an important discursive paradigm which 
governs the organization of "relevant" knowledge in scientific and po-
litical debates (IPCC 2014b, p. ix). The multiple ways in which risk – 
and therefore implicitly hazards, exposure, vulnerability and adaptive 
responses – are discursively articulated is a crucial aspect that deter-
mines how power takes effect. The rationale behind this discursive-
material understanding of power is the simple fact that "language mat-
ters deeply for analysis, interpretation and action" (Ribot 2011, p. 1160). 
Dominant discursive paradigms directly affect and transform social re-
ality, for instance by framing and contextualizing causality, and in de-
fining what is considered risky and who or what is at risk. Further-
more, in communicating risk, monitoring risk, and by directing organ-
izational strategies and resources, discourses also provide interpreta-
tions of circumstances and appropriate means that constitute political 
claims for action (Schulz and Siriwardane 2016, p. 176). In this sense, 
discourses are more than language, since the 'objective truth' about risk 
is created through shared normative definitions of reality, but not in-
dependent of contextual circumstances and practices. 
Yet, while the SKAD perspective acknowledges that hegemonic strug-
gles over normative meanings and paradigms are an inevitable fact of 
social life, it seeks to overcome some of the practical challenges that the 
Foucauldian and Laclau/Mouffe traditions are facing in terms of ap-
plying discourse analysis as a concrete research tool. To be precise, the 
goal is to countervail a certain empirical bias or determinism which 
might trouble concepts of hegemony and evoke simple dichotomies 
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between power as negative and resistance as positive. It can be argued, 
for instance, that an empirical approach to the study of discursive he-
gemony may not yield many new insights, because the theorist always 
seems to know in advance "how ideology works" (Keller 2005, p. 3). In 
acknowledging these shortcomings, SKAD proposes several analytical 
concepts and tools that can be used for discourse analysis (Keller 2013, 
p. 115; Ullrich and Keller 2014, p. 124-125). In the following, I have se-
lected and re-combined four key elements of the wider SKAD reper-
toire that I consider most relevant for the assessment of adaptation dis-
courses in Ghana: 
1. As a first step, I deem it necessary to identify overarching inter-
pretative schemes that govern relevant discursive formations. In 
this study, I will focus on overarching notions of risk and cli-
mate change adaptation.  
2. The second analytical step concerns the identification of discur-
sive classifications. Based on a comprehensive review of the ad-
aptation literature, I have identified dominant classifications of 
adaptation that simultaneously relate to four institutional path-
way scenarios: (1) adjustment, (2) reform, (3) transformation, 
and (4) business-as-usual. 
3. The third step focuses on the phenomenal structure of the se-
lected discursive classifications. This means to delineate spe-
cific cause-effect arguments about risk and the need to adapt to 
climate change, including the definition of problem dimen-
sions, action alternatives, consequences, and value-implica-
tions, for example with regard to the interpretation of nature-
culture relations. In other words, I intend to explore how prob-
lematizations of risk relate to the aforementioned classificatory 
categories of adaptation, and how specific problematizations 
that are expressed in interview or policy statements might pos-
sibly relate to (or differ from) these categories in their norma-
tive underpinnings and narrative structures. 
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4. In addition, the narrative approach will be combined with a  
dispositif analysis to determine how adaptation discourses are 
embedded in specific historical contexts and institutional are-
nas, and to illustrate how these arenas are in turn defined by 
actors’ positionalities and dynamic relationships between     
materiality and social signification. Here, the focus rests on the 
relational dimension of risk and the institutional organization of 
territoriality. 
 
Relational Risk: Power and the Institutional                                     
Organization of Territoriality  
The contextual aspect of discourses, or the more-than-language dimen-
sion of discursive production, is referred to as the so-called dispositif in 
Foucauldian terms. The dispositif describes the material, practical and 
institutional "infrastructures" on which discourses rest (Keller 2008, p. 
101). Rule-based incentives, opportunity structures and material as 
well as symbolic resources for articulation that are put in place "to 
solve a problem" are thus an integral part of the dispositif (Keller 2011, 
p. 49). For example, we may consider the organizational structures of 
the Ghanaian climate change adaptation arena as part of the dispositif 
to manage social risk and solve the problem of adaptation. The adap-
tation dispositif thus determines how adaptation 'solutions' or inter-
ventions are carried out, and who can legitimately and effectively ar-
ticulate a discursive position within a given institutional context. 
Thus, to explore how subjects at risk are created, it is vital to analyze the 
adaptation dispositif and focus on the hybrid relationships between 
processes of social signification on the one hand, and the concrete ma-
teriality of landscapes and resource flows on the other. The primary 
process through which both realms of human action – social significa-
tion and constructed materiality – enter into a hybrid relationship will 
be defined as the institutional organization of territoriality. For example, 
even though climate-related hazards such as floods and droughts       
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occur across West Africa, the concrete impacts of these risks are expe-
rienced in different ways by individuals based on their relative expo-
sure, vulnerability and adaptiveness. Based on the assumption that un-
mediated natural risks do not exist, it is evident that exposure, vulner-
ability and adaptiveness are significantly shaped by the institutional 
organization of territoriality. Who or what is at risk – or perceived to 
be at risk – crucially depends on how material and symbolic resources 
are valued, mediated and channeled by institutions. It can therefore be 
concluded that the institutional organization of territoriality is at the 
same time defined and mediated by hybrid forms of social signification 
and materiality that transcend time and place. 
Figure 3. The Institutional Organization of Territoriality 
(Schulz and Siriwardane 2016, p. 177) 
Furthermore, to map the multiple ways in which the institutional or-
ganization of territoriality takes effect and creates subjects at risk, this 
study presumes that the dispositif for adaptation is not only defined 
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by discursive and material problem-solution patterns, but also deter-
mined by processes of territorial boundary-making. Risk thus has to be 
seen as inherently politicized, because the institutional organization of 
a given social territory inevitably proceeds in a way that privileges 
some actors or ideas over others. In addition, the institutional organi-
zation of territoriality also demarcates different domains of risk by 
generating insider-outsider relations. This nuanced understanding of 
institutional territorialization helps emphasizing the social production 
of risk by maintaining a strong focus on discursive articulations, 
speaker positions, and material factors that enable or constrain adap-
tiveness relative to a particular setting and normative agenda (Schulz 
and Siriwardane 2015). However, as important as these broad-based 
relational aspects of risk may be, it is still essential to consider specific 
causal relationships that can only be fully understood if the situatedness 
of risk is taken into account as well, and if locally distinct manifesta-
tions of risk are thoroughly investigated. 
 
Situated Risk: Power as an Event 
In the previous two sections, I have outlined how power is expressed 
through discourses and their related dispositifs. I have also illustrated 
that analyzing the institutional organization of territoriality is a useful 
starting point for conducting an assessment of the political adaptation 
'arena' in Ghana. However, to avoid getting bogged down in endlessly 
complex relationships between inter-dependent and multi-layered in-
stitutional structures while assessing the social production of risk, it is 
necessary to 'work backwards' and also consider the situatedness – that 
is, the event-related dimension of risk. Working backwards from an 
event, in this sense, means to assess situation-specific social impacts to 
deduce more reliable information about cause-effect and instrument-
achievement relations that determine how risk is socially produced. 
Case study research can contribute substantially to this endeavor, ex-
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plicitly by shedding light on locally diverse manifestations of risk per-
ceptions and risk exposure. Granting that isolated observations do not 
easily lend themselves to generalization, a case study approach may 
nonetheless be useful in exploring causal relationships between locally 
experienced hazards and dynamic states of adaptiveness. 
However, although scholarly attention to hegemonic discourses and 
power relations is slowly increasing in adaptation research, there is rel-
atively little empirical work available that deals with cause-effect and 
instrument-achievement relations in cases where power is exercised. 
While being immersed in 'the field' researchers may rather find that 
responsibilities are often dispersed and allegedly powerful political ac-
tors may feel powerless when it comes to the implementation of adap-
tation policies that have been devised at the drawing board. More often 
than not, policy mainstreaming and implementation takes place in 
'messy' institutional environments that are characterized by processes 
of creative politicking and self-interested appropriation. Many socio-
economic and political interventions that are seeking to strengthen 
adaptiveness are in fact hampered by a lack of resources and deeply 
engrained institutional lock-ins, which makes adaptation a daunting 
task.  
Nevertheless, assessing specific cause-effect and instrument-achieve-
ment relations does not necessarily mean to deploy a prescriptive logic 
of organizational efficiency which aims to measure social outcomes 
against the backdrop of normative benchmarks for successful adapta-
tion. Rather, it needs to be examined under which circumstances one 
may actually speak of a tangible institutional influence on the social 
production of risk. 
Following Maxwell (2010), this study therefore rejects a hierarchical 
and dichotomous relationship between statistical variables and their 
context and draws on both qualitative (event-related) as well as quan-
titative (survey-based) research methods to determine how institu-
tions causally influence the social production of risk. The goal of this 
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"mixed-methods" approach (see Johnson et al. 2007) is to present a mul-
tifaceted account of risk that is based in the 'subjective' dimension of 
risk (social signification) on the one hand, and the 'objective' dimension 
of risk (the materiality, probability, magnitude and frequency of risk) 
on the other. Moreover, while some theorists have argued that such a 
combination of interpretivist and realist epistemologies is contradic-
tory in essence, I argue that an integrated research design is not only 
useful in testing causal theories from multiple perspectives, but also 
epistemologically commensurable with an account of normative soci-
ology that is rooted in the cognitive order of society and based on no-
tions of situated cognition and knowledge(s) (Solomon 2007; Strydom 
2013). 
What is arguably still needed, then, is an overarching analytical frame-
work that is able to accommodate a mixed-methods research design 
based on the previously described three 'faces' of the risk/power co-
nundrum (discourse, relational risk and situated risk) in a wider risk 
assessment context. The following section seeks to provide such an 
overarching risk assessment framework and to develop a forward-
looking approach to adaptation by introducing the notion of institu-
tional adaptation pathways. 
 
Institutional Adaptation Pathways                           
and Scenario Planning 
Integrating notions of institutional change into risk assessments is a 
difficult task, particularly because attempts at framing institutions 
within adaptation scholarship have been fraught with the same con-
ceptual challenges that NIE and NI have been grappling with. These 
challenges include the question of how trajectories of institutional 
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change can be theorized, to what degree they can be meaningfully in-
fluenced, and how the problem of defining criteria for the selection and 
weighting of institutional influences on adaptation processes can be 
solved in the context of multi-hazard risk assessments (MRAs). In adap-
tation research, the definitional criteria of institutions are almost exclu-
sively derived from NIE and NI, and tend to be relatively uniform. 
Gupta et al. (2010, p. 460), in employing a definition issued by the In-
stitutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (IDGEC) program, 
define institutions as "systems of rules, decision-making procedures, 
and programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the par-
ticipants in these practices, and guide interactions among the occu-
pants of relevant roles." Similarly, Agrawal and Perrin (2009, p. 351) 
conceptualize institutions as "humanly created formal and informal 
mechanisms that shape social and individual expectations, interactions 
and behavior." Arguably, these definitions are representative of a min-
imal consensus in environmental change research in terms of defining 
institutions (see Adger and Kelly 1999, Young et al. 2008, Dovers and 
Hezri 2010).33  
Defining institutions in largely managerial terms – as rules, programs, 
mechanisms and decision-making procedures – nevertheless conveys 
a strong sense of institutional 'design-ability' and "cockpit-ism" (Hajer 
et al. 2015). Ever since the emergence of the adaptation debate, a major 
strand of adaptation research has focused on the "human ability to get 
institutions right" through managerial and organizational fixes, based 
on the goal to either develop or strengthen adaptiveness (Cleaver 2012, 
p. 1; Obeng and Agyenim 2013, p. 193). The nomenclature of interna-
tional development is no different in its managerial discourse rife with 
                                                          
33 A notable exception in adaptation scholarship are the three structural dimensions 
proposed by Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete (2011, p. 2), who distinguish between 
structures of legitimation (norms and rules that regulate social interaction and enforce 
conformity), structures of domination (control over mechanisms determining resource 
distribution in society and symbolized by centers of authority), and structures of signi-
fication which produce interpretations or meanings that are used to make sense of ex-
perience. 
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metaphors of institutions as organizations. Institutions are taken to be 
purpose-led and steerable entities, with the ability of 'doing' things 
such as "balancing the interests of the different stakeholders" and being 
capable of credibly implementing solutions they propose (Hallegatte 
et al. 2011, p. 15). It can be argued that these perceptions of institutions 
still linger on the very surface of self-referential managerial structures, 
which are theoretically disembedded from their wider social context. 
The degree to which social institutions are malleable and can be 
steered as uniform entities must therefore be carefully assessed on a 
case-by-case basis.  
Yet, it is evident that contemporary debates about risk assessments still 
rest on teasing out the wrong variables, indicators, baselines and 
benchmarks from the right, whereas aspects such as cultural values, 
norms, power relations and discourses which shape institutional life in 
all its diversity have received far less attention. As I have shown in 
great detail throughout this chapter, it has become sufficiently clear 
that these analytical blind spots are likely to have tangible conse-
quences for the implementation of adaptation actions, and may be in-
creasingly problematic for individual as well as collective efforts to in-
crease adaptiveness. As Dryzek (1996, p. 122) maintains: "Formalists 
who hope that supportive discourses will simply fall into place once 
the [institutional] hardware has been established are likely to be disap-
pointed". Arguably, this means that technological fixes, short-term pol-
icy interventions and top-down approaches to organizational design 
are less likely to be successful in instigating the long-lasting normative 
and cultural-cognitive changes that are required to reform/transform 
social structures against the backdrop of anthropogenic climate change 
(Schulz and Siriwardane 2015).  
For example, recent studies on the historical dimension of transforma-
tive change testify to the fact that social transformations are in essence 
related to the co-evolutionary development of institutional arrange-
ments, technologies, and normative as well as cultural-cognitive pat-
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO  117 
 
terns of meaning-making.34 Occasionally these co-evolutionary pro-
cesses of social change proceed in a more incremental fashion, while in 
other cases they materialize as abrupt changes between different social 
equilibria. Whatever may be the case, the key question that needs to be 
answered is how the richness and diversity of institutional life can be 
properly accounted for in the context of MRAs.  
While I have already outlined a methodological approach to analyze 
the risk/power conundrum from an institutional point of view – spe-
cifically in drawing on notions of discourse, relational risk and situated 
risk – the pathways approach is more concerned with the question of 
how the interaction between these aspects may limit or enable institu-
tional responses to risk in the future, particularly in relation to people’s 
livelihoods and adaptiveness. Overall, possible institutional pathways 
may align with discursive classifications of adaptation as adjustment, 
reform or transformation, or follow other local visions of social change, 
including business-as-usual scenarios. What is most important from a 
pathways perspective, therefore, is to discern how institutional pro-
cesses are influencing adaptive and maladaptive responses, and to in-
vestigate how biogeochemical and social change over time determine 
'adaptive space' and room for agency or maneuvering. 
Instead of drawing on the common problem-solving mode of organi-
zations rooted in "ever more sophisticated risk analysis techniques and 
management approaches", a pathways approach seeks to "expose, test, 
deepen, and clarify" those interpretative frames and shared under-
standings of the social world that are needed to make responsible and 
transparent decisions about collective actions for adaptation (Wil-
kinson and Kupers 2014, p. 76). In other words, a pathways approach 
seeks to assess the social ordering principles that govern the produc-
tion of risk, and aims to identify trends in risks in order to "not only 
respond to past conditions, but anticipate what may be coming" (van 
Aalst et al. 2008, p. 173).  
                                                          
34 For a summary, see Jacob et al. (2012). Also see Schulz and Siriwardane (2015). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
118                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
However, as it may be difficult to deduce particular trends in risks 
from locally contingent risk perceptions and uncertain projections of 
future social impacts, an institutional emphasis within the adaptive 
pathways frame seems to be a useful conceptual extension for MRAs. 
Since deeply engrained normative ambiguities and institutional lock-
in effects might restrict adaptive pathways at different levels of society, 
viewing risk assessments through an institutional lens may help in 
shifting the focus of analysis on enabling structural conditions for ad-
aptation and 'authentic' political engagement.  
Today, a common methodological response to the aforementioned 
challenges posed by MRAs is to combine quantitative methods with 
qualitative approaches that are frequently used by anthropologists and 
development researchers. Qualitative approaches in development 
studies and anthropology are typically based in Participatory Learning 
and Action (PLA) methods such as transect walks and risk mapping, 
asset inventories and livelihood surveys, cropping and rain calendars, 
oral histories, group meetings or discussions, as well as key informant 
interviews (van Aalst et al. 2008, IIED 2009). What is common to these 
PLA methods is a strong focus on social relationships that are not pre-
dominantly shaped by managerial and utilitarian ways of thinking and 
interacting. However, as economic relationships are indubitably a cen-
tral part of everyday life, PLA methods also include economic perspec-
tives based on the notion of archetypal livelihoods. The idea of archetypal 
livelihoods, according to van Aalst et al. (2008, p. 175), implies that "a 
relatively large number of people’s livelihoods can be assessed 
through the analysis of relatively few 'economic activity combinations' 
that are based on the possible archetypal livelihoods of that area." 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that multidimensional 
risks frequently extend beyond the narrow scope of economic and 
communal life and continue to raise normative questions about insti-
tutionally entrenched power relations. Thus, I consider it necessary to 
combine PLA methods with more forward-looking ideas based on the 
notion of "pathways to adaptation" (for an overview, see Eisenhauer 
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2016). Approaching the idea of contested adaptation pathways from 
an institutional perspective, in particular, yields tangible benefits in 
terms of connecting the discursive, relational and situational aspects of 
risk. An institutional pathways perspective takes into account that ad-
aptation actions must be informed by a critical analysis of how the risks 
and adaptive spaces of the future are imagined in a normative sense, 
and how institutional processes and political decisions of the past and 
present continue to shape the very boundaries of adaptive trajectories. 
Exploring individual or collective positionalities and decision points 
vis-à-vis certain adaptation pathways thus enables a clearer view of 
how adaptive trajectories are institutionally embedded, and how they 
are historically, spatially and temporally evolving. 
Figure 4. Institutional Adaptation Pathways  
(Source: author, also compare Wise et al. 2014, p. 326) 
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The extent to which the future can be imagined – let alone effectively 
managed – nevertheless remains a pertinent question in the context of 
adaptation planning and decision making. Inevitably, decisions do not 
automatically lead to desired outcomes. Moreover, adaptive or reflex-
ive organizational learning with the goal to make informed and re-
sponsible decisions usually requires openness and the integration of a 
wide variety of different types of knowledges. This includes positivist as 
well as interpretivist frames of reference which are often not easy to 
combine, as I have discussed very extensively in the first half of this 
chapter. On a whole, anticipatory scenario techniques are still very 
marginal in adaptation planning compared to predictive models that 
are framing adaptation "as a form of rational evidence-based risk man-
agement" (Rickards et al. 2014, p. 654).  
In Ghana, however, the so-called Akropong Approach offers a unique 
entry point for scenario planning since it includes both imaginative as 
well as a calculative aspects. The Akropong Approach has been devel-
oped and used for adaptation planning and cross-sector analyses, and 
works with scenarios that include  
(…) a qualitative, storytelling component, and a quantitative compo-
nent. The quantitative component may include a formal model or 
may show indicative figures based on anticipated developments or 
comparable historical situations (Kemp-Benedict and Agyemang-
Bonsu 2008, p. 835). 
In augmenting the cross-sectoral outlook of the Akropong Approach, 
I will concentrate on a limited number of scenarios: (1) adjustment, (2) 
reform, (3) transformation, and (4) business-as-usual. The main goal is 
to explore possible institutional adaptation pathways, and identify sce-
narios that are most likely to occur, taking into account the "interac-
tions between events or trends that have been identified as key to the 
development of the system under study" (Kemp-Benedict and Agye-
mang-Bonsu 2008, p. 834).  
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However, the main analytical pitfall that needs to be avoided in this 
regard is the excessive use of quantitative models and statistics to inform 
future adaptation scenarios. In other words, primarily relying on cal-
culative models to inform qualitative 'futuring' strategies such as joint 
stakeholder workshops might provoke different forms of cognitive 
bias among participants and decision makers. This includes tendencies 
to search for or interpret predictive scenario-related information in a 
way that confirms one’s preconceptions, and to regard future options 
that are based on numeric information or quantifiable probabilities as 
more objective. The notion of institutional adaptation pathways, as I 
have described it, thus offers an additional perspective on scenario 
planning by focusing on the existing and empirically traceable structural    
aspects of social change to describe possible institutional adaptation 
scenarios. Accordingly, the four pathway scenarios are shown below. 
Figure 5. Range of Institutional Pathway Scenarios  
 
 
 
Scenario A 
"Adjustment" 
Scenario B 
"Reform" 
 
Scenario C 
"Transformation" 
Scenario D 
"Business-as-usual" 
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Analytical Framework 
A basic question that has to answered for the development of a holistic 
analytical framework is how complexity can be reduced without losing 
analytical precision. As uncertainties persist and normative framings 
of adaptation options need to be explored, new forms of analysis are 
required which take into account political power asymmetries and the 
wider socio-territorial context in which adaptive trajectories unfold.  
The frame of reference that is adopted in this study is rooted in an in-
stitutional pathways approach and combines methods of qualitative and 
quantitative inquiry. In sum, the analysis focuses on three core re-
search goals. Each research goal includes particular subsets of specific 
research questions and methods in order to test the following hypoth-
esis based on empirical data: "Institutions are the primary factor that de-
termines social vulnerability in the research area." 
 
Research Questions and Methodology  
 
The institutional pathways approach: three core research goals 
1 – Tracing official adaptation discourses and expert perceptions of risk from 
the national to the local level 
The first analytical goal is to explore how discourses on adaptation are 
changing across scales, and how policy translation from the national to 
the local level plays out in practice. Normative framings of risk are 
compared to four institutional pathway scenarios: (1) adjustment, (2) 
reform, (3) transformation, and (4) business-as-usual to test emerging 
connections between these scenarios and available empirical data.  
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Related research questions:  
1. How are adaptation-related risks defined and prioritized by 
government officials and academic specialists as well as inter-
national NGOs and development agencies? And in how far do 
normative definitions, perceptions and prioritizations of risk 
change from the national to the local level? 
2. How is adaptation perceived by Agricultural Extension Agents 
(AEAs) who work directly with farmers in the research area? 
What are the most widely applicable adaptation options? 
Research methods:  
Semi-structured interviews and group discussions: semi-structured inter-
views (n=15) as well as several informal discussions with government 
officials, academics, adaptation policy consultants and staff members 
of international donor organizations have been conducted at the na-
tional, regional, and district levels to assess how notions of climate 
change adaptation and risk are discursively framed in different mana-
gerial contexts (see Annex 1). In addition, a group discussion with 
AEAs (n=12) has been carried out to assess how the concept of adapta-
tion is perceived by professionals at the Ministry of Food and Agricul-
ture who work directly with farming households.  
Structured interviews with key specialists: structured interviews were 
conducted with NADMO district coordinators (n=13) as well as AEAs 
(n=12) working in the Vea Catchment area to elucidate various percep-
tions of risk and explore climate change adaptation options. 
Participation in stakeholder meetings: participatory research in the con-
text of civil society stakeholder meetings prior to the establishment of 
the NCCP has been conducted to gain further insights into stakeholder 
dynamics during the policy development process. 
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Discourse analysis: drawing on the Sociology of Knowledge Approach 
to Discourse (SKAD), an in-depth analysis of core policy documents 
and key specialist interviews has been performed. The main analytic 
goal is to assess normative interpretations of risk across a wider spec-
trum of adaptation-related policy areas to determine how definitions 
and priorities may change across scales. 
 
2 – Conducting a multi-hazard risk assessment in the Vea Catchment area 
The main goals of the MRA include (a) an assessment of the economic 
situation of local households, (b) an assessment of the social, institu-
tional and physical environment in which households are embedded, 
and (c) the identification and evaluation of risks and risk impacts. In 
order to perform this task, research assistants were hired locally. 
Related research questions:  
1. How do households in the research area perceive risks? What 
are the relevant institutional determinants of risk? 
2. How exactly do institutions shape the vulnerability of house-
holds with regard to these risks? Are there perceivable differ-
ences between rural and urban households, and between sub-
sistence and commercial farmers? 
Components of the multi-hazard risk assessment:  
Household interviews: using a mix of quantitative survey techniques and 
open-ended questions, household interviews (n=484 HH) were carried 
out in the following communities in the research area: Vea-Gunga, 
Yikene Adohbisi, Zaare Amoabisi, Namoo-Akunka as well as Bolga-
tanga-Sawaaba and Bolgatanga-Damweo. Additional interviews have 
been conducted with commercial farmers at the Vea irrigation project. 
This selection of field sites allowed for a direct comparison between 
different farming and irrigation practices as well as between small-
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scale subsistence farmers, commercial farmers, and non-farm house-
holds. Moreover, the portfolio of livelihood activities in the research 
area has become moderately diverse over time. Hence it has been pos-
sible to analyze risk distribution, both spatially and socially, among 
rural and urban populations with moderately diversified sources of in-
come. 
PLA methods: facilitated group discussions have been held in Vea with 
two separate groups (a men’s group with the chief of Vea and his el-
ders, and a women’s group). Food security and seasonal rainfall calen-
dars have been prepared to learn more about participants’ perceptions 
of risk. 
 
3 – Analyzing relational risks (cross-cutting/integrative component) 
The third analytical goal concerns the identification of relational risks 
and institutional barriers. The main aim of this cross-cutting task is to 
explore whether there are empirically traceable points of divergence 
between empirical findings and managerial policy narratives. Further-
more, this component of the MRA is concerned with the impact of in-
stitutional territorialization processes on possible adaptation path-
ways. In order to determine the framework conditions for change from 
an institutional point of view, special emphasis is given to dynamic 
power relations and institutional interactions across scales. 
Related research questions:  
1. How exactly are institutional territorialization process taking 
shape? 
2. How do institutional factors converge across scales to create 
subjects at risk? At which point are exclusionary social processes 
created, and how are they relevant for the adaptiveness of 
households in the research area? 
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3. How do the empirical findings of the MRA compare to organi-
zational discourses about climate change adaptation and risk? 
What are the policy implications? 
Research Methods:  
Analysis of institutional territorialization processes: qualitative field re-
search has been carried out to evaluate socio-spatially situated risks 
and illustrate the complex interactions between risk exposure, hazards 
and the institutional organization of territoriality in the Vea Catchment 
area. Illustrative examples include the case of the Vea irrigation pro-
ject, as well as changing patterns of reciprocity and communal solidar-
ity that are mediated by social institutions. 
Data triangulation: the cross-cutting component of the MRA draws on 
secondary data such as aggregated statistical macro data, journal arti-
cles, grey literature and conference materials in order to triangulate 
empirical findings by evaluating different data sources. 
 
The Vea Catchment as a Field Site 
The selected field site for the MRA is the Vea Catchment in the Upper 
East Region of Ghana (UER), which is also one of the designated focus 
areas of the WASCAL core research program. The Vea Catchment is 
situated in the West African Sudanian Savanna zone between latitudes 
10° 45' to 11° 00' north and longitudes 0º 45' to 0º 56' west, covering 
about 235 km² and stretching through two administrative districts, the 
Bongo District and the Bolgatanga Municipal District (Eickhof 2010, p. 
6). Bolgatanga, the regional capital of the UER, is located in close prox-
imity to the Vea Catchment, and will be the focus area for the urban 
subcomponent of the MRA. The main occupations in the area are sub-
sistence and cash crop farming, hunting, weaving, brewing and agro-
forestry. Livestock rearing includes sheep, goats, cattle, pigs and poul-
try such as guinea fowl. Land holdings are usually very small, a little 
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over 1.9 hectares on average, and plots are often scattered (DPCU 2010, 
p. 10). In the Bongo District, 71.6 percent of all households are engaged 
in agriculture, while the percentage in the Bolgatanga Municipal Dis-
trict is slightly lower at 67.1 percent.35  
Rural farming systems in the catchment area are centered around small 
compound farms. This particular type of smallholder agriculture is 
mostly rainfed and primarily based on traditional staple crops such as 
early millet (nara), late millet, maize, and guinea corn. Commercial 
farming is concentrated around two major irrigation schemes which 
allow for the cultivation of crops and vegetables during the dry season: 
the Tono project near Navrongo and the Vea dam project near Bolga-
tanga (GSS 2013, p. 4). The main cash crops that are cultivated in these 
irrigated areas are rice and tomatoes.  
During the dry season, farming activities in the catchment are centered 
around rivers and small water bodies, where pump irrigation and 
bucket irrigation are practiced. Other irrigation techniques that are 
used outside of larger irrigation projects are based on the use of 
wastewater and the abstraction of groundwater through boreholes and 
wells. Typically, most smallholder farming activities must be carried 
out during the single rainy season in order to meet the food require-
ments for the year. As this is normally not achieved, communities and 
individuals are pressed to find additional coping mechanisms to meet 
their basic needs in an increasingly unpredictable socioeconomic and 
physical environment (Quaye 2008, Gyampoh et al. 2009, Dasgupta 
and Baschieri 2010). In addition to irrigation, common adaptation 
strategies that are used by farming households during the dry season 
include the changing of planting dates and crop varieties, water stor-
age for vegetable farming and the construction of dugouts during 
drought periods (Ofori-Sarpong 2001, Barry et al. 2010, Nakuja 2012). 
                                                          
35 Data Source: Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Ghana Statistical Service. Dataset 
from 2012. Calculations by author. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
128                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
Farm households also rely on informal credits and other traditional 
systems of reciprocity, and seek to diversify their income through non-
farm activities such as hunting, fishing, weaving, brewing, shea butter 
processing and petty-trading (Schulz and Siriwardane 2016, p. 181).  
The table below gives an overview of a larger variety of crops and veg-
etables that are grown by commercial farmers and households in the 
catchment area. 
 
Table 4. Agricultural Production at Field Sites  
Dry season farming  
(November until April) 
Rainy season farming 
(May until October) 
Rice (c)  
Maize (b) 
Tomatoes (b)  
Kenaf (b)  
Okra (b)  
Amaranth ('aleefu') (b)  
Chili ('pepper') (b)  
Beans (o) 
Onions (b)  
Sugarcane (c) 
Shea nuts (c) 
Rice (c)  
Maize (b) 
Tomatoes (c) 
Kenaf (b)  
Okra (o) 
Amaranth ('aleefu') (o) 
Chili ('pepper') (b) 
Groundnuts (b)  
Beans (b)  
Late Millet (o) 
Early Millet (o) 
Guinea-corn (b)  
Sweet potatoes (b)  
Lettuce (o) 
Shea nuts (c) 
 
(o = mostly for own consumption; c = mostly commercially; b = both, commer-
cially and for own consumption; data based on household interviews, n=484) 
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   Map 3. Field Sites
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Field Research Approach 
To allow for a more targeted field research approach, a number of in-
stitutional processes and 'gatekeepers' that mediate access to liveli-
hood resources have been identified before collecting quantitative as 
well as qualitative household-level data in the Vea Catchment area. 
The process was supported through semi-structured expert interviews 
in Accra and Bolgatanga (n=15) that took place from July until Decem-
ber 2012 (for a complete list, see Annex 1). The key goal was to identify 
institutions which potentially exert the greatest influence on the vul-
nerability of households, and to include a variety of actors from differ-
ent sectors of society based on an iterative approach. The findings of 
this preliminary evaluation process are summarized in the table below. 
Table 5. Institutional Mediation of Household Access to Resources 
Access to:                  Provision  Mediating Factors 
Decision-making    
processes 
Politicians; state          
administration;            
religious/traditional 
authorities; influential 
individuals (business 
people, farmers)  
Elite, patronage and 
kinship networks; 
group affiliations; 
party membership;   
organizational               
structures 
Financial capital Banks; remittances;   
labor market; informal 
loans; income diversi-
fication through non-
farm activities  
Social networks such 
as groups and associa-
tions; information and   
education/training;   
access to natural           
resources; migration 
and market dynamics;    
collaterals 
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Land 
 
 
 
Inheritance or kinship; 
traditional authorities 
(earth priests); formal 
and informal leasing; 
irrigation authority; 
emerging land markets 
Gender-based norms; 
socioeconomic status; 
insider-outsider         
dynamics (group-
based, ethnic, kinship);         
village committees  
Agricultural services 
and inputs 
MOFA, ICOUR, input       
dealers, (I)NGOs,    
agro processors, 
wealthy farmers 
Social networks            
and AEAs, especially 
for subsidies and            
machines; public             
investment; private             
investment and           
market dynamics   
Markets and value 
chains 
Agribusiness and   
processors; private 
merchants; irrigation 
company; MOFA; 
Government 
Public policies and         
investments (infra-
structure), private        
investments; access to 
natural and social           
capital (elite networks,  
education and infor-
mation); market                 
dynamics  
Health care Public clinics                  
(National Health           
Insurance Scheme); 
private clinics;            
traditional healers 
Financial resources;  
social networks 
Household water  Pumps and boreholes, 
public water bodies 
such as rivers and 
lakes, pipe-borne      
water  
Water communities; 
negotiation among  
water user groups; 
user fees  

 
 
CHAPTER THREE:                              
TRACING ADAPTATION                
DISCOURSES FROM THE                
NATIONAL TO THE LOCAL LEVEL 
 
The third chapter draws on select analytical methods offered by the 
Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) to illustrate 
how climate change adaptation is discursively framed by adaptation 
specialists and practitioners at different levels of society. Based on 
quantitative survey data and semi-structured interviews, the over-
arching goal is to provide a broad-based overview of relevant adap-
tation discourses in Ghana. The analysis focuses on the issue areas 
of adaptation financing and mainstreaming, disaster risk reduction 
and early warning systems, as well as on the delivery of agricultural 
extension services. Particular attention is paid to the organizational 
and technological infrastructure on which contested adaptation dis-
courses rest (the so-called dispositif). Findings show that current at-
tempts at increasing the adaptiveness of farmers and government or-
ganizations are fundamentally constrained by the persistent quan-
daries of resource lack and unfinished decentralization. It is also ar-
gued that the resulting politics harbor the danger of neglecting pro-
poor adaptation in favor of predominantly market-driven ap-
proaches with a strong focus on large-scale agricultural production. 
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Funding Priorities under the      
National Climate Change Policy 
I don’t care if it’s climate change or green men from Mars ... if we can do something 
that will increase the ability of the people of Ghana to respond to difficulties in what-
ever form, that is what I consider development … climate change, in that respect, is an 
opportunity to speed up some of the development processes which may not have been 
on the radar of the politicians if it was not for the fact that there is money sitting some-
where. I think that is the basic error in this whole structure which is climate change 
adaptation: people adapt, they do not adapt to climate change, they adapt to circum-
stances.  
― Interview with Prof. Dr. Christopher Gordon, University of Ghana at Legon, 
Scientific Coordinator for the National Climate Change Policy 
Official adaptation policy debates in Ghana revolve primarily around
the potential risks and financial constraints that climate change poses 
for socioeconomic development. Climate change is commonly re-
garded as a problem being caused by industrialized countries, but also 
seen as a 'game changer' and political window of opportunity to 
address well-known development priorities by adopting an integrated 
adaptation approach that puts the poor and vulnerable at the center of 
political attention. Adaptation policy narratives in Ghana are thus 
closely linked to familiar sustainable development discourses, alt-
hough new financial instruments such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
and the Adaptation Fund (AF) are increasingly influential with regard 
to the strategic orientation of development planning and disaster risk 
reduction at different levels of government. Debates about climate 
change and adaptation are also emerging in the media, civil society 
and the academe, whereas state institutions and international donor 
organizations are positioning themselves in the changing political 
landscape, offering and 'mainstreaming' (i.e. normalizing) their own 
specific interpretations of risk and vulnerability. In consequence, it has 
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become increasingly difficult to gain a comprehensive overview of the 
multiple strategic priorities and implementation approaches that are 
currently influencing the Ghanaian adaptation 'arena'.  
In the case of adaptation finance, the ongoing policy debate can largely 
be subsumed under the technical term climate finance readiness. In the 
agricultural sector, the government of Ghana has previously identified 
Sustainable Land and Environmental Management (SLEM) as a strategic 
entry point for long-term adaptation planning (GoG 2015, p. 73). The 
key policy focus in agriculture is firmly placed on developing climate-
resilient agriculture and food security systems, for example through 
the introduction of improved crop varieties, non-organic fertilizers, 
and the piloting of weather index insurance products. The strategic 
priority areas of the NCCP also include disaster preparedness and re-
sponse, equitable social development (i.e. issues related to health, 
water, sanitation, gender, and migration), as well as 'appropriate' in-
frastructure and energy systems development. Yet, broader concerns 
still persist among policy makers with regard to existing funding 
mechanisms and institutional capacities that are needed to implement 
concrete adaptation actions and ensure donor coordination.  
One policy option under discussion is to build on existing organiza-
tional structures for disaster risk reduction to create integrated stake-
holder platforms and common financing mechanisms for addressing 
environmental management, DRR and sustainable development 
across sectors and at the national, regional and district levels. Imple-
menting such actions ultimately depends on improved access to inter-
national funding streams, especially those administered by the GCF 
and AF, as well as new financing sources in the development sector. 
Yet, it is clear that GCF and AF funds alone are unlikely to cover a 
reasonable part of the expected adaptation costs in Ghana. Thus it is 
argued that further donor support for sustainable development is re-
quired, including the possible implementation of (highly contested) 
REDD+ activities to address deforestation and forest degradation.  
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The Ghanaian government, in cooperation with the government of 
Japan and the United Nations Development Programme, has therefore 
initiated a policy dialogue on innovative climate finance options under 
the Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP), and launched the Green Climate 
Fund Readiness Programme in June 2015. The different finance options 
that are currently under discussion include private sector cooperation 
and privatization, domestic budget support, and enhanced adaptation 
financing through capital markets. As outlined in the NCCP, the 
government is prioritizing a coordinated approach to climate change 
financing based on existing practices in public financial management 
and national development planning. However, insufficient informa-
tion on climate change impacts in specific sectors, coupled with lack of 
credit enhancement schemes has thus far dissuaded private sector 
institutions like banks and insurance companies from getting more 
actively involved in risky climate change adaptation and mitigation 
projects, regardless of the expected negative impacts of climate change 
on key sectors of the Ghanaian economy.  
A more innovation-oriented approach to harnessing private sector 
financing for CCA and DRR activities has been outlined in the national 
Budget Statement and Economic Policy for the fiscal year 2015, themed 
"Transformational Agenda: Securing the Bright Medium Term 
Prospects of the Economy". In line with paragraph 449 of the budget, 
the Ghanaian government has decided to "implement measures to 
undertake climate change and green economy programmes and pro-
jects that promote clean environment, job creation and poverty 
reduction [as well as] Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional 
Review (CPEIR) leading to climate sensitive budgeting in the medium 
term" (GoG 2015, p. 88). This approach is generally well aligned with 
the strategic priorities that are described in the 2010 policy discussion 
document Ghana Goes for Green Growth, and with the overarching 
vision of the NCCP (2013, p. ix), namely to "ensure a climate resilient 
and climate compatible economy while achieving sustainable develop-
ment and equitable low carbon economic growth for Ghana." 
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Nevertheless, in spite of the increased political attention for climate 
change it must be conceded that the current status of climate finance 
readiness in Ghana is still relatively low, particularly with regard to 
the country’s lack of organizational capacity to manage accessed funds 
and compete for international funding streams, including financial 
resources channeled through the GCF and AF. While donor-driven 
capacity building initiatives have contributed considerably to keeping 
environmental governance and climate change finance on the govern-
ment’s agenda, substantial progress has yet to be made in the fields of 
knowledge transfer, awareness raising and implementation. 
At the same time, much will depend on the aftermath of the twenty-
first session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, which 
has been held in Paris in November/December 2015, and the political 
will to capitalize the GCF and other climate finance mechanisms to 
provide adequate financial support for the implementation of 
adaptation initiatives and programs. By the end of 2015, the AF had 
only disbursed a total volume of 95 million USD in grants, including 
8,293,972.19 USD for a project on water management and livelihood 
diversification in northern Ghana. The GCF Board, in turn, is still in 
the process of approving relevant projects and programs. While this 
research is conducted, it is still unsure whether Ghana will be able to 
secure GCF funding due to complex accreditation and application 
procedures. Moreover, since it is abundantly clear that current 
adaptation financing is insufficient to address Ghana’s adaptation and 
development challenges in the medium and long term, additional 
financial efforts on behalf of the private sector will be required to 
reinvigorate the global partnership for Sustainable Development. The 
preliminary Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International 
Conference on Financing for Development notes that 
Achieving an ambitious post-2015 development agenda, including all 
the SDGs, will require an equally ambitious, comprehensive, holistic, 
and transformative approach with respect to the means of implemen-
tation, combining different means of implementation and integrating 
the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable 
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development. This should be underpinned by effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions, sound policies and good governance at all levels 
(DESA 2015, p. 3; emphasis added). 
Financial decisions at the global and national levels of governance will 
therefore determine the actual implementation of adaptation actions. 
Meanwhile, critics have been quick to note that the concept of 'climate 
finance' still remains ill-defined from a legal perspective, potentially 
favoring the re-labeling of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as 
climate finance.36  
Another point of contention is the utter disregard for climate justice 
concerns such as public accountability and civil society participation 
during the establishment of the GCF. The policy process that has led to 
the formation of the GCF Private Sector Facility, in particular, raised 
pertinent questions about the United Nations’ efforts to engage private 
investors and businesses. Civil society organizations have repeatedly 
pointed to multiple instances of regulatory capture due to intransparent 
bureaucratic procedures and the biased appointment of official 
consultants whose "advice" created a path dependence in framing 
priority areas for GCF investment (Bracking 2015). The strong impetus 
on the commodification of the environment in the debate about climate 
finance also increases the likelihood of 'transforming transformation' 
into another empty signifier that is used to shape policy discourses 
according to private sector interests. Large-scale investments by agro-
industries and other strictly market-oriented interpretations of 'trans-
formative' socioeconomic change thus harbor the danger of neglecting 
pro-poor adaptation policies, and set the scene for different adaptation 
scenarios, ranging from business-as-usual to adjustment, reform, and 
agricultural transformation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Field notes: Interview with a member of the National Climate Change Committee. 
Accra, August 2012.  
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Defining the Dispositif: Policy Translation 
from the National to the Local Level 
Mainstreaming Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction into           
Development Planning 
The National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS 2010) of 
Ghana outlines ten (10) priority adaptation programs that have been 
identified according to the Akropong Approach. These priority programs 
are also reflected in the newly adopted NCCP, and emphasize the cen-
trality of poverty reduction and socioeconomic development for cli-
mate change adaptation in Ghana. They are shown in the table below. 
Table 6. Priority Adaptation Programs of the NCCAS 
 
1. Increasing resilience to climate change impacts: identifying and  
enhancing early warning systems 
2. Alternative livelihoods: minimizing impacts of climate change for  
the poor and vulnerable 
3. Enhance national capacity to adapt to climate change through  
improved land use management 
4. Adapting to climate change through enhanced research and  
awareness creation 
5. Development and implementation of environmental sanitation  
strategies to adapt to climate change 
6. Managing water resources as climate change adaptation to enhance  
productivity and livelihoods 
7. Minimizing climate change impacts on socioeconomic development  
through agricultural diversification 
8. Minimizing climate change impacts on human health through               
improved access to healthcare 
9. Demand- and supply-side measures for adapting the national         
energy system to impacts of climate change 
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10. Adaptation to climate change: sustaining livelihoods through              
enhanced fisheries resource management 
 
 
At the highest political level, the Ministry of Environment, Science, Tech-
nology and Innovation (MESTI) serves as the main coordinating body for 
the integration of climate change adaptation measures into national 
development planning, and specifically into Ghana’s Shared Growth 
and Development Agenda (GSGDA II 2014). The mainstreaming pro-
cess is currently piloted in ten (10) Districts. 
However, due to the diversity of individuals and organizations that 
are already involved in the implementation of adaptation measures in 
Ghana, it has become increasingly important for adaptation scholars to 
investigate the inter-sectoral policy networks that are spearheading cur-
rent implementation efforts. The responsible organization for the im-
plementation of adaptation policies, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), explicitly underlines the importance of inter-sectoral 
policy networks by concluding that  
(…) the success of inter-sectoral processes in fighting climate change 
risks depends to a large extent on an enhanced understanding and 
acceptance by policy makers, technocrats and all other stakeholders. 
They must be linked to the institutional structures (rules, procedures, 
regulations, norms, values and organizations) within the national   
development planning system (EPA 2013, p. 4). 
With a stronger political commitment to mainstreaming thus comes a 
discernible shift in official policy discourses. To be precise, the adapta-
tion policy debate has been extended from short-term reactive adjust-
ment measures to the integrated implementation of CCA and DRR ef-
forts across sectors, and at the regional, district and sub-district levels. 
Notably, a guidebook on 'Integrating Climate Change and Disaster Risk 
Reduction into National Development, Policies and Planning' has been re-
leased in 2010 by CC-DARE, EPA, the National Development Planning 
Commission and NADMO. The technical guidebook outlines several 
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areas for mainstreaming that closely follow the national development 
policy process, including policy formulation, planning, budgeting and 
implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation (Nelson et al. 
2010, p. 31).  
Without going into further details, it seems as if a core policy narrative 
emerges from the National Adaptation Strategy, the National Climate 
Change Policy, and the Hyogo Framework for Action: institutional re-
forms are urgently required to mitigate the risks that climate change 
poses for socioeconomic development, and to build a strong organiza-
tional basis for policy implementation (Nelson et al. 2010, p. 17; also see 
NCCP 2013). In short, institutions should be strengthened to become 
more transparent and adaptive to change, which can present new de-
velopment opportunities. However, such discussions about institu-
tional reform, mainstreaming and policy networks are not a new phe-
nomenon. In fact, they are tightly linked to another influential debate 
that has shaped Ghanaian political discourses since the late 1980s: the 
issue of decentralization. 
 
Decentralization and Structural Challenges for Implementation 
Ghana’s decentralization process has been driven by the political will 
to overcome the inefficiencies associated with inherited colonial gov-
ernance structures. The Local Government Law of 1988 as well as the 
Fourth Republican Constitution of 1992 made provision for decentral-
ization and structural reforms with the main goal to create enabling 
political conditions for equitable social development. The desired out-
come was to replace centralized organizational arrangements by trans-
ferring political, administrative and financial authority from the na-
tional level to the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies 
(MMDAs). This transfer of responsibilities to the MMDAs, however, is 
still far from being completed. The Ministry of Local Government, Rural 
Development and Environment (MLGRDE), the mandated government 
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authority for the coordination of Ghana’s decentralization efforts, out-
lines ten (10) priority action areas for Ghana’s 'National Decentraliza-
tion Action Plan' (2010-2014): 
 
1. Political decentralization and legal reforms; 
2. Administrative decentralization; 
3. Decentralized development planning; 
4. Spatial planning; 
5. Local economic development; 
6. Fiscal decentralization; 
7. Popular participation and accountability; 
8. The social agenda; 
9. Involvement of non-state actors in local governance; and 
10. Institutional arrangements for policy coordination. 
 
However, in Ghana’s three-tiered system of local governance, policy 
networks are permanently competing for influence in central–local 
government relations (Koranteng and Larbi 2008). In other words,   
policy networks are making use of legal, budgetary and other systemic 
power asymmetries to shape the outcomes of decentralization pro-
cesses according to their specific interests. This political aspect of de-
centralization includes strategic competition for financial and other re-
sources between political networks within the Regional Coordinating 
Councils at the regional level, the Metropolitan, Municipal and District 
Assemblies at the district level, and the Town/Area Councils and Unit 
Committees at the sub-district level (which are sometimes even dys-
functional).  
As the initial case study has illustrated, another layer of complexity is 
added through the political 'double bind' of chiefs and earth priests, 
who are often (informally) involved in party politics, while simultane-
ously performing their role as traditional leaders.  
In sum, there is little doubt that the slow decentralization process has 
an inhibiting effect on the implementation of adaptation measures. The 
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NCCAS explicitly recommends a decentralized implementation strat-
egy and frames the district level as the "most crucial level" for imple-
mentation efforts (NCCAS 2010, p. 23). Yet, slow implementation 
should not be seen as a regulatory problem. Most practitioners were in 
fact of the opinion that existing decentralization laws and policies are 
sufficient in principle, while the channeling of financial resources to 
the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies was seen to be 
unsatisfactory in practice, regardless of political commitments to fiscal 
decentralization. Accordingly, it was a commonly held sentiment 
among participants that decentralization laws needed to be more rig-
orously applied, and that increasing the capacity of district and sub-
district level staff to access and manage financial resources is critical to 
ensure public accountability, facilitate cross-sectoral action, and ad-
dress local adaptation priorities. During an interview with a policy ex-
pert in Accra, this sentiment was expressed very clearly: 
The legal framework for decentralization is good, but the problem has 
to do with enforcement. Every district generates local revenues and 
some percentage is supposed to be given to local structures, but there 
is no capacity. We do not have people with the capacity to manage 
the resources there. So the problem is related to understaffing as well 
as limited knowledge. Also, at the national level, with regard to the 
District Assemblies, there is supposed to be fiscal decentralization, 
but there is a resistance because those at the national level think that 
if they push the resources there, they will have nothing left for them-
selves (...), they want to continue controlling those at the local level. 
So you have resistance at the national level to channel resources to the 
District Assembly level, and at the District Assembly level to send re-
sources to the lowest level, that is the Area Council and Town Council 
level. 
– Advocacy & Strategic Partnership Manager on Climate Change, CARE In-
ternational, Accra 
The hierarchical structure of decision making and the influence of na-
tional-level policy networks is also visible at the level of the Regional 
Coordination Councils (RCCs). The ten (10) RCCs in Ghana are largely 
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controlled by the respective Regional Ministers, who are, in turn, di-
rectly answerable to the central government. A regional government 
official explains:  
 
Each institution reports to the head office. The Regional Minister can 
have some ideas, but if the head office does not see it as their vision, 
it will not work out. You may have a particular regional vision, but it 
may not be the Ashanti regional vision, the Western regional vision. 
At the head office they are looking at all these regions (…) 
On the ground, decision making is supposed to be decentralized so 
that you can take decisions then and there, apply them, and make 
sure that you solve your problems. But decentralization exists only 
on paper, we do not have financial decentralization. Somebody who 
is not seeing what is happening on the ground may decide to cut the 
funding (…) 
Even if you decentralize, you may take a decision now, and those 
looking at your expenditures may not agree. Let's say you are sup-
posed to be constructing dams as an irrigation development author-
ity, and now you also want to plant trees. These expenditures may 
not even be covered by your mandate. If you are dealing with envi-
ronmental issues, you may want to take decisions that will involve 
tree planting, that will involve getting communities organized, but 
because there is no complete decentralization someone will tell you 
that this is not your mandate.  
– Senior Basin Officer, White Volta Basin Office of the Ghana Water 
Resources Commission, Bolgatanga  
 
Along with a lack of financial resources, decentralization challenges 
were frequently mentioned as a problem during expert interviews and 
are widely acknowledged to be one of the most important reasons why 
the implementation of adaptation policies is an exceedingly difficult 
task. In fact, decentralization challenges are featured prominently in 
scientific articles and donor brochures about every imaginable devel-
opment issue that is currently under discussion in Ghana, ranging 
from local economic development and natural resource management 
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to disaster risk reduction, gender mainstreaming and climate change 
adaptation. Curiously, however, the analysis frequently stops at this 
point, and technical or managerial recommendations are made that as-
sume the existence of a neutral state apparatus, while trying to explain 
how 'actors' form their causal beliefs about political interventions ac-
cording to 'rational' criteria.  
Following this structural logic does not present a problem per se, due 
to the fact that people who are working in governmental environments 
are certainly engaged in multiple practices of rational organizing. 
However, even assuming that decentralization and organizational re-
forms are the sine qua non to advance adaptation, it has to be asked how 
managerial rationalities are seen – and often transcended or trans-
formed – by those who are supposed to enact them.  
At the regional and district level, government officials and assembly 
members have developed a rather critical view of new mainstreaming 
and policy pilot initiatives, mainly as a result of increased workloads 
for pilot districts and due to mainstreaming approaches that neglect 
long-term training measures. Capacity building and training work-
shops at the regional, district and sub-district levels are often irregular 
events, mainly as a result of relatively short project and funding cycles, 
while technical and structural capacities for the implementation and/or 
coordination of adaptation activities are still weak. 
When asked to name the most relevant political bodies that could fa-
cilitate the decentralized coordination of adaptation activities across 
sectors, policy experts frequently mentioned the Regional Disaster 
Management Platforms. At the regional level, DRR platforms are chaired 
by the Regional Minister, while the NADMO Regional Coordinator 
serves as a secretary. Platform membership also includes other re-
gional directors of government MDAs, together with representatives 
of the armed forces, the police and fire services, as well as academia, 
donor organizations, and the private sector. However, it is evident that 
the focus of regional DRM platforms is mainly on disaster prevention 
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and relief efforts, and not necessarily on the planning and local imple-
mentation of adaptation programs or sustainable development pro-
jects. It was pointed out in interviews that there was little exchange on 
climate change matters among the regional heads of government min-
istries, departments and agencies in the context of DRR platform meet-
ings. One DRR specialist also mentioned that the activities of the DRM 
platform are mainly related to advocacy, awareness creation and coor-
dination, while a government employee remarked: 
When they were designing the DRM platform, in my view, they 
thought of disaster only in terms of floods.37 
Participants also considered Environmental Management Committees at 
the regional and district levels to be particularly relevant for the coor-
dination and implementation of adaptation activities. The EPA has es-
tablished Environmental Management Committees at the regional and 
district levels to monitor and coordinate activities related to environ-
mental protection and enhancement. At the regional level, Environ-
mental Management Committees consist of the regional heads of de-
partments and organizations, the District Assemblies, the Regional 
and District Planning Officers, NGOs and traditional authorities. Dis-
trict level Environmental Management Committees, in turn, are made 
up of five (5) District Assembly members as well as selected represent-
atives of environmentally related departments, NGOs, and CBOs. 
Arguably, these coordinating platforms are still embedded in the same 
political networks and top-down governance structures that character-
ize the entire political management system in Ghana. In the Upper East 
Region, Environmental Management Committees are nonetheless per-
ceived to be suitable institutional entry points for the implementation 
                                                          
37 Field notes: Interview with Sustainable Development Analyst, UNDP, Accra, Sep-
tember 2012, and interview with Senior Basin Officer, White Volta Basin Office of the 
Ghana Water Resources Commission, Bolgatanga, January 2013. 
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of adaptation actions, mostly due to the fact that there is already prac-
tical experience with desertification control, environmental awareness 
creation, and community involvement. Strengthening the role of these 
environmental committees, financial and otherwise, and linking them 
more closely to the work of the DRR platforms and the Ghana Meteor-
ological Service was thus considered a preferred policy choice com-
pared to establishing new adaptation-related implementation arrange-
ments. Interestingly, participants considered the National Climate 
Change Committee and other ministerial climate change 'desks' or 
'task forces' that have recently been inaugurated by the central govern-
ment to be of much less relevance for the roll-out of community-based 
adaptation programs on the ground.38  
One possible reason for these reservations among policy experts is the 
fact that the mainstreaming of donor-driven development concepts – 
for example desertification and gender equality – has been strained by 
the same type of decentralization challenges that are now stalling the 
mainstreaming of adaptation policies. With regard to previous experi-
ences in gender mainstreaming, Ramya Subrahmanian (2007, p. 113) 
observes that, since the late 1990s, a "decade of mainstreaming experi-
ence has uncovered many lessons. Many of these are about the nature 
of the state and its institutions, and the kinds of spaces that are availa-
ble to promoting transformative change." 
Strengthening existing Environmental Management Committees and 
DRR platforms may thus be seen as an ambitious or even unrealistic 
political goal, as it implies to tackle the underlying structural problems 
of decentralization. In light of the wider transformative development 
agenda, however, the counter-argument holds that the introduction of 
new national-level networks for environmental management has thus 
                                                          
38 These include: the EPA climate change desk; the MOFA climate change task force; 
MOFEP Climate Change Unit; the Ghana Environmental Conventions Coordinating 
Authority (GECCA); and the NREG program. 
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far yielded little evidence of meaningful community involvement and 
tangible improvement on the ground (Torpey 2012). 
Therefore, to learn more about the discursive landscape in which the 
decentralization debate unfolds, it is important to engage with organ-
izational narratives about risk-seeking or risk-avoiding behavior. Assum-
ing that taking ownership of reformist/transformative agendas is per-
ceived to be more politically or financially risky than the negative ef-
fects of the status quo – for example unsustainable economic develop-
ment and severe disaster impacts – it is questionable whether norma-
tive and cultural-cognitive changes will occur at a fast enough rate to 
avoid serious development setbacks. 
As I have outlined earlier, general risk preferences with regard to pol-
icy choices in the public sector are significantly shaped by donor agen-
das, financing, and influential development policy networks at the 
level of the central government. It can thus be concluded from the pre-
liminary results that finding appropriate solutions for highly specific 
adaptation contexts crucially depends on enabling structures for inclu-
sive and sustainable social development. Indeed, if the overarching 
goal of adaptation actions is strengthening people’s adaptiveness and 
fostering resilience, progressive and ambitious political goals should 
not be neglected, even if the interpretation of the transformative devel-
opment agenda remains a controversial political issue. 
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Expert Views on Adaptation 
International Development Agencies 
Adaptation experts and policy makers in Ghana seem to agree that, in 
addition financial constraints, low levels of public awareness and in-
sufficient organizational capacities are major impediments for policy 
implementation. This includes the organizational ability to monitor 
and assess adaptation programs, and to determine the status quo (or 
baseline) that enables decision makers to establish criteria for 'success-
ful' adaptation. In order to define consensual criteria for success, it has 
been suggested to involve 'affected' populations more closely in the 
planning and implementation of adaptation projects, according to the 
reformist notion of 'participatory' decision making and in line with the 
NCCP principle of subsidiarity, which states that decisions should be 
taken at the lowest appropriate level in society (see NCCP 2013, p. 23). 
However, it has to be borne in mind that addressing political questions 
about adaptation from a solely state-centric perspective means being 
bogged down by a managerial mindset that permanently forces the 
scholar to think in organizational categories. It may also lead to a nar-
row view of adaptation as a purely techno-scientific problem that can 
only be solved by experts. Hence I will draw on a discourse analytical 
repertoire to illustrate how international agencies and donor organiza-
tions are influencing technical governance discourses by identifying 
cause-and-effect connections, and by suggesting 'appropriate' adapta-
tion responses.  
Without doubt, development partners exert a good amount of influ-
ence on sector-specific policies in Ghana, including climate change ad-
aptation. Sometimes this influence is clearly visible, for instance 
through direct budget support, policy mainstreaming, assistance with 
report writing, and donor representation in political bodies such as the 
National Climate Change Committee. In other cases, donor influence 
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is more subtle, and framed as 'technical' assistance. This may include 
the operationalization of risk and vulnerability assessments, the selec-
tion of pilot studies as well as and the interpretation of technical con-
cepts such as adaptation, sometimes in line with private economic in-
terests at the level of implementation.  
Thus, in view of the accelerating commodification and 'neoliberaliza-
tion' of the transformative development paradigm – especially in the 
agricultural and forestry sectors – there is obviously little reason to 
value third party consultation as objective and without motive.  
Similarly, it must be assumed that local elite networks are potentially 
complicit in advancing rent-seeking behavior and corruption. In the 
context of Ghana, as well as internationally, it is an open secret that 
enforcing accountability and transparency vis-à-vis powerful financial 
and political interests is an arduous task. A Ghanaian NGO representa-
tive remarks: 
We act as watchdogs. Industrialized countries together with the 
World Bank and big international corporations offer financial support 
for climate change projects, but they are often using the problems of      
African countries to present false ideas just for their own profit (…) 
What is the zeal of Ghana as a country to strengthen climate justice? 
It has not happened yet. 
– Member of the National Climate Change Committee & Friends of 
the Earth, Accra 
When taking a closer look at how adaptation options are framed in   
international donor accounts, a good number of examples for 'neolib-
eral' adaptation solutions can certainly be found. Examples include 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES), promoted by the World 
Bank under the umbrella of Sustainable Land Management (SLM), and 
the endorsement of a highly controversial Green Revolution model of 
agriculture, primarily advanced under the banner of the Global Alliance 
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for Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA).39 Other examples for controversial 
market-based approaches are genetically engineered 'climate-ready' 
crops, carbon trading schemes such as REDD+, as well as the piloting 
of agricultural insurance products in selected districts by international 
donor agencies and the insurance industry. 
For the case of Ghana, it must nevertheless be conceded that private 
sector interests in the area of climate change and adaptation are still 
limited in scope, and should not be exaggerated. Quite to the contrary, 
the private sector is currently more interested in exploiting fossil fuel 
reserves and degrading the environment rather than to invest in a 
'green' economy. The Upper East Region, in particular, generally suf-
fers from a lack of public and private investment in every sector of the 
economy, ranging from waste management, education and infrastruc-
ture to energy, communications and health service provision. While 
this situation is troublesome indeed, it also presents new opportunities 
for investments in decentralized renewable energies, agroecological 
solutions and other environmentally friendly technologies. What is 
problematic, however, is that development policies for Ghana’s north 
have achieved relatively little to support small-scale farmers as well as 
                                                          
39 For a critical scientific review of the Green Revolution model see IAASTD (2009). 
Moreover, an open letter signed by an international coalition of more than 80 NGOs 
and CSOs states: "Food producers and providers – farmers, fisherfolk, and pastoralists 
– together with our food systems are on the front lines of climate change. We know 
that urgent action must be taken to cool the planet, to help farming systems – and 
particularly small-scale farmers – adapt to a changing climate, and to revive and           
reclaim the agroecological systems on which future sustainable food production         
depends. The Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture, however, will not deliver 
the solutions that we so urgently need. Instead, 'climate-smart' agriculture provides a 
dangerous platform for corporations to implement the very activities we oppose. By 
endorsing the activities of the planet’s worst climate offenders in agribusiness and in-
dustrial agriculture, the Alliance will undermine the very objectives that it claims to 
aim for. Although some organizations have constructively engaged in good faith for 
several months with the Alliance to express serious concerns, the concerns have been 
ignored. Instead, the Alliance is clearly being structured to serve big business interests, 
not to address the climate crisis" (see http://www.climatesmartagconcerns.info,        
September 2014). 
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women, young people, the elderly, and the urban poor. In sum, these 
groups are frequently neglected in the context of sporadic project in-
terventions, while international donor attention mainly rests on com-
mercial agriculture and export-oriented growing schemes to stimulate 
job creation, following the logic of trickle-down economics. There is 
also a neglect of rapidly growing peri-urban areas where urbanization 
is creating new marginality 'hot spots' through the transformation of 
traditional agricultural livelihoods.  
Admittedly, questions of 'inclusive' and 'participatory' development 
have not been completely ignored in mainstream adaptation policy 
discourses. The government’s definition of adaptation as a develop-
ment issue primarily sees adaptation as a political and social question. 
Similarly, international development agencies are promoting sustain-
able, participatory and inclusive development. An international public 
servant remarks: 
I think the issue is also about equity, because your economic status 
will affect the way in which you respond to risk – I am talking about 
autonomous adaptation. There are cases where the relatively well en-
dowed households are trying to manage their risks, and they can do 
it by themselves. But their actions will influence the way the poor 
households manage their risks. One anecdote that I heard during our 
adaptation consultation is that the richer households tend to raise 
more cows to manage their risk. But that would mean encroaching 
into communal lands which are also degrading. So poverty is a big 
challenge, but it is also about equity. In the northern regions, I think, 
this is a big challenge. 
– Programme Specialist for Sustainable Development, UNDP, Accra 
Arguably, such definitions of risk are still neglecting macroeconomic 
factors and regulatory capture within processes of rational organizing. 
It is therefore necessary to delve a little deeper into the troublesome 
question of policy translation. 
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The National Disaster Management Organization 
In order to investigate how layers of social signification are changing 
as soon as the concept of climate change adaptation is translated and 
re-negotiated at the district level, structured interviews with NADMO 
district coordinators in the Upper East Region of Ghana (n=13) have 
been conducted. Among several other questions, the district coordina-
tors were asked to consult with their colleagues and team members to 
describe what the idea of adaptation means (or could mean) for their 
daily work. Throughout the entire UER, seven out of thirteen districts 
provided a response to this specific question. This equals a total re-
gional response rate of 53.8 percent.40   
In sum, the following definitions of climate change adaptation were 
given by the NADMO Municipal and District secretariats (discourse   
referents are marked for anthropocentric and natural causal explanations):  
(1) "Climate change adaption means how the environment 
changes in a particular season each year." 
 
(2) "Climate change adaption means adjusting to a situation that 
would occur as a result of climate change impacts, e.g. too 
much rainfall, long periods of drought, too much heat that can 
bring Cerebrospinal Meningitis." 
 
(3) "Climate change adaption may be described as measures put in 
place to cope and deal effectively with changes that may occur 
in the environment as a result of changes in the climatic condi-
tions or the weather." 
                                                          
40 The survey was conducted after the district reform of July 2012, when four new dis-
tricts were established in the Upper East Region, bringing the total number of munic-
ipalities and districts to thirteen (13). The Municipal and District secretariats who pro-
vided a response (7) were located in the Kassena–Nankana East District, Kassena–
Nankana West District, Bawku Municipal District, Bolgatanga Municipal District, 
Nabdam District, Bulisa South District, and the Bongo District. 
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(4) "Climate change adaption is changing your attitude and actions 
to enable you to live under an inevitably changing climate 
[symbolic reference to fate, note of the author] with minimum dis-
turbance in your new way of life, for example with regard to 
your shelter, your food, your clothes, farming practices, etc." 
 
(5) "Climate change is a situation which is characterized by both 
man-made and natural occurrence which has a negative impact 
on mankind. The factors which contribute to climate change are 
as follows: air pollution, pollution of water bodies, deforesta-
tion." 
 
(6) "Climate change adaptation means responding directly or indi-
rectly to human activity that alters the composition in the 
global atmosphere and which, in addition to natural climate 
variability, can be observed over a longer time period." 
 
(7) "Adaptation is that what we have to do to protect us and our 
children." 
 
 
 
These different statements about the nature of adaptation are intri-
guing for several reasons. First of all, it is noticeable that almost all of 
the above definitions are in some way or another framing adaptation 
as coping or adjustment to natural phenomena, while the statements 
number (2) and (3) even mention these terms explicitly, and statement 
number (4) makes a reference to inevitable fate. Second, if human in-
volvement in climate change is acknowledged, improved environmen-
tal protection is often suggested as a solution, for example in state-
ments number (5) and (6). The statements that are found to be most 
closely linked to political or development-related issues are 'changing 
your attitude and actions' (4), and protecting 'us and our children' (7).  
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But what do these findings actually mean for the implementation of 
adaptation policies? Broadly speaking, it can be concluded that efforts 
at 'mainstreaming' climate change adaptation into DRR planning at the 
district level have successfully advanced 'mainstream' resilience think-
ing, and thus promoted narratives of adaptation as coping or adjust-
ment to environmental phenomena. Moreover, it appears that the link 
between adaptation, DRR and social development is still rather weak 
at the district level. Yet, to be able to fully interpret these problematiza-
tions of risk, the risk perceptions of NADMO district officials need to 
be further examined. Initially, members of the individual NADMO 
secretariats in the UER were asked to rank the risks in their specific 
districts on a scale ranging from 8 ('most important') to 1 ('least im-
portant'). Selected results for the two NADMO district secretariats in 
the Vea Catchment are presented below. 
Figure 6. Risk Perception of NADMO Specialists in the Bolgatanga                   
Municipal District 
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Figure 7. Risk Perception of NADMO Specialists in the Bongo District 
 
 
 
When asked for the underlying reasons that determine the 'risk status' 
of people with regard to the above mentioned hazards, one high rank-
ing NADMO official explains: 
We did a vulnerability assessment in some of the communities. We 
also looked at the hazards, their period of occurrence, their force and 
frequency. With regard to vulnerability, we look at physical vulnera-
bility, social vulnerability, economic vulnerability. We also do capa-
city assessments. You cannot do DRR without looking at these things. 
But the greatest factor that actually determines the risk status of our 
people has to do with poverty … I will use my own term – 'micro-
micro' poverty. That is poverty at the smallest units level. I do not 
even want to use the term household. It is even smaller than the 
household, at the individual level. It has to do with unemployment. 
The majority of the youth are unemployed. They have no sources of 
livelihood, so that makes them helpless. Then, if you take the house-
hold level, many depend on rainfed agriculture. 
– Upper East Regional NADMO Coordinator, Bolgatanga 
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It becomes very clear from these findings that the negative impacts of 
'natural' hazards such as flood, drought and changing rainfall patterns 
are mediated by poverty and high unemployment rates. The govern-
ment’s priority to foster job creation for young people should, there-
fore, be seen as directly related to adaptation. While youth make up 
roughly one third of the population in Ghana, the dilemma that deci-
sion makers are currently facing is that the formal sector is largely in-
capable of presenting the majority of young people with sufficient ed-
ucational, economic and social opportunities. This situation leaves in-
formal sector employment as the only alternative against the backdrop 
of accelerating urbanization, population growth and rural transfor-
mation. According to statistical data presented by the African Devel-
opment Bank, the OECD Development Centre and the United Nations 
Development Programme, the overall unemployment rate for the age 
group between 15 and 24 in Ghana is currently at 25.6 percent (African 
Economic Outlook 2012, p. 14). 
At the same time, it needs to be taken into account that risk and human 
vulnerability are crucially determined by the institutional organization 
of territoriality. This organizational 'making of landscapes' includes in-
frastructure, service provision as well as knowledge and resource 
flows. As I have argued earlier on, it is precisely the complex interplay 
between situated and relational risk that makes the use of terms such 
as 'adaptive capacity' inherently problematic. Not only are peoples’ ca-
pacities mediated by social vulnerability and institutional settings, 
they are also potentially limited by macroeconomic effects that are be-
yond the immediate control of the individual. 
From an educational perspective, the 'capacity' NADMO staff in the 
UER is certainly above average. Senior staff members have often ob-
tained an academic degree, while some employees indicated during 
interviews that they have previously authored books and taught clas-
ses. The overall picture with regard to the material equipment at the 
regional and district levels, however, is rather bleak. A NADMO Dis-
trict Coordinator remarks: 
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The district office has no vehicle, which makes it very difficult to carry 
out our mandate. Moreover, it is at times difficult to reach our staff 
on their cellphones because of network problems. 
– NADMO District Coordinator, Bongo District 
 
Certainly, one would be right to conclude that these material and in-
frastructural constraints are merely symptomatic of a general lack of 
resources. Participants concurred, for example, that there was an over-
all shortage of relief items, recovery and rescue tools, boats, and life 
jackets during flood and storm events, and that most of them were 
stored at the regional headquarters and needed to be transported in 
case of an emergency situation. Eight out of thirteen NADMO district 
secretariats (61 percent) also indicated that data sharing practices be-
tween government agencies were unsatisfactory, especially with re-
gard to meteorological information. Moreover, it was pointed out by 
31 percent of the participants that available maps were either outdated 
or not very accurate. Flood maps are usually not digitalized, and often 
prepared by donors (see Picture 3).  
Picture 3. Flood Maps in the NADMO Regional Office, Bolgatanga    
© Author, 2012 
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Overall, donor dependence is exceptionally high, mostly due to the fact 
that disbursements from the District Assemblies’ Common Fund for 
DRR activities are still far from being sufficient. As expected, this ma-
terial argument also extends to the capacity building aspect of DRR. 
Training small groups of people in using supportive technologies such 
as mobile GIS devices for vulnerability assessments is hardly the most 
pressing issue, as long as simple means of transport are not available 
for many staff members in their daily work. Moreover, it will be re-
quired to offer additional training on disaster response and rescue for 
local level staff and NADMO volunteers. 
Under these circumstances, and as long as the government prioritizes 
other policy sectors, it will be extremely difficult for NADMO to fulfill 
its actual mandate – especially at the post-disaster stage. This rather 
well-known fact has been made explicit in almost every report and sci-
entific assessment that has been dealing with the implementation of 
the Hyogo Framework for Action in Ghana.  
Unsurprisingly, the National progress report on the implementation of the 
Hyogo Framework for Action (2013-2015) also links remaining implemen-
tation gaps at the district level to unfinished fiscal decentralization: 
Through the national budgetary allocation funds are made available 
for disaster management annually in the country. These funds in-
clude the contingency funds, a percentage of the district assembly 
common funds within the local government system allocated to dis-
aster related activities ... The budgetary allocation for DRR in the 
country is not enough because not all the amount approved for DRR 
activities are released from the approved budget. Some institutions 
do not see the need for DRR hence do not make provision for it 
(NADMO 2015, p. 10). 
Similar material and organizational constraints are also hindering the 
implementation of improved early warning systems, as I will briefly 
illustrate in the following section. 
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Improving Early Warning Systems 
Indigenous early warning systems for environmental hazards such as 
drought, floods and storm surges in Ghana have, in large part, devel-
oped independently of modern technological advances, while still be-
ing deeply engrained in existing communal structures and nature-cul-
ture relations. Technology-based early warning systems now operate 
in parallel with these indigenous systems, usually following a top-
down and linear End-to-End (E2E) model of early warning (UNISDR 
2009). The E2E model in Ghana is mostly based on data recorded at the 
GMet weather stations throughout the country. Anomalous rainfall 
patterns are recorded and reported to the GMet headquarters, where 
the validity of the information is cross-checked and subsequently 
shared with other governmental organizations such as NADMO and 
the river basin authorities. Alternatively, information from the district 
level is communicated upwards to national level authorities for vali-
dation. In case of a confirmed emergency situation, NADMO issues an 
official warning message and initiates actions for disaster risk manage-
ment at the regional and sub-regional levels. As a final step in the E2E 
model, an early warning message is disseminated directly to poten-
tially affected communities where appropriate preparations are made.  
Yet, it must be considered that the above description of the E2E process 
represents an ideal state of affairs, while the current status of early 
warning systems in Ghana remains problematic. In early June 2015, the 
tragic flood disaster and related explosion of a gas station near the 
Kwame Nkrumah Circle in Accra have called attention to the fact that 
the translation of early warning information into targeted responses at 
the community level is still a major constraint for NADMO as well as 
other emergency management organizations.  
Besides organizational limitations, social vulnerability in flood prone 
areas is exacerbated by the insufficient enforcement of building codes 
and a lack of adequate infrastructure such as public emergency shelters 
and drainage systems. Thus, it must be concluded that the strategic 
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shift in DRR policies from reactive emergency management to more 
proactive awareness creation, risk mitigation and vulnerability reduc-
tion efforts is still not complete. 
In order to facilitate the desired policy shift toward prevention, and to 
actualize the integrated implementation of DRR and CCA activities, 
NADMO and the Government of Ghana have entered into a strategic 
partnership with the Norwegian Government and UNDP under the 
Community Resilience through Early Warning (CREW) Project in 2012. 
The CREW project was implemented over a three year period from 
2012-2015, and mainly focused on improved early warning systems for 
floods and drought. Its aim was to "build capacities within the country 
to reduce disaster risk by putting in place an integrated early warning 
system that is both scientific and people-centered" (CREW Project 
2012, p. 2). However, the inherent limitations of these project-based 
DRR approaches have been clearly outlined by NADMO in its National 
progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action. 
The report concludes: 
The CREW project only caters for 10 pilot districts and the pro-
gramme may not be sustainable when the tree years elapse. There is 
also the problem of adequate funding and logistical constraints 
(NADMO 2015, p. 16). 
One possible avenue to improving the safety and adaptiveness of indi-
viduals that has been previously suggested in the DRR literature is to 
adopt a participatory (or reformist) early warning approach, where 
"communities at risk drive the conceptualization and application of 
early warning systems" (Baudoin et al. 2014, p. 13).  
The essential problem with this approach is that it perpetuates a divide 
between scientific and traditional modes of knowledge production, 
while avoiding a deeper engagement with power-ridden institutional 
processes that potentially affect the outcomes of deliberative decision 
making. Communities at risk are, in other words, neither entirely com-
  
 
 
 
 
 
162                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
munal – for example with regard to gender disparities and social ine-
qualities – nor fortuitously 'at risk'. Placing bottom-up communication 
at the heart of improved early warning approaches thus requires great 
caution, especially since social norms and previous experiences with 
development projects structure local political arrangements. As I have 
discussed in the first part of this chapter, flows of knowledge and re-
sources between agencies and administrative levels in Ghana are 
highly politicized, while clientelist networks or political affiliations 
may undermine the impartiality of relief efforts. At the same time, 
structural and financial constraints are limiting the operational readi-
ness of local organizational structures, especially at the level of the 
Town/Area Councils and Unit Committees. 
Moreover, while indigenous early warning systems based on biologi-
cal indicators are becoming increasingly unreliable due to changing 
climatic conditions, another pressing question that emerges is how the 
interplay between technological and non-technological warning sys-
tems might be enhanced. For example, how can educational efforts to 
discourage risky (or even illegal) behaviors such as building on water-
ways, farming in flood prone areas, and dumping garbage in drainage 
pipes be supported? Unfortunately, the National Climate Change Pol-
icy as well as the National Adaptation Strategy have little so say about 
how exactly these tasks could be achieved.  
Considering existing patterns of social marginality and poverty, no-
tions of 'choice' or 'cultural practices' may be little more than a distrac-
tion from underlying economic pressures that push many people into 
risky or illegal behavior. Particularly in the northern regions, it is ques-
tionable whether a strong focus on 'participation' and single 'priority' 
hazards such as drought and floods will yield sustainable outcomes 
for DRR and CCA in the current development climate. The main rea-
son for this rather pessimistic outlook is the experience that creating 
spaces for participatory and community-based adaptation in local 
planning processes is not simply a matter of carving out apolitical 
niches and creating awareness for sporadic project interventions. Due 
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to the embeddedness of local level planning processes in top-down 
governance structures, authentic participation will crucially depend 
on organizational culture, donor incentives, and the long-term political 
will to create an enabling policy environment for CBA and DRR. 
Nevertheless, to arrive at a more balanced picture, and to illustrate 
how farming households are officially supported in their struggles to 
adapt to multiple social and environmental stressors, it is necessary to 
investigate how adaptation is perceived by Agricultural Extension 
Agents (AEAs) who work directly with farmers in the research area. 
 
Agricultural Extension Agents 
The agricultural extension system in Ghana developed during the co-
lonial era, mostly as an attempt to "extend" or transfer research-based 
knowledge to rural populations and promote the use of subsidized in-
puts to improve yields and increase agricultural productivity (Naam-
wintome and Millar 2013, p. 5). After independence in 1957, the state 
remained the responsible agent for agricultural extension delivery to 
farmers, until public sector involvement declined considerably during 
the early 1980s as a result of donor-driven structural adjustment pro-
grammes. The newly emerging vacuum in public service delivery was 
quickly filled, and ultimately led to a more prominent role for various 
NGOs and international donor agencies in supporting farmers. 
According to Buadi et al. (2013, p. 20), it was only after 2007 that gov-
ernment investments in agriculture have increased again. Yet, there are 
many persistent challenges for the delivery of agricultural extension 
services in Ghana, for instance understaffing and a lack of training op-
portunities for AEAs.  
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Especially in the northern savanna zone, inadequate extension service 
delivery together with endemic poverty and a lack of access to credit 
and grain storage facilities outside of bigger irrigation schemes nega-
tively affect the situation of small-scale food crop farmers who are not 
engaged in commercial agriculture.  
At present, AEAs in Ghana do not offer specific climate change-related 
extension advice to farmers, although MOFA staff are generally well 
aware of increased climate variability and its effects on yields and crop 
productivity. At the same time, farmers themselves are very sensitive 
to ecological and socioeconomic changes and are constantly seeking 
for innovative ways to adapt. From a theoretical point of view, this 
means that the overall relationship between AEAs and farmers is not 
necessarily characterized by an expert/lay knowledge divide as farmers 
themselves are climate 'experts' in their own right. Yet, a top-down ap-
proach to knowledge 'delivery' based on the Western techno-scientific 
model serves as the underlying philosophy for official agricultural ex-
tension services today, even if the linear model of extension does not 
entirely preclude participation or knowledge co-creation. For instance, 
there are examples of participatory extension such as farmer-to-farmer 
exchange and farmer field fora that seek to facilitate social learning and 
voluntary exchange based on farmers’ needs. Local farmer groups 
have proven to be another relatively stable platform for peer group ex-
change and farmer-driven innovation, even if individual economic in-
terests based on competitive advantage may inhibit the flow of infor-
mation, especially in the absence of suitable incentives to share inno-
vations. Moreover, instead of focusing on more intensive work with 
individual farmers, MOFA policies and donor-driven projects fre-
quently ask for the ad hoc formation of farmer groups, even if selected 
farmers have little previous experience in working together, thus en-
dangering the sustainability of extension impacts. 
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However, extension impacts remain notoriously difficult to measure, 
due to a lack of baseline data and strong reliance on proxy indicators. 
Thus, a group discussion with twelve (12) AEAs in the Bongo District 
of the UER has been conducted in November 2012 to learn more about 
the most widespread agricultural adaptation strategies that are cur-
rently being used by farmers in the research area. 
In sum, the AEAs described the economic situation of farmers in the 
Bongo District as increasingly difficult. Food crop farming continues 
to be the main economic activity in the area, whereas most agricultural 
households are poor smallholder farmers who depend on rainfed ag-
riculture. Participants pointed out that average smallholder produc-
tion often remains below subsistence level, and is thus insufficient to 
sustain a family, especially during the dry season. This means that it is 
nearly impossible for most households to make a living by farming 
alone. According to MOFA extension agents, ecological and popula-
tion pressures on scarce resources such as soil and water are constantly 
growing, whereas yields are decreasing in the district. At the same 
time, only a few households are engaged in formal employment and 
farmers usually depend on donor support or wider social or elite net-
works to be able to obtain costly farm inputs. 
Thus, in view of increasing human pressures on scarce natural re-
sources, and bearing in mind the generally poor quality of soils in the 
region, the group discussion revealed that the development of adapta-
tion strategies by farmers in the Bongo District is primarily a response 
to accelerating land degradation and soil erosion (i.e. insufficient soil 
moisture and fertility). Erratic rainfall patterns and dry spells were 
named as the second most important ecological factors which require 
farmers to develop improved soil and water conservation practices.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
166                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
Two promising practices that are currently being applied to reduce 
surface runoff, control soil erosion and improve water quality are con-
tour ridging and the use of Vetiver grass (Chrysopogon nigritana). Other 
successful techniques that were reported to have increased yields and 
soil fertility in the area include cereal-legume rotation and composting.  
Yet, it was argued by some participants that local small-scale farmers 
are experiencing extreme difficulties while trying to produce an ade-
quate amount of manure or compost for plots larger than one hectare. 
Infrastructural constraints in transporting compost to farmers’ fields 
was seen as another primary obstacle that could potentially limit a 
more widespread adoption of agroecological adaptation practices. 
Another key message that emerged from the debate was that most 
small-scale farmers in the district have no or very limited access to wa-
ter for dry season irrigation farming. This problem significantly de-
creases households’ adaptiveness and livelihood security in the face 
erratic precipitation patterns, prolonged dry spells, environmental 
degradation, and inadequate employment opportunities. During the 
discussion, AEAs agreed that the main water sources for irrigation 
during the dry season are household water (wastewater) and stored 
water from small dams and dugouts. These perceptions are largely 
confirmed in previous studies, for example by Namara et al. (2010, p. 
9), who assert that informal irrigation systems such as small reservoirs 
in the UER are crucial for subsistence farmers, but often poorly man-
aged and generally in a bad condition. By contrast, AEAs regarded 
other irrigation techniques such as shallow groundwater irrigation and 
pump irrigation as less relevant for most agricultural households in 
the district, with the notable exception of the Vea irrigation scheme, 
where commercially oriented dry season farming and pump irrigation 
are practiced on a larger scale (see Picture 4). 
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Picture 4. Pump Irrigation at the Vea Irrigation Scheme 
© Author, 2013 
Despite the pervasive lack of economic opportunities in the formal sec-
tor, participants also agreed that the diversification of income streams 
through non-farm activities is a commonly practiced risk management 
strategy that is widespread in all strata of society. Rural farming house-
holds in the district, according to AEAs, are mostly reliant on income 
diversification through poultry rearing, livestock farming, informal 
employment and seasonal migration (see Figure 8). Small-scale eco-
nomic activities that are officially promoted by the Bongo District As-
sembly – for example formal employment opportunities in the shea 
butter industry and handicrafts such as basket weaving – feature less 
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prominently in the perception of AEAs, despite the fact that the Bongo 
District is well known to export these products internationally. 
 
Figure 8. Perception of Farmers’ Income Diversification Strategies by 
Agricultural Extension Officers in the Bongo District (n=12) 
 
(Source: field work, Bongo, 2012) 
When asked for an overview of agricultural adaptation techniques that 
were used 'very often' by farming households in the Bongo District, 
AEAs emphasized the changing of planting dates, the introduction of 
improved seeds and fast-growing crop varieties, as well as the inter-
cropping of cereals and legumes (see Figure 9, marked in red). Inter-
estingly, these expert opinions largely cohere with studies on farmers’ 
perceptions that have been conducted in the Sekyedumase, Gomoa 
East and Akuapim South Municipal Districts, respectively (Fosu-Men-
sah et al. 2012, Yaro 2013a).  
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Figure 9. Perception of Farmers’ Adaptation Strategies by Agricultural    
Extension Officers in the Bongo District (n=12) 
 
(Source: field work, Bongo, 2012)41 
                                                          
41 Adaptation measures applied by farmers (from left to right): changing of planting dates 
(CHG), introduction of more resilient livestock varieties (LIV), introduction of im-
proved seeds and fast-growing crop varieties (SEE), land rotation (LRO), increased use 
of chemical fertilizer (CHE), cultivation in lowlands (LOW), avoiding the burning of 
bushes and crop residues (BUR), retention and incorporation of crop residue to im-
prove soil fertility (SOI), covering vegetables with plants/grass (VEG), water storage 
for dry season vegetable farming (WAT), construction of hand-dug wells or boreholes 
for water supply during drought periods (HAN), use of weather forecasts (WEA), live-
lihood diversification (DIV), intercropping of cereals and legumes (INC), planting of 
trees (TREE), increased use of water and soil conservation techniques (TEC), use of 
formal and informal micro credit (MICRO). 
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Creating Subjects at Risk?                                  
The Politics of Indeterminacy 
Traversing the seemingly rigid boundaries between the calculative 
logic of quantitative risk assessments and ideational approaches that 
perceive risk as being constituted by shared discursive practices is per-
haps one of the most troubling tasks that this study has to confront. 
However, irrespective of the related theoretical difficulties that I have 
addressed in the conceptual part of this study, I maintain that an inte-
grated perspective on the social production of risk is rewarding as it al-
lows to see the notion of 'risk' as a subject of politics on the one hand, 
and as a means of creating political subjects (who are ‘at risk’) on the 
other. Dynamic processes of political subject formation, in this sense, 
mainly function through the enactment of institutionalized rationali-
ties and "normalized systems of representation which draw on the 
ideas and materials of risk" (Power 2014, p. 385). 
According to this line of reasoning, I have applied the methodological 
repertoire of SKAD to illuminate the multiple ways in which subjects 
at risk are produced through discursive classifications and problemati-
zations on the one hand, and the concrete materiality of landscapes and 
resource flows on the other. In defining the institutional organization 
of territoriality as the primary process through which social significa-
tion and the material world enter into a hybrid relationship, I have also     
extended the reach of SKAD as an empirical approach to dispositif 
analysis.  
In the Ghanaian context, the analysis of the dispositif for adaptation 
revealed how institutionalized processes of financing and policy main-
streaming are presently affecting the translation and normalization of 
adaptation-related policies from the international to the district level. 
Moreover, in laying bare the structural impediments for the implemen-
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tation of normative adaptation policies, I have shown how current at-
tempts at increasing the adaptiveness of farmers and government or-
ganizations are constrained by the persistent quandaries of resource 
lack and unfinished decentralization. 
An intriguing trope that emerges from the analysis of the official ad-
aptation discourse in Ghana is what I would like to term the politics  
of  indeterminacy . While adaptation is widely regarded as a window 
of opportunity to address national development priorities, adaptation 
policy narratives in Ghana are increasingly marked by notions of risk 
and uncertainty. These narratives can easily be linked to neoliberal        
rationalities of individualization and commodification – mainly as a 
result of their strong emphasis on indeterminacy. As Luigi Pellizzoni 
(2014, p. 203) argues:  
Turbulence and contingency… do not mean paralyzing un-
controllability but lack of limits, room for maneuver, opening 
up of opportunities. The more unstable the world, the more 
manageable … The contrast with traditional environmental 
and social science understandings of uncertainty could not be 
starker. 
In other words, risk and uncertainty as well as the unfinished business 
of decentralization potentially function as enabling 'indeterminacies' 
for political and economic entrepreneurs, and open up new opportu-
nities for regulatory capture and profiteering. If individualistic notions 
of participation, self-help and local responsibility are placed at the cen-
ter of adaptation efforts – especially in an apolitical manner – these 
ideas might countervail the interests of poor and marginalized groups 
such as young people, landless sharecroppers and smallholder farmers 
who do not have reliable political networks to articulate their needs 
and ideas. The likely outcome of such regulatory capture by special 
interest groups is the accelerated commercialization of environmental 
resources in a way that is largely incompatible with wider principles 
of environmental sustainability and 'pro-poor' development at the 
  
 
 
 
 
 
172                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
level of implementation. Overall, it is questionable whether a one-
sided focus on large-scale agricultural modernization, export orienta-
tion and the application of hybrid seeds, inorganic fertilizers and pes-
ticides is a feasible strategy for poverty reduction among poor small-
holders. As Hesselberg (2013, p. 109) posits, it is hard to imagine "what 
kinds of agricultural higher-value non-staples northern Ghana can en-
gage in that would enable successful exports on a larger scale." More-
over, it is to be expected that narrow mechanization and expansion 
strategies for rural transformations will result in the expropriation of 
smallholder farmers in areas with scarce land resources, thereby per-
petuating existing social problems and potentially creating new ones.  
A recent historical study of agricultural modernization projects in 
Ghana based on remote sensing techniques also finds that dominant 
narratives about unsustainable smallholder farming practices and sub-
sequent environmental degradation are not necessarily reflecting the 
actual state of the environment. Instead, it is suggested that these crisis 
narratives are used as a political strategy to justify the redistribution of 
land from allegedly unproductive and unsustainable smallholder 
farmers to elite commercial farmers with links to global value chains, 
following the donor-driven call for a 'New Green Revolution' in Africa 
(Amanor and Pabi 2007, p. 65).  
In their study of agricultural intensification in northern Ghana, Nyan-
takyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr (2015) also give us a glimpse of what 
is to be expected when the Green Revolution model of agriculture is 
applied on a larger scale. Not only do the authors find that high-input 
forms of agricultural intensification are reducing farmers’ adaptive-
ness and ability to take independent decisions about their own liveli-
hood strategies. The authors also assert that external factors such as 
large-scale land acquisitions driven by local elites further undermine 
potentially resilient and diversified systems of agroecological food 
production. Therefore, it must be asked which innovative adaptation 
strategies could possibly be employed to avoid the marginalization of 
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smallholder farmers as well as the cooptation of natural resource re-
gimes through so-called institutional "triangles of accommodation" that 
have emerged between (neo)traditional authorities, local administra-
tive elites, and large-scale commercial farmers (Laube 2007, p. 324). 
One possibility to increase the inclusiveness of adaptation measures in 
the agricultural sector is to improve access to credit schemes for mar-
ginalized smallholder farmers (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2015). As structured 
interviews with AEAs have revealed, formal and informal credit is still 
very difficult to obtain for many farming households in the Bongo   
District, thus limiting individual options for investment and non-farm 
income diversification (see Figure 9). The targeted channeling of finan-
cial support to farmers must hence be carefully assessed on a case-by-
case basis – especially when it is combined with a politicized push for 
Green Revolution technologies – since the average farm household 
may be locked into an agro-industrial 'treadmill' where the "family 
must strive to produce more and yet more to satisfy the debt obliga-
tions of an agro-ecological model whose reproduction flows primarily 
through the circuit of capital" (Moore 2015, p. 16). Thus, the main po-
litical challenge is to find a proper balance between agricultural mod-
ernization, for instance with regard to improved irrigation facilities, 
and the increased support for less commercially oriented but poten-
tially resilient food production systems. Instead of completely shifting 
the political focus away from small-scale farming, it seems prudent to 
strengthen smallholder agricultural systems and traditional crops that 
are historically well adapted to the northern savanna zone, especially 
in view of increased climate variability and future climate change im-
pacts, as well as the current lack of economic alternatives. 
Another viable alternative for supporting socially inclusive agricul-
tural adaptation is the promotion of non-farm income generating ac-
tivities that are, simultaneously, sensitive to income and power dispar-
ities, skills gaps and traditional gender roles. Yet, due to the fact that 
such ambitious support mechanisms strongly depend on enabling in-
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stitutional structures and favorable market dynamics across scales, in-
tegrating adaptation with vulnerability and risk reduction measures 
has become a highly complex task. While elucidating perceptions of 
climate change adaptation based on structured and semi-structured in-
terviews with professionals in the fields of environmental and devel-
opment policy as well as disaster risk reduction, this complexity has 
clearly come to the fore. Structured interviews with NADMO district 
coordinators have shown that definitions of adaptation as adjustment 
to natural impacts currently dominate professional disaster risk reduc-
tion debates in the UER. This focus on adjustment adaptation may not 
be suitable to address some of the more systemic or structural prob-
lems of adaptation. Moreover, it has become clear that the indetermi-
nacies of risk are not only an opportunity for political entrepreneurs to 
advance their special interests. Discourses about risk also play a role in 
creating new political subjectivities among affected populations, 
thereby closely mirroring the ideas and dynamics of international de-
velopment discourses and funding priorities. During an interview 
with a senior official of the WRC in Bolgatanga, this process of political 
subjectification was described as follows: 
Traditionally, we do not believe that any single member of  
society should be homeless. You are taken into another fam-
ily, the whole community will be a source of support. Now, 
we have thrown in some English words, and we have called 
it disaster. The people see it as an occurrence, and we call it 
'disaster' and put fear and panic in them. A disaster has come. 
Then we say National Disaster Management Organization. 
Go and manage the disaster. But they just carry a few bags of 
rice, some milk and sugar, and some mosquito nets. Then, the 
community begins to see the people who have been affected 
by such an occurrence as those whom the government has 
given rice ... The government has given you a mosquito net, 
you are now a disaster victim (laughs). 
– Senior Basin Officer, White Volta Basin Office of the Ghana 
Water Resources Commission, Bolgatanga  
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It can be concluded from these observations that a discursive approach 
to institutional dynamics has been particularly valuable for exploring 
the socio-political production of risk. In the following chapter, I will 
complement this discursive perspective on expert perceptions of risk 
with a multi-hazard risk assessment. The overarching goal is to explore 
how households in the study area perceive risks, and to ascertain 
whether additional institutional determinants of risk can be identified 
empirically by focusing on processes of institutional territorialization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: ASSESSING                   
SITUATED AND RELATIONAL                    
RISK IN THE VEA CATCHMENT   
 
Drawing on a multi-hazard risk assessment (MRA), this chapter ex-
amines how the institutional organization of territoriality shapes the 
interplay between situated and relational risk. The MRA focuses on 
the institutional, physical and socioeconomic environment in which 
households are embedded, motivated by the primary goal to identify 
and evaluate risks as well as risk impacts. Using a mix of quantita-
tive survey techniques and open-ended questions, household inter-
views were carried out in seven communities in the WASCAL re-
search area. The selected rural and urban field sites allowed for a 
comparison between different farming and irrigation practices as 
well as between small-scale subsistence farmers, commercial farm-
ers, and non-farm households. Moreover, facilitated group discus-
sions were held in Vea with two separate groups, a men’s group and 
a women’s group. The overall aim of the discussion was to learn 
more about peoples’ perceptions of risk and climate variability. The 
chapter concludes with an investigation of institutional territoriali-
zation processes to illustrate the complex interaction between risk 
exposure, hazards and the institutional organization of socio-spatial 
relations in the Vea Catchment area. 
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Overview of the Research Area:                        
Socioecological Trends 
The Upper East Region (UER) of Ghana is bordered by Burkina Faso 
to the north, and Togo to the east. The UER also shares internal borders 
with the Upper West and Northern Regions of Ghana. The population 
size of the UER is estimated to be 1.046.545, which accounts for 4.2 per-
cent of the total national population (GSS 2013, p. 8). The largest ethnic 
groups in the region are the Mole-Dagbon, Gurma, Grusi and Mande-
Busanga (GSS 2013, p. 34). The climate in the UER is classified as trop-
ical, while the year is divided into two distinct seasons, a lengthy dry 
season spanning the months of October to April, followed by a rainy 
season that is stretching from May to September, with a mean annual 
rainfall between 800 mm and 1.100 mm (GSS 2013, p. 2).  
Administratively, the UER is split into 13 districts. The city of Bolga-
tanga is the main economic hub as well as the regional capital of the 
UER, and also houses the Regional Coordinating Council. The UER’s 
political landscape is generally marked by the pervasive presence of 
international development organizations, together with nongovern-
mental and civil society organizations. Local chiefs and other custom-
ary social institutions possess widespread legitimacy, and crucially in-
fluence patterns of social mobilization, despite the occasional occur-
rence of conflicts that involve (neo)traditional authorities. 
Economic activities in the UER are characterized by low levels of in-
come diversification, and 83.7 percent of all households in the region 
are engaged in agricultural activities that are highly vulnerable to cli-
mate change and increased variability (GSS 2012, p. 80). This socioeco-
nomic situation makes the development of adaptation and risk man-
agement plans for local agricultural livelihoods all the more salient. 
Changes in the intra-seasonal variability of rainfall, in particular, have 
a strong impact on peoples’ food security, as they negatively affect the 
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production of both cash and staple crops (Yaro 2013a). Available cli-
mate data for the UER show, for example, that dry periods during the 
rainy season have in fact increased (Riede et al. 2016).  
Rainstorms and flash floods also occur frequently during the rainy sea-
son, at times resulting in the loss of lives. Particularly in the riparian 
areas along the White Volta, flooding events are worsened when the 
overspill of the Bagré Dam in Burkina Faso is released into the 
Nakanbé river (the Burkinabe stretch of the White Volta). Such regular 
flood and storm events certainly have an impact on food and nutri-
tional security in the region. In some cases, they destroy staple crops 
which are grown during the rainy season and often serve as a house-
hold’s food supply throughout the year. Chronic food and nutrition 
security remain pervasive throughout the region, especially during the 
so-called 'lean season' which normally peaks in April and May. It is 
assumed that 38 percent of the regional population are – to some extent 
– food insecure (CFSVA 2012, p. 19). 
It is clear that these hazards not only constrain socioeconomic activities 
in the region, but also lead to increased health risks, displacement, and 
widespread damage to infrastructure and personal property. How-
ever, due to the complexities posed by intersecting risks, a causally 
simplistic and linear relationship between human vulnerability and 
environmental change should not be assumed. Environmental hazards 
may play only their part in deepening vulnerabilities associated with 
poverty, institutional structures, and social marginality (Schulz and 
Siriwardane 2016). Notably, data from the fifth and sixth round of the 
Ghana Living Standards Survey (see GLSS 5 and 6, 2005-2013) identify 
the UER as one of the poorest regions in the country, falling behind 
with regard to most human development indicators such as education, 
access to social services, and infrastructure provision. The regional per-
centage of the population defined as "extremely poor" (below the ex-
treme poverty line of 792 GHS) is 44.4 percent, while the percentage of 
the population classified as "poor" (below the absolute poverty line of 
1.314 GHS) comprise 21.3 percent (GLSS 6 2014a, p. 15-16). At the same 
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time housing quality is well below the national average, and only a 
quarter (24.1 percent) of the regional population have access to elec-
tricity (GSS 2013, p. 149). All in all, these aspects are likely to exacerbate 
the impacts of even 'minor' climate related hazards. 
Thus, despite the progress that Ghana has made over the past two dec-
ades with regard to economic development and improved living 
standards, the north still lags behind due to the limited number, vari-
ation and quality of household assets, and because of widespread in-
come insecurity and poor health standards. As a result of high popu-
lation density, arable land is relatively scarce in the region, which is 
often seen to be a major reason for environmental degradation. 
Against the backdrop of pervasive poverty, risk exposure levels are 
also determined by age and gender-related factors. Women form the 
majority of the poor since they are primarily working in the two 
'hotspots' of Ghanaian poverty – namely, the agricultural sector and 
the informal economy (ILO 2005). This pervasive social pattern is often 
claimed to be a consequence of socio-cultural factors and categoriza-
tion, resulting in limited access to productive resources such as land 
(Quaye 2008). Women in general are seen to be more dependent on 
natural resources for their livelihoods, while access to these very re-
sources is mediated through gendered roles and norms that tend to 
disadvantage women, both materially as well as relationally. The 
younger and older segments of society are also at a disadvantage, for 
they are subject to cultural norms similar to those that deny women 
access to productive resources (i.e. 'social invisibility') (Chant and 
Jones 2005, Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett 2009). 
In sum, the historic 'underdevelopment' of the UER has often been at-
tributed to colonial legacies, pervasive shortcomings in development 
policies, and 'neoliberal' structural transformations that gradually al-
tered the socio-cultural and economic character of the region, espe-
cially by making way for trajectories of greater liberalization and indi-
vidualization (Yaro 2013b). In the same vein, statistical data reveal that 
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population loss as a result of labor migration progresses at a "fast rate" 
(GSS 2013, p. 169). This pervasive pattern of outmigration can certainly 
be ascribed to concomitant economic, population-related and environ-
mental pressures. Yet it must be borne in mind that out-migration also 
has deep-rooted cultural and historic origins that need to be consid-
ered, such as customary payments and other forms of societal expecta-
tions related to marriage arrangements (Sow et al. 2014).  
 
 
 
Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment:                        
Applied Methods 
Data for the multi-hazard risk assessment were collected in the Vea 
Catchment area between 2012 and 2013 (see Map 4). In preparation of 
the MRA, job interviews with potential field assistants were held in the 
district capital of Bongo. Five field assistants who had previously 
gained experience with the administration of survey forms were hired 
to conduct interviews and provide translations. Before the household 
survey was officially rolled out, several training sessions took place. 
The goal was to discuss the selection of field sites as well as the trans-
lation of survey questions into the local languages. A pilot study was 
then carried out to test the accuracy of translations and solve the re-
maining practical problems that emerged during the first few inter-
views.  
Since the target population in the Vea Catchment area is generally dis-
persed across a relatively wide geographic region, time and budget 
constraints did not allow for a simple random sampling approach. In-
stead, the study utilized a multi-stage sampling approach. Lists of all 
census areas in the in the Bongo and Bolgatanga Municipal districts 
were obtained from the local Planning and Coordination Units. Based 
on consultations with planning specialists, all census areas located in 
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the Vea Catchment (110) were identified, and subsequently stratified 
into rural and urban areas (see Annex 3). It was ultimately decided to 
determine the status of a specific census area by population size, 
whereas census areas with 5.000 or more inhabitants were classified as 
'urban'. A simple random sampling approach was then used to select 
five census areas from the rural stratum as well as two census areas 
from the urban stratum. 
Table 7. Rural and Urban Households in the Vea Catchment Area 
Total number of households              
in the Vea Catchment area 
27.098 HH 
Total number of urban households 
in the Vea Catchment area 
11.028 HH (40.7%) 
Total number of rural households     
in the Vea Catchment area 
16.070 HH (59.3%) 
(Source: MLGRDE, data for the year 2000) 
Due to the fact that recent information about the precise number of 
households per census area was not readily available at the time of the 
study, and since official numbers dated from the year 2000, an enumer-
ation exercise constituted the first phase of the household survey (see 
Table 8). After the enumeration had been completed, 484 out of 759 
households in seven census areas were surveyed based on a simple 
random sampling approach, assuming an unchanged distribution rate 
of rural and urban households within the Vea Catchment (59 percent 
rural and 41 percent urban, see Table 7). All household interviews were 
anonymized. Participants were previously informed about the study 
background and asked for their explicit consent to ensure maximum 
compliance with ethical standards (see Annex 2: Core Ethics Principles 
for Field Work). No participants below the age of 18 were involved in 
the study, and only the heads of households were interviewed. More-
over, it was ensured that half of the interviews took place during the 
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dry season to achieve more balanced results. This procedure was ex-
tremely time intensive, and sometimes required enumerators to revisit 
households where the head of the household was not at home at the 
time of contact. Interviews with household heads who were involved 
in farming activities occasionally took place near the farmers’ fields, 
and it was made sure that the daily routines or economic activities of 
participants were not unnecessarily interrupted.  
Table 8. Selected Communities in the Vea Catchment Area 
Community District Enumeration Sampled  
1. Yikene Adohbisi Bolga rural 38 36 
2. Zaare Amoabisi Bolga rural 132 114 
3. Vea-Gunga Bongo rural 107 81 
4. Namoo-Akunka Bongo rural 33 33 
5.Vea Irrigation Project  Bongo rural 170*  20 
6. Bolgatanga-Sawaaba Bolga urban 131 120 
7. Bolgatanga-Damweo Bolga urban 148 80 
 TOTAL  759 HH  484 HH 
 RURAL 480  284 (59%) 
 URBAN 279  200 (41%) 
(Source: field work, Vea Catchment, 2012-2013; *The total numbers for the Vea irriga-
tion project refer to a core group of 170 commercial farmers with plots that are larger 
than 2 ha, and not to the total number of 2.000 farmers who farm on project land) 
In addition to the household survey, a facilitated group discussion was 
held in Vea with two separate groups, a men’s group and a women’s 
184   CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
group. A separation between men and women was deemed necessary 
to ensure that all participants would express themselves as freely as 
possible. The overall aim of the group discussion was to learn more 
about peoples’ perceptions of risk and climate variability. Group 
discussions were formally arranged during a preliminary audience at 
the palace of the chief of Vea. After being informed about the exact 
research aims, the chief and his elders generously agreed to apprise 
the neighboring communities about my plans to organize a public 
meeting, and to encourage people to attend. The meeting took place 
at a community center in Vea, which had been deemed suitable to 
host a larger number of participants. A local food vendor was 
engaged to cater for the participants during the event. The facilitation 
of discussions was mainly entrusted to my field assistants, who also 
provided the necessary translations. 
Findings of the Quantitative 
Household Survey 
Demographic Data 
Demographic data obtained from the household survey indicate that 
the average age of household heads within the rural stratum was 44.1, 
whereas the average age of urban household heads was 39.1. The sex 
distribution among household heads in rural (68.7 percent male and 
31.3 percent female) as well as in urban areas (64.5 percent male and 
35.5 percent female) demonstrates the predominance of male headed 
households in both strata, which is largely coherent with the overall 
demographic situation in the UER (GSS 2013, p. 37). Moreover, it was 
found that the average age of commercial farmers within the rural stra-
tum was 41.2, and that the heads of those households who were en-
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gaged in commercial farming at the Vea irrigation project were exclu-
sively male. The average household size in urban areas was 5.1 per-
sons, while households in rural areas were found to be slightly larger, 
with 6 people on average. These findings largely cohere with the aver-
age household size for the region, which is 5.2 for urban and 6.1 for 
rural areas, according to the latest census data (GSS 2013, p. 37).  
The level of formal education in the research area is generally low. Fig-
ures 10 and 11 illustrate that almost 58 percent of all rural and 41 of all 
urban households did not benefit from formal education at all. These 
findings have serious implications for the adaptiveness of households 
and individuals. Awareness raising and other educational activities, 
for example in agriculture and economic management, must be tai-
lored to address a population which is, to a considerable extent, unable 
to read and/or write, while economic and environmental conditions 
are putting high pressure on local livelihoods. 
Figure 10. Highest Level of Formal Education in the HH (Rural) 
(Source: field work, Vea Catchment, 2012-2013; n=284 HH) 
No formal education (57.7%)
Primary school (15.8%)
JSS/SHS (19.4%)
Middle school (2.8%)
Secondary school (0.7%)
Vocational training (0.7%)
Secondary certificate (1.1%)
Post-secondary diploma (0.7%)
Bachelor degree (1.1%)
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Figure 11. Highest Level of Formal Education in the HH (Urban) 
(Source: field work, Vea Catchment, 2012-2013; n=200 HH) 
Methodologically, a possible shortcoming of the study is the exclusion 
of individuals below the age of 18 due to ethical considerations. How-
ever, available statistical data show that the percentage of household 
heads in the age cohort between 0-19 years of age is comparatively low 
at the regional level (1.1 percent) (GSS 2013, p. 37). Accordingly, it is 
assumed that the exclusion of this age group does not significantly al-
ter the results of the survey. 
Housing Conditions 
Housing conditions and architecture are important determinants of 
well-being and adaptiveness. At the same time, they significantly in-
fluence social vulnerability. Dwellings in the predominantly rural Vea 
Catchment are mostly rooted in the vernacular architectural traditions 
of the northern savanna, and represent local cultural identities as much 
as they reflect functional necessities and physical constraints. Histori-
cally, communities in the northern savanna zone have been regularly 
No formal education (41%)
Primary school (19%)
JSS/SHS (24.5%)
Middle school (3.5%)
Secondary school (1%)
Vocational training (1%)
Secondary certificate (2%)
Post-secondary diploma (4.5%)
Bachelor degree (3.5%)
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exposed to attacks by slave-raiders, threatened by animals or intervil-
lage warfare, and were subjected to punitive raids undertaken by the 
colonial authorities (Swanepoel 2008). Thus, safety considerations and 
the enhancement of defensive properties can be seen as major reasons 
why traditional buildings were constructed as semi-fortified com-
pounds.  
The typical compound is entered through a main gate that faces away 
from the weather side to protect the house from harmattan winds and 
passing rain showers. Behind the main entrance gate, traditional com-
pounds frequently open up into a cattle yard with several fowl coops 
and the so-called zong or zongo, a meeting hall and ritual room that is 
used for ancestral worship, funeral rites, receptions, relaxation as well 
as the observation of the immediate surroundings (Gabrilopoulos et al. 
2002, p. 230). After passing through the entrance area, one normally 
faces several rooms for sleeping, cooking and storage, which are sepa-
rated according to sex and social hierarchy, and structured around one 
or several general-purpose courtyards (Gabrilopoulos et al. 2002, p. 
230). In the courtyard(s), one also encounters ancestral shrines, mortars 
for the pounding of grain, and granaries for storage. Vegetables, trees 
and crops are usually grown in the immediate proximity of a com-
pound, including crops such as millet, which are used for traditional 
cultural purposes and ceremonies. Animal husbandry in the Vea 
Catchment is mostly focused on sheep, goats, cattle, pigs and poultry 
such as guinea fowl. Population pressure and land scarcity in the area 
have also necessitated the use of short-fallow bush farms, which are 
normally located several kilometers from the main compound. 
The most common materials for the construction of outer walls in the 
study area (n=484 HH) are mud-bricks (56 percent), while cement 
blocks are more frequently used in urban environments (39 percent 
overall). Common roofing materials to date are metal sheets (86 per-
cent), even in the rural parts of the Vea Catchment, although such 
building materials are generally more expensive than mud-bricks/clay 
(3.3 percent) or grass thatch roofing (2.7 percent), and thus reflect the 
  
 
 
 
 
 
188                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
social status of the house owner. Moreover, metal roofing is fireproof 
and requires less maintenance, even if its insulating qualities against 
heat and cold are inferior in comparison to traditional roofing materi-
als such as thatch (Drucker-Brown 2001, p. 671). Concrete structures 
with roofing tiles and multistoried commercial or administrative 
buildings are also a common sight in expanding peri-urban residential 
areas and urban settlements such as Bongo or Bolgatanga. 
Findings show that roughly half of all households in both urban and 
rural areas (52.5 percent) have access to electricity, although power 
outages are a regular occurrence. The main sources of water for house-
hold consumption are pipe-borne water (31.4 percent), and water from 
boreholes or wells (68.6 percent). Household waste is normally dis-
posed or burned in the immediate surroundings of settlements. In ur-
ban areas, the indiscriminate disposal of solid waste frequently leads 
to the blockage of drainage pipes, which can prove fatal in the case of 
flooding or torrential rainfall. 
Picture 5. Typical Vernacular Architecture in the Research Area 
© Author, 2013 
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Generally, heavy rains and floods constitute major risks in the study 
area. Traditional mud-brick structures are often not able to withstand 
storms, torrential rainfall, and the resulting flash floods. Hence entire 
buildings or single rooms frequently collapse, while roofs are torn 
from buildings (see Picture 6). Tall crops and grasses such as okra,      
kenaf or millet, which are often planted in the immediate vicinity of 
buildings, only provide rudimentary protection against such risks.  
Picture 6. Storm Impact in Bolgatanga, Upper East Region 
 
(Source: NADMO, Bolgatanga, 2011) 
 
Agriculture, Irrigation and Income Diversification 
Agriculture is a key livelihood activity for the vast majority of rural 
households in the study area (96.6 percent). By contrast, the picture is 
drastically different in urban areas, where only 3.5 percent of all par-
ticipants indicated that agricultural activities are the 'main source of 
livelihood' for the household. What needs to be asked in view of these 
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findings is whether urbanization and the diversification of non-farm 
income sources should be seen as directly linked?  
To begin with, there is certainly evidence to suggest that agricultural 
land in the research area is lost through urbanization processes. Urban 
sprawl and population growth potentially contribute to the degrada-
tion of natural resources such as soil and water in formerly rural envi-
ronments, thus increasing overall pressure on the natural resource 
base and accelerating land use competition (Kuusaana and Eledi 2015). 
The high incidence of non-agricultural livelihood strategies in urban 
spaces can, therefore, be attributed to a complex mix of rural transfor-
mation processes, social networks and dynamic mobility patterns that 
traverse artificial rural-urban boundaries. Furthermore, it must be 
borne in mind that the political clout of authorities and specific settle-
ment histories play an important role with regard to the creation of 
economic opportunities in a particular place.  
How people can make use of emerging economic opportunities also 
depends on factors such as family size, education, socially stratified 
access to value chains or organizational support (Yaro 2006). Previous 
research on dynamic urbanization processes in northern Ghana has 
shown that livelihood diversification does not automatically translate 
into higher wages and income security. Unemployment and low pay-
ing jobs in the informal economy are still the norm in urban centers 
like Bolgatanga, despite the fact that many households are engaged in 
horticulture and small-scale farming activities to supplement their in-
come and increase food security (Schulz and Siriwardane 2016, p. 183). 
Hence it cannot be generalized from the initial survey findings that a 
higher degree of livelihood diversification is only typical for 'urban' 
environments, or necessarily more beneficial in terms of increasing 
adaptiveness. Livelihood diversification is neither a progressive shift 
from one static livelihood pattern to another (e.g. from farming to non-
farm activities), nor can it be separated from complex processes of       
institutional territorialization. What can be concluded instead is that 
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dynamic livelihood patterns, individual livelihood choices and socio-
environmental risks are profoundly structured by institutional factors. 
Simply distinguishing between rural/urban or farm/non-farm liveli-
hood activities is not sufficient to capture this complex and interrelated 
nature of livelihood portfolios (Yaro 2006). 
In addition to income diversification, another factor that is frequently 
mentioned in the literature as a key determinant for household adap-
tiveness is landholding size (for an overview, see Chamberlin 2008). 
Results indicate that rural households who are engaged in agriculture 
as a key livelihood activity are predominantly smallholder farmers, de-
fined as farming households who cultivate plots of less than 1 ha per 
season. In rural areas, the average plot size was found to be 0.93 ha per 
household, while households in the rural stratum with access to a 
larger irrigation scheme reported an average plot size of 2.0 ha. 
The concrete effects of institutional territorialization and resulting po-
tentials for income diversification may nevertheless differ profoundly 
within the so-called 'smallholder' spectrum of agriculture, for instance 
according to macroeconomic conditions and structural factors such as 
access to infrastructure, labor, fertile land, education, markets, as well 
as agricultural services and inputs. Moreover, it needs to be taken into 
account that traditional cultural institutions play an important role for 
land use practices and the allocation of land. Access to fertile land, es-
pecially to exclusive plots that are located within irrigation schemes, is 
strongly mediated by financial resources, social networks, and tradi-
tional gender roles. Overall, female headed households are at a disad-
vantage when it comes to the allocation of land and agricultural inputs. 
In comparison to their male counterparts, female headed households 
usually own less assets such as agricultural equipment or animals that 
produce manure for the fertilization of fields. In line with customary 
norms, land is allocated to males only, normally by the local earth 
priest or chief, and females have no right to inherit land. However, in 
practice at least "unmarried, divorced, or widowed women are always 
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allocated a portion of the household land for farming purposes" (To-
nah 2008, p. 117). 
Moreover, there are some exceptions to this rule if male individuals 
decide to lease land in the name of their female family members, which 
usually requires substantial financial resources and a reputable job, for 
example as a government employee. Alternatively, a man may also 
lease land in his own name, and pass it on to his wives or daughters. 
For Ghanaian nationals, the maximum lease period for a particular 
tract of land is 99 years (Interview at the WRC in Bolgatanga, 2013). 
Family land, by contrast, is strictly passed on in accordance with the 
traditional patrilineal inheritance system. Thus, when it comes to the 
ownership of land, the male inheritor usually holds the land in trust 
for the family and does not have the right to give it away without the 
knowledge or agreement of the other family members. Concerning the 
relationship between land tenure and gender, it must therefore be con-
sidered that dynamic cultural and economic institutions have created 
two parallel systems, the monetary leasing system on the one hand, 
and the traditional patrilineal system of family inheritance on the 
other. Hence it can be concluded that traditional institutions and gen-
der roles still play an important role in terms of perpetuating existing 
power asymmetries, while economic factors are becoming increasingly 
important as determinants of social stratification. 
Agricultural land use in the study area is mainly centered around agro-
pastoral smallholder cropping systems and the cultivation of tradi-
tional staple crops such as millet and sorghum that are grown during 
the wet season for domestic consumption. Animals such as sheep, 
goats, cattle and poultry are fully integrated into the farming system, 
at least if households can afford to keep them, for example by using 
animal manure for the fertilization of fields, and as an 'asset' that can 
be sold during the lean season or in times of hardship. Cash crops such 
as rice and tomato are also cultivated during the dry season in case 
irrigation options are available, primarily by men, to increase the avail-
able income for reinvestment and consumption. Normally, cropping 
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and (re-)investment proceed in a cyclical fashion. Traditional staple 
crops that are cultivated during the wet season are used to finance dry 
season production, whereas dry season revenues are in turn used to 
obtain inputs for wet season farming. Harvest losses or minimal re-
turns during one season can therefore seriously affect livelihood out-
comes. The annual cropping cycle for staple crops normally starts at 
the beginning of the year, sometimes with land clearing based on 
'slash-and-burn' practices, and is followed by land preparation (see Ta-
ble 9). Most smallholders depend on hired or communal labor for land 
preparation, because mechanical equipment is hardly available and/or 
affordable for the majority of farmers in the region. Precarious finan-
cial conditions thus present another major risk, since farm inputs such 
as inorganic fertilizers that are needed for land preparation are hardly 
attainable for many smallholders. Planting usually starts when the 
rainy season sets in, and is generally a risky business due to the vola-
tility of local climatic conditions. 
Picture 7. Land Preparation in the Bongo Area 
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Agricultural livelihoods in the region are thus characterized by a mix 
of unfavorable climatic conditions and unsustainable farming prac-
tices, which are widely adopted due to a lack of economic alternatives. 
For example, farmers’ fields were usually left to fallow after several 
years to protect the fertility of soils. Yet fallow periods are now becom-
ing increasingly shorter due to economic and population pressures – if 
they are not entirely disregarded – which has led to a strong decline of 
soil fertility and reduced organic matter content in soils. Moreover, as 
Heve et al. (2016, p. 1) observe, climatic conditions in the northern sa-
vanna zone "limit crop productivity, biomass accumulation and conse-
quently lead to low soil cover and increased frequency of soil exposure to wind, 
runoff and erosion, which, in turn, reduce topsoil depth." 
Table 9. Schematic Cropping Calendar for Typical Staple Crops 
 
(Source: MOFA, Bolgatanga, 2013) 
Operation/activity Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Land Clearing
Land Preperation
Planting
Filling-in
1st Weeding
Fertilizer Application
2nd Weeding
Transplanting
Top Dressing
Re-shaping/Earthen-up
Harvesting
Drying/Processing 
Storage
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Taken together, these livelihood risks have a considerable impact on 
food security, especially for small-scale subsistence farmers who de-
pend on rainfed agriculture during the wet season. Despite the fact that 
the overall food security situation in northern Ghana has improved 
over the past several decades, seasonal food shortages still present a 
serious problem. Yet, during a group discussion that was held in Vea 
participants initially disagreed on whether food insecurity in the area 
is most prevalent from November to December or from March to May. 
Eventually, a consensus was reached that the period between March 
and May should be regarded as the most challenging time (or 'lean sea-
son') for most households in terms of food security. 
Table 10. Food Security Calendar 
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Early 
millet 
      ooo
oo 
ooo oo o o  
Guinea 
corn 
        ooo
oo 
oo 
oo 
oo o 
Ground-
nuts 
         ooo
oo 
oo 
oo 
oo 
Late    
millet 
            
Rice oo o        ooo
oo 
oo 
oo 
ooo 
Okra       oo 
oo 
ooo     
Kenaf      ooo
oo 
oo 
oo 
ooo oo o   
 
(Source: field work, Vea, 2013) 42 
 
Older participants also pointed out that precipitation patterns in the 
region have changed drastically compared to the 1980s. In particular, 
they observed that the rainy season now starts in May or even June 
                                                          
42 The food security calendar is based on a discussion with a women’s group in Vea. 
The small circles indicate the availability of various foodstuffs throughout the year, 
ranging from one circle (almost none) to five circles (plenty). 
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instead of April, which was considered a serious problem for food se-
curity because of the unreliable and erratic nature of rainfall and re-
sulting crop failures. 
While regional climate data do not clearly confirm such an overall shift 
in the onset of the rainy season, or at least not a shift that goes beyond 
naturally occurring climate variability, there are still robust signals for 
an observable rise in temperatures together with an increase of dry 
spells during the wet season (Riede et al. 2016). In combination with 
unfavorable socioeconomic conditions, converging environmental 
hazards such as land degradation, drought, floods and erratic rainfall 
patterns have serious negative impacts on local livelihoods. 
Accordingly, access to irrigation facilities seems to be an important fac-
tor for the adaptiveness of smallholder farmers who mainly depend on 
rainfed agriculture for their livelihoods, and often need to engage in 
precarious economic activities during the dry season to complement 
their income and ensure food security. During the dry season, small-
holder farming activities in the catchment area are mostly centered 
around rivers and small water bodies where pump irrigation and 
bucket irrigation are practiced. The most common dry season irriga-
tion techniques outside of larger irrigation projects are the use of 
wastewater and stored water from small dams, boreholes, or hand-dug 
wells. Survey results show that 46.1 percent of the predominantly rural 
households who indicated agriculture as their 'main occupation' had 
the means (access, finance and required labor capacity) to capitalize on 
some form of dry season irrigation. Among these households, 10.6 per-
cent had direct access to the surface-water gravity-flow system at the 
Vea irrigation scheme. 
Yet, irrigation efficiency is rather low on average, while purchasing the 
necessary equipment and fuel for motor pump irrigation is too costly 
for most subsistence farmers (Agyare et al. 2009, p. 266). Irrigation lev-
ies and land use fees charged by local landlords for dry season farming 
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near rivers further exacerbate existing social inequalities. Reliable ac-
cess to dry season irrigation, especially at larger irrigation projects, is 
therefore tightly linked to disposable income, and also hinges on per-
sonal relations with the irrigation bureaucracy that is responsible for 
the allocation of irrigated plots. However, the question that needs to 
be asked at this point is whether access to larger tracts of land at com-
mercial irrigation projects should be seen as a key solution for improv-
ing household adaptiveness? 
As mentioned in the opening case study, one of the most important 
infrastructures for commercial dry season farming in the study area is 
the Vea irrigation project, which is managed by the government-
funded Irrigation Company of Upper Region Ltd. (ICOUR). The Vea 
irrigation project is located near the town of Vea, about 10 kilometers 
away from the city of Bolgatanga. The Vea irrigation facilities, together 
with a reservoir and an earth-filled dam, were built between 1965 and 
1980 for multiple purposes such as dry season farming, small-scale 
fisheries and the provision of drinking water. 
Map 4. The Vea Irrigation Project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: ICOUR; also see: Kusi 2013) 
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The total area developed for irrigation is 850 ha during the wet season, 
and roughly 400 ha during the dry season. The Vea reservoir is directly 
fed by the Yaragatanga river. Currently, a core group of 170 commer-
cial farmers with plots larger than 2 ha have been allocated land be-
tween the 14.5 km long left bank canal (129 farmers) and the 11.3 km 
long right bank canal (41 farmers) of the irrigation scheme (Map 4; in-
terview at the ICOUR project office in Vea, 2013). In total, the irrigation 
project is said to support around 2.000 farmers (Ofosu 2011, p. 84). 
Crops and legumes under cultivation include rice, tomato, cowpea, on-
ions, soybeans and 'pepper' during the dry season, as well as ground-
nuts, sorghum/millet, rice and maize during the wet season. The pro-
ject facilities also include various fish ponds that cover a total area of 
3.2 ha. The most common irrigation technique practiced by project 
farmers in the upland areas of the irrigation scheme is furrow or pump 
irrigation, whereas farmers in lowland areas simply irrigate their plots 
by flooding (Ofosu 2011, p. 87). 
With regard to the maintenance of the irrigation scheme, the opening 
case study has shown that no major rehabilitation work has taken place 
since the completion of the Vea dam in the 1980s. This problematic sit-
uation, exacerbated by unsustainable agro-pastoral practices and tor-
rential rainfall events, has led to the slow erosion of the walls of the 
Vea dam, and resulted in the siltation and blockage of irrigation canals 
and drainage systems (Adongo et al. 2014). Higher average tempera-
tures, together with wind erosion and evaporation caused by a loss of 
vegetation cover and the weak enforcement of buffer zone policies 
have also led to a decrease of water levels in the reservoir (Eickhof 
2010, p. 104). As a consequence, many small-scale farmers were forced 
to abandon their farmlands because of a lack of water supply for dry 
season farming, or had to resort to costly motor pump irrigation in the 
upland areas of the irrigation scheme. Despite the ingenuity of local 
farmers who need to cope with constantly falling water levels, these 
converging problems seriously reduced the overall production capac-
ity of the irrigation project. Data provided by the Irrigation Company 
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of the Upper Region Ltd. (ICOUR) for the period from 2001-2012 con-
firm that cropping outputs at the Vea irrigation scheme were consist-
ently lower than the desired cropping targets (see Annex 3). Volatile 
climatic conditions, insufficient maintenance, unsustainable farming 
and user practices, as well as latent sociopolitical conflict since the con-
struction of the irrigation scheme have thus created a difficult environ-
ment for dry season farming in the research area (see Konings 1981). 
Furthermore, since available land at the Vea irrigation project is scarce 
and much sought-after, members of the ICOUR bureaucracy have be-
come influential political entrepreneurs who are able to capitalize on 
the prevailing 'politics of indeterminacy' (also see Laube 2009). 
Thus, concerning the initial question of whether access to larger plots 
of land at an irrigation project should be seen as a key solution for      
improving household adaptiveness, it can be said that at least in terms 
of ensuring food security, access to irrigation alone does not seem to 
be the decisive factor. As the survey results show, seasonal food inse-
curity among rural households is extremely high (92.6 percent), and it 
is nearly as high among households who have direct access to the Vea 
irrigation scheme (90 percent). Urban households, by comparison, are 
still food insecure, but at a relatively lower rate (64 percent). 
These findings provide a first glimpse on how institutional dynamics 
are presently shaping the territorialization of risk as well as the adap-
tiveness of households in the Vea Catchment area. The following sec-
tion seeks to extend these preliminary insights by further investigating 
how diverse livelihood risks are distributed among urban non-farm 
households, rural subsistence farmers, and farmers with access to the 
Vea irrigation project. In other words, to fully address the main ques-
tion that guides this inquiry, namely whether institutions are the key 
factor that determines social vulnerability in the research area, it will 
be vital to closely examine how households are embedded in networks 
of social institutions and organizational support mechanisms. 
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Determinants of Adaptiveness? Organizational Support,                           
Social Institutions and Implications for Food Security 
It has become clear from previous results that complex patterns of in-
stitutional territorialization play a major role for climate change adap-
tation in Ghana. What can be recognized so far based on empirical ev-
idence is that social institutions and organizational support mecha-
nisms are at the heart of adaptation processes due to their important 
role in shaping vulnerabilities and risks. Specific organizational con-
figurations may either enable or constrain people’s adaptiveness and 
livelihood choices, for example by mediating access to material and 
symbolic resources, and by influencing the ways in which these mate-
rial or symbolic resources are used. Social institutions, in turn, crucially 
affect relations of reciprocity and territorial (i.e. socio-spatial) relations 
through, for instance, governing labor arrangements in the agricultural 
sector. 
Concomitantly, to better understand the interplay between relational 
livelihood risks and institutional environments, particularly with re-
gard to specific socio-spatial configurations in the Vea Catchment, it is 
crucial to explore under which circumstances households might or 
might not be able to rely on social institutions and organizational sup-
port mechanisms to increase their adaptiveness. Therefore, as a first 
step, risk profiles have been created for urban households, rural house-
holds and farming households with access to the Vea irrigation scheme 
based on the results of a quantitative household survey (Figure 12). 
The overall survey design is rooted in locally situated categories of risk 
– so-called 'emic' categories – that have been co-developed with partic-
ipants during preliminary field interviews in order to avoid biased re-
sponses to prefigured definitions of risk. This overall approach takes 
into consideration "that the strategy people adopt to deal with climate 
change is highly dependent on what they think and believe is happening" 
(Yaro et al. 2016, p. 77; also see Teye et al. 2015). 
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Initially, a direct comparison between the risk perceptions of local 
household heads and government specialists in the Bongo and Bolga-
tanga Municipal Districts revealed that household heads considered 
food shortages a more severe risk than NADMO district staff. It is also 
interesting to note that water shortages did not feature at all in the per-
ceptions of DRR specialists, while participants in both urban and rural 
areas ranked water shortages particularly high among the risks they 
claimed to be exposed to.  
These diverging perceptions may be explained by the limited political 
mandate and organizational capacity of NADMO. As the dispositif 
analysis in the previous chapter has revealed, the emphasis of re-
gional DRR activities is mainly on disaster prevention and relief 
efforts. It is not, however, on the planning and local implementation 
of adaptation programs and sustainable development projects with a 
focus on, for example, water security. Thus, despite the fact that the 
NCCP explicitly mentions water availability, quality and access as 
key policy goals for development interventions in general (and inte-
grated DRR and CCA measures in particular), the overall situation 
remains problematic in the view of most households.  
In addition, the results point toward another noticeable discrepancy 
between expert perceptions of risk and the views of local households. 
Bushfire outbreaks ranked relatively high on the agenda of DRR au-
thorities in Bongo and Bolgatanga, whereas rural and urban house-
holds alike deemed bushfires to be of far lesser importance. As Nsiah-
Gyabaah (1996, p. 24) argues, one possible explanation for these diver-
gent risk perceptions of DRR specialists and local households is the fact 
that annual bush burning is "deeply embedded in the cultural values 
and traditional farming systems of the people" in northern Ghana, 
mainly in the context of land clearing practices.  
Yet, the survey also showed that known vulnerabilities continue to ex-
ist in cases where a tight alignment between national policy priorities 
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and the risk perceptions of district-level officials and affected house-
holds can be observed. Households at the urban fringes of Bolgatanga 
almost collectively stated that they were seriously affected by recur-
ring flood events, either as a result of riverine flooding or due to tor-
rential rainfall. These risk perceptions were shared by about 60 percent 
of all rural households and by more than 80 percent of households with 
access to the Vea irrigation project. Likewise, storm risks were deemed 
to be highly relevant by rural and urban households alike. 
 
 
 
Source: own field work, Bongo and Bolgatanga, 2012-2013. Total number of surveyed 
households: 484; rural: 264 (100%); urban/peri-urban: 200 (100%); irrigation scheme: 20 
(100%).43 
43 Risk categories (from left to right): storm, dry spell, flooding, bushfire, food short-
ages, water shortages, erratic rainfall, late onset of rains, infectious diseases, livestock 
diseases, crop diseases, animals destroying crops. 
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While these risk perceptions are in line with the DRR policy focus of 
the NCCP (2013, p. 31) and reflect the high priority that is accorded 
to flood and storm risks by NADMO district officials, it is evident 
that precarious agricultural livelihoods and unstable income sources 
together with the patchy implementation of DRR and CCA measures 
have a strongly negative effect on peoples’ adaptiveness. 
In addition, a number of other interesting differences and similarities 
between the risk perceptions of rural households, urban households, 
and households with direct access to the Vea irrigation scheme 
emerge from the survey. One of the most salient similarities between 
different types of households is that agricultural risks such as erratic 
rainfall patterns and the late onset of rains were perceived as almost 
equally relevant by both, rural and urban households. Similarly, dry 
spells were not only regarded as a significant risk by rural farming 
households, but by many urban households as well (nearly 40 percent). 
This means that erratic precipitation patterns and more frequent and 
intense dry spells during the rainy season are not only a major risk for 
rural households who depend on wet season crop production as a key 
livelihood activity. During interviews, it was confirmed that urban 
households also saw rainy season horticulture as a viable strategy to 
supplement their food resources and income. Surprisingly, however, 
urban households perceived risks such as livestock diseases, crop dis-
eases and the destruction of crops by animals to be less important for 
their livelihoods, while rural households identified the same risks as 
very relevant. This interesting difference can arguably be explained by 
the comparatively minor role of agriculture and livestock keeping as 
primary livelihood activities for urban populations. 
At first glance, it may be thus concluded from this broad comparison 
of risk perceptions that there is a relatively close match between the 
priority risks of government organizations and affected households, 
indicating that the mainstreaming of adaptation policy priorities is not 
completely out of tune with local risk perceptions. However, national 
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adaptation policy guidelines have not yet been translated into more 
integrated implementation efforts. The main reasons for this imple-
mentation gap are certainly limited organizational capacities, limited 
political mandates, as well as a lack of financial means and political 
will. At the same time, it is evident that donor-driven efforts at 'main-
streaming' CCA into DRR planning at the district level primarily re-
sulted in interpretations of adaptation as adjustment to environmental 
stressors, whereas attention for the social production of risk – both ma-
terially and discursively – was comparatively low. 
Moreover, as soon as social institutions are included in the risk assess-
ment, a far more complex picture emerges. For example, social institu-
tions are perpetually transcending place-based notions of risk as well 
as rural-urban dichotomies through "teleconnections" or links between 
the "urban and rural ends of a pathway" (Seto et al. 2012, p. 7690). One 
of the most important teleconnections that plays a role in this regard is 
the transmission of remittances. Overall, 20.8 percent of all rural house-
holds and 16.2 percent of all urban households confirmed that they had 
received remittances for at least 3 months of the year, either from 
within the country or from abroad. 
These results stand in marked contrast with previous studies that were 
conducted in the Bolgatanga Municipal and Bongo Districts and report 
a much higher reliance on remittances, occasionally of more than 50 
percent (see, for example, Yiran 2016, p. 226). However, there are sev-
eral possible explanations for this discrepancy. On the one hand, in-
come is a sensitive issue, and participants may either over- or underre-
port sources of household income for various reasons. What is more 
likely, on the other hand, is that the ability of migrant laborers to send 
remittances to the north is dwindling due to increasingly limited eco-
nomic opportunities as well as inadequate wages for unskilled laborers 
and aspiring youth in urban centers (World Bank 2015b, p. 36; also see 
Laube 2016, p. 130). Since some of the urban populations that were in-
terviewed for this study are located at the outskirts of Bolgatanga, it is 
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also likely that the reliance on remittances is lower in these areas than 
in the urban core. The main argument in favor of this assumption is 
that the social composition in the peri-urban areas of Bolgatanga indi-
cates a concentration of socially disadvantaged groups at the outskirts 
of the city (for a more detailed study, see Schulz and Siriwardane 
2016).44 
Concerning the nature of social institutions in general, a trend toward 
greater individualization and monetized communal relations has been 
observed for Ghana. A previous study by Yaro (2013b, p. 421), for in-
stance, notes a pervasive change in social norms and values, exempli-
fied by "emerging cracks in the 'collective' philosophy of traditional systems, 
as nuclear families develop individualistic tendencies in response to difficult 
economic situations and perceived opportunities." One prime example for 
these individualistic tendencies is the increased normalization of cash 
payments for communal labor and land preparation that results in 
higher expenses for many farming households, and especially for those 
who are not able to perform strenuous agricultural work by them-
selves. 
These broader social trends are also reflected in the results of the 
household survey. When asked for reliable networks that the house-
hold could turn to in times of need or crisis – for example when the 
household is affected by those risks that members of the household 
identified to be most relevant for their own livelihoods – a majority of 
participants mentioned the 'nuclear family' (rural 80.6%, urban 84.5%, 
irrigators 90%), followed by the 'extended family' (rural 44.4%, urban 
38.5%, irrigators 35%) and 'close friends' (rural 25.3%, urban 39.5%, ir-
rigators 25%). By comparison, people in the 'same community' fea-
tured far less prominently in the perception of household heads (rural 
                                                          
44 Such a distinct pattern of socio-spatial differentiation must not always be assumed, 
since there are also cases where wealthier individuals move to the peri-urban fringes 
of bigger cities, for example in Accra. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
206                      CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
 
5.3%, urban 3%, irrigators 5%). These results point toward a tendency 
of individualization that manifests itself most clearly in urban areas.  
For example, while household heads in rural areas still recognized the 
support of 'traditional authorities' (9.1%), 'community based organiza-
tions' (CBOs) (3.9%), 'local politicians' (8.4%), 'international non-gov-
ernmental organizations' (INGOs) (1%) and the 'United Nations sys-
tem' (3.5%), these organizational support mechanisms played no role 
at all for urban households and households with direct access to the 
Vea irrigation scheme. The only organizational support mechanisms 
that were more widely acknowledged by all three types of households 
were the support networks of 'faith based organizations' such as local 
mosques or churches (rural 7%, urban 3%, irrigators 5%), and the sup-
port of 'NADMO' (rural 6.3%, urban 27%, irrigators 20%). 
Generally, membership in social groups was comparatively low in the 
case of urban households, which also confirms the presumed trend to-
ward greater individualization in urban environments (rural 60.2%, 
urban 27.5%, irrigators 70%). Comparatively, rural households and 
households with access to the Vea irrigation project appear to be better 
networked, for example through communal labor as well as participa-
tion in farmer-based associations and farmers’ unions. Such relations 
of reciprocity and social networks seem to be less strongly developed 
in urban areas. 
In addition, it was found that access to agricultural extension services 
is distributed in a highly uneven manner among rural smallholder 
farmers and farmers with access to the Vea irrigation facilities (rural 
15.5%, irrigators 45%). These results are consistent with earlier studies 
on farmers’ adaptation strategies in rural northern Ghana, which re-
port that "agricultural extension services are missing" for smallholder 
farmers in rural areas (Laube et al. 2012, p. 764). A similar pattern of 
uneven access also emerged with regard to tractors (rural 2.5%, irriga-
tors 20%), improved seed varieties (rural 7.4%, irrigators 15%), and in-
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organic fertilizers (rural 11.3%, irrigators 45%). Apart from wider fi-
nancial issues, this pattern of uneven access to agricultural inputs and 
services can be explained by comparatively better conditions for com-
mercial farmers who are able to purchase land at the Vea irrigation 
scheme, and consequently benefit from the on-site services of both 
ICOUR and MOFA.  
With regard to the provision of inorganic fertilizers, in particular, it 
was revealed during informal group discussions in Vea that the two 
main reasons for uneven access are corruption and the limited flow of 
information to rural farmers. Since 2008, inorganic fertilizers are sub-
sidized by the Government of Ghana, thus guaranteeing beneficiaries 
a 50 percent discount on fertilizer purchases. To benefit from these fer-
tilizer subsidies, it is nevertheless necessary for farmers to acquire of-
ficial coupons that are distributed by MOFA through its AEAs. How-
ever, the majority of the poor hardly benefit from existing government 
subsidies, mostly due to a general lack of awareness and formal edu-
cation, and because of illegal practices such as fertilizer theft and brib-
ery with regard to the distribution of fertilizer coupons. These findings 
point toward another instance where the interplay between the 'poli-
tics of indeterminacy' and local 'triangles of accommodation' has ulti-
mately turned the tables in favor of wealthier and better networked 
local elites. 
Urban households, by contrast, considered agricultural service deliv-
ery to be factually nonexistent. Once again, this result may support the 
initial hypothesis that agriculture and livestock keeping play a com-
paratively minor role as primary livelihood activities for urban popu-
lations in the research area. Another way of looking at this service gap, 
however, is that a dormant potential for intensifying urban agriculture 
through improved and more targeted service delivery exists. In fact, 
the potential of urban agriculture might be tapped to diversify income 
sources and to increase the adaptiveness as well as the food security of 
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urban populations – especially of the urban poor – with probable pos-
itive rippling effects for their education and health (see Kuusaana and 
Eledi 2015). 
Concerning financial capital in general, access to formal credit schemes 
was slightly better for urban households than for those in rural areas, 
while commercially oriented farm households with access to the Vea 
irrigation scheme found it much easier to obtain a credit if needed (ru-
ral 16.9%, urban 18.5%, irrigators 55%). These findings are not surpris-
ing, given the inability of poor households to provide adequate collat-
erals to local banks or farmer-based groups, and due to the risky or 
precarious nature of most occupations in the area. At the same time, 
informal credits are often arranged between local elites and the rural 
or urban poor, who hardly have other opportunities to access financial 
capital. In many cases, these informal arrangements are of a rather ex-
ploitative nature, and do not contribute to sustained pro-poor devel-
opment (see Schindler 2010). 
The key question that still needs to be answered, then, is what lessons 
may be learned from these combined findings, particularly with regard 
to the circumstances in which households might or might not be able 
to rely on social institutions and organizational support mechanisms 
to increase their adaptiveness. 
On the one hand, it can be concluded that there is a rather close match 
between the risk priorities of household heads and district level DRR 
specialists in the case of storms, floods and drought, particularly be-
cause such risks are directly related to the political mandate of 
NADMO. In the agricultural sector, on the other hand, it has been ob-
served that AEAs are well aware of the income diversification strate-
gies and adaptation techniques that are applied by farm households 
to manage their scarce physical resources (e.g. land, soil and water) 
and deal with the uncertainties of risky agricultural livelihoods (see 
Figures 8 and 9). 
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Beyond reactive DRR measures and the immediate adjustment of ag-
ricultural practices to climatic stressors, however, noticeable imple-
mentation gaps exist at different levels of government. For example, 
more coordinated CCA and DRR approaches are still missing when it 
comes to addressing the negative impacts of macro-level social dynam-
ics such as persistent decentralization challenges, the absence of non-
farm economic opportunities, and the erosion of social support net-
works beyond the core family. This situation, together with poverty 
related concerns and a lack of policy coordination among donors and 
government agencies across sectors contributes to patchy policy imple-
mentation as well as unreliable organizational support mechanisms for 
local populations. 
Indeed, some of these organizational challenges were taken into ac-
count in the NCCP as well as in the Ghana Goes for Green Growth docu-
ment, especially in the context of "fragmented environmental legisla-
tion and poor governance due to poor coordination of management" 
(NCCP 2013, p. 70), and with regard to the prioritization of "equitable 
development, coordination and harmonisation" (Ghana Goes for 
Green Growth 2010, p. 9). There is also general awareness among pol-
icy makers that the development of integrated implementation and 
long-term investment strategies with a focus on bulk infrastructure 
and public service delivery is still lagging behind. 
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether such political measures alone 
will be sufficient to move multi-layered organizational settings toward 
more integrated, equitable and forward-looking adaptation pathways. 
With regard to household adaptiveness and situated risks, the results 
of the survey rather indicate that – at least in the case of Vea irrigation 
project – farmers’ food and livelihood security did not increase signif-
icantly through comparatively better access to irrigation facilities, ag-
ricultural services, and financial credit schemes. Irrigators in the re-
search area, in other words, were not found to be considerably more 
food secure than rural or urban households. 
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As discussed in the previous section, the root causes for this situation 
are high population growth together with a strong economic depend-
ence on precarious agricultural livelihoods. In particular, a pervasive 
lack of alternative income sources ties many households to a gradually 
deteriorating natural resource base, and forces farmers to engage in 
unsustainable agricultural practices. With the exception of the wealth-
iest farmers who are able to shift their production if soils get depleted, 
most farmers at the Vea irrigation scheme are compelled to farm the 
same land one year after another, without fallow, due to unequal ac-
cess to scarce land resources. 
In addition, Fianko et al. (2011, p. 222-223) point out that the UER ac-
counts for one of the highest rates of fertilizer consumption in the 
whole of Ghana, mostly as a result of commercial farming activities at 
the Vea and Tono irrigation schemes. However, intensive fertilizer and 
chemical application lead to the acidification of soils, while mechanical 
land preparation, deforestation, overgrazing and the burning of crop 
residues further exacerbate soil degradation and erosion in areas un-
der intensive year-round use (MOFA 2007, p. 7; also see Obiri-Nyarko 
2012). One of the results of these unsustainable resource management 
practices is that cropping outputs at the Vea irrigation scheme were 
consistently lower than the desired cropping targets, with consequent 
negative impacts on household income and food security (see Annex 
3). 
In other words, better access to tractors and agro-chemicals does not 
necessarily lead to more sustainable farming outcomes, since existing 
agricultural intensification strategies are often rather ill-suited for local 
soil conditions. The improper use of chemicals, for example, favors the 
spread of pests and diseases by depleting soil fertility, and by increas-
ing insecticide resistance in insect populations. In a similar way, inten-
sive monocropping for commercial purposes increases the probability 
of weed infestations. Overall, there is evidence to suggest that unsus-
tainable forms of land intensification significantly contribute to envi-
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ronmental degradation in high-density farming areas, and that the un-
professional application of chemicals at the Vea irrigation scheme 
leads to considerable health risks for both farmers and consumers (see 
Pelig-Ba 2011, Jayne et al. 2014).  
Another factor that plays an important role with regard to low crop-
ping outputs and the food insecurity of irrigating households at the 
Vea irrigation scheme is the poor condition of the existing infrastruc-
ture. Despite the fact that irrigators have direct access to the Vea project 
facilities, the performance of the irrigation infrastructure is severely 
hampered by low water levels in the reservoir as well as the poor state 
of irrigation canals and drainage systems. Thus, even if sufficient water 
for irrigation is available, the opening of irrigation gates frequently 
leads to the indiscriminate flooding of fields, thereby resulting in crop 
damage as well as the washing away of applied fertilizers. 
These findings clearly illustrate that improved access to agricultural 
inputs and irrigation facilities alone is not sufficient to prevent sea-
sonal food shortages. Kuwornu and Owusu (2012, p. 86) largely sup-
port these empirical findings by asserting that "traces of food unavaila-
bility in some periods of the year within irrigating households cast doubts 
about the potency or efficiency in provision of support services in the irriga-
tion areas." Another study by Al-Hassan (2015, p. 78), which explores 
the food security situation of irrigators and non-irrigators in the Bol-
gatanga Municipal District, finds that "two-thirds (66%) of irrigators 
(…) compared to 73% of rain-fed farmers reported having experienced 
food shortages." 
Similarly, access to credit and improved seed varieties does not neces-
sarily translate into sustained household food security. Although irri-
gators have better access to formal as well as semi-formal credit 
schemes and improved seed varieties than rural households, inter-
views in Vea revealed that such services may not always generate the 
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expected benefits.45 Credit utilization may be ineffective due to factors 
such as poor infrastructure and the resulting waste of fertilizers, be-
cause of the risky nature of farming in general, and in view of a general 
lack of hired labor for land preparation if household labor is not a fea-
sible option. 
A recent study by Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr (2015) also 
finds that the adoption of improved or "hybrid" maize varieties is not 
always the best choice for smallholder farmers. Despite the promise of 
higher yields, hybrid maize varieties have higher labor as well as ferti-
lizer and agro-chemical requirements, while new seeds need to be 
bought every season, which makes the production of hybrids more ex-
pensive. At the same time, hybrids are less resistant to late season 
droughts than local varieties, and not well-suited for beneficial inter-
cropping with legumes or other cereals, as the study reveals. 
Furthermore, if households are additionally affected by hazards such 
as floods or storms during the cropping year, it is evident that organi-
zations such as NADMO can only provide emergency relief services (if 
at all). Yet they are not able to assist individuals in coping with the 
medium- and long-term impacts of property loss and damage. As 
crops and household items are generally not insured, farm households 
can easily fall back into poverty due to recurring hazards such as 
drought, flooding or storms, while agricultural credit may be diverted 
to non-agricultural uses. 
Placing the focus of 'pro-poor' agricultural adaptation strategies pri-
marily on access constraints and high-input intensification without 
simultaneously considering the quality of services, infrastructural pro-
vision, and infrastructural maintenance is therefore likely to result in 
unbalanced adaptation outcomes. Hence it is questionable whether the 
                                                          
45
 In the rural financial sector, "formal" credit is mainly provided by rural and commu-
nity banks as well as savings and loans companies, while "semi-formal" credit schemes 
are primarily offered by NGOs and cooperatives such as credit unions (Bendig et al. 
2009, p. 11). 
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agricultural modernization approaches that are outlined in the NCCP 
(2013, p. 30), namely "the development and application of new crop varieties 
…; higher energy and water inputs to support large-scale irrigation; and 
mechanization" are all equally suitable to increase food security as well 
as long-term yield stability in the research area. 
Lastly, it needs to be ascertained why urban households in Bolgatanga 
seem to be relatively better off in terms of food security, despite exist-
ing evidence for greater individualization and lower levels of institu-
tional support. Is there reason to believe that income diversification 
away from agriculture – which normally accompanies processes of ur-
banization and labor market transformation – actually betters the food 
security situation of urban households? 
Generally, there are only few recent studies that deal with the devel-
opment of the urban political economy in northern Ghana (see, for ex-
ample, Naab et al. 2013, Poku-Boansi and Amoako 2015, World Bank 
2015a). These studies paint a rather mixed picture with regard to the 
effects of urbanization on poverty reduction, income diversification 
and food security in Ghana’s northernmost regions. Obeng-Odoom 
(2012, p. 85), for example, aptly summarizes the mixed effects of accel-
erating urbanization by pointing out that "the increasing prominence 
of the private sector in the urban economy has impacted positively on 
capital formation and job creation [while] urban and national inequal-
ity levels have dramatically increased." 
In answer to these concerns, the Ghanaian Government has identified 
a considerable number of pressing urbanization challenges that will 
have to be tackled to reduce urban poverty and to achieve more inclu-
sive economic development. These challenges include the underdevel-
opment of the urban economy and the industrial sector, prevalent land 
use disorder and unplanned urban expansion, poor urban governance 
and institutional coordination, as well as inadequate infrastructure 
and public service delivery (World Bank 2015a, p. 9). 
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Youth unemployment and under-employment also continue to be se-
rious problems for social cohesion in the country, although reliable sta-
tistics are not available at the moment, and published estimates vary 
considerably. A recent report prepared by the Ghanaian Workforce 
Development Institute estimates the youth unemployment rate to be 
15.9 percent (Baffour-Awuah 2013, p. 2), while the African Economic 
Outlook (2012, p. 14) states an unemployment rate of 25.6 percent for 
the age group between 15 and 24. By contrast, the sixth round of the 
Ghana Living Standards Survey reports that only 5.5 percent of the 
Ghanaian youth are currently unemployed (GLSS 6 2014b, p. 68).  
Regardless of these differences in numbers, however, there is little 
doubt that unemployment, especially among young people in urban 
areas, is one of the biggest problems facing the Ghanaian economy. In 
its National Employment Policy, the GoG (2014, p. 2) has emphasized 
that it is "now set to deal comprehensively with the challenge of grow-
ing unemployment (…) targeting in particular, vulnerable groups, the 
youth, women and persons with disability." In the Bolgatanga Muni-
cipality, this pledge has unfortunately not been backed by sustained 
political action. It has been reported, for example, that the National 
Youth Employment Programme – an initiative created by the govern-
ment to address the problem of youth unemployment – was com-
pletely inactive during the years 2013 and 2014 (Bolgatanga Municipal 
Assembly 2015, p. 22). 
In addition to these labor market constraints, it is evident that the de-
velopment gap between the southern and northern regions of Ghana 
makes diversification into non-farm economic activities particularly 
difficult for people who are living in the urban centers of the northern 
savanna. In the Bolgatanga Municipality, existing opportunities for 
non-farm income generation are mostly self-employment, low paying 
jobs in the private informal sector, and – to a very limited extent – pri-
vate as well as public wage jobs (GSS 2014, p. 42). The fact that 41 per-
cent of all urban households that were interviewed for this study did 
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not have access to formal education also shows that there is an urgent 
need for improved education and skills training. 
However, even though opportunities for urban households to engage 
in non-farm economic activities are limited, especially for low-skilled 
workers and vulnerable groups, the results of the survey also show 
that urban households in Bolgatanga are relatively more food secure 
than rural households and irrigators. These findings are still surpris-
ing, especially in view of existing individualization tendencies, and in 
the light of empirical evidence for lower levels of organizational sup-
port for urban households. Hence it must be assumed that the urban 
environment in Bolgatanga offers structural advantages which have a 
moderately positive effect on the food security of urban households. 
Although there are only few studies which focus on food security in 
northern Ghana’s cities, previous research indicates that some of the 
key factors which are most likely to have a positive impact on the food 
security of urban households are education, salable skills and house-
hold composition, whereas factors such as remittances and access to 
credit appear to be less relevant (Maxwell et al. 2000, p. 147; also see 
Frimpong and Asuming-Brempong 2013, p. 29). Therefore, despite the 
difficult economic situation in the UER, there is reason to assume that 
higher educational levels in urban areas also lead to a relatively higher 
likelihood of finding gainful employment, and ultimately effect higher 
per capita food expenditures which might outweigh the high costs of 
living in an urban environment (CFSVA 2012, p. 25-27). 
Another point worth mentioning is the fact that urban agriculture as a 
small-scale strategy to increase urban food security has received con-
siderable attention over the past decade.46 Prior research in northern 
                                                          
46
 Referring to urban agriculture as a 'small-scale strategy' does by no means imply 
that urban agriculture is not important for achieving food security. It rather means that 
food production systems are also tightly linked to larger-scale phenomena such as 
market processes, macroeconomic policies, as well as larger infrastructural and gov-
ernance systems with their respective discourses and dispositifs. 
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Ghana suggests that urban agriculture may act as an additional safety 
net for the most vulnerable segments of society, although certain res-
ervations must be kept in mind. Studies on urban agriculture in north-
ern Ghana show that urban farming is still below its potential, mostly 
because of environmental and health risks, due to limited institutional 
support, and as a result of conflicts over land use (Drechsel and Keraita 
2014, Kuusaana and Eledi 2015). 
Regarding the case of Bolgatanga, in particular, findings indicate that 
the role of urban agriculture in reducing food insecurity should not be 
overstated. Overall, 64 percent of all surveyed urban households in 
Bolgatanga had to cope with seasonal food shortages, while only 3.5 
percent stated that agriculture was their main source of livelihood. In 
addition, agricultural risks played a much lesser role in the perception 
of urban households, which points toward a relatively minor role of 
agriculture as a key food security strategy for urban populations in the 
research area. 
However, whether general conclusions about the role of urban agricul-
ture as an effective adaptation strategy can be drawn from these find-
ings is hard to evaluate. What can be said about food security in the 
research area as a whole, and about the results of the household survey 
in particular, is that a number of prior studies have reported similarly 
high rates of food insecurity (Quaye 2008, Al-Hassan 2015), whereas 
other assessments have given more conservative estimates, yet affirm-
ing that the UER is the region with the highest percentage of food in-
secure households in Ghana (see, for example, CFSVA 2012, p. 20). 
Thus, as case study research does not easily lend itself to generalization 
and since available findings are often contradictory, it is evident that 
further research on the relational determinants of food (in)security in 
northern Ghana’s rapidly growing small- and medium-sized cities is 
urgently needed. 
As Frimpong and Asuming-Brempong (2013, p. 30) remark, there are 
still "serious gaps in our knowledge and understanding of whether the 
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causes and determinants of food security in rural and urban house-
holds are the same to warrant the same approach in dealing with the 
problem." It is not entirely clear, for example, whether lower reliance 
on agriculture and better access to infrastructure in urban environ-
ments significantly increase the adaptiveness of households, consider-
ing that the costs of living in a city are high, and that constrained urban 
job markets provide very limited opportunities for non-farm income 
diversification. Especially for the most vulnerable segments of the ur-
ban population, and for individuals with low educational levels, it is 
extremely difficult to diversify into sustainable non-farm employment. 
Regarding the rural end of the rural-urban continuum, the survey re-
sults also show that access to credit, services, inputs and infrastructure 
alone will not lead to a substantial improvement in household adap-
tiveness as long as issues of quality and utilization receive compara-
tively little attention. Moreover, there is ample evidence to suggest that 
large-scale, export-led commercial agriculture with high input de-
mands, as it is currently envisioned in relevant agricultural policies for 
northern Ghana (SADA 2010, p. 25 and GSGDA II 2014, p. 54-58), is not 
a 'one size fits all solution' for food security and long-term yield stabil-
ity in the region. 
Instead of shifting the focus of agricultural policy away from small-
scale farming and toward large-scale commercial agriculture, it seems 
prudent to strengthen smallholder agricultural systems and traditional 
crops that are historically well adapted to the northern savanna zone. 
Increased climate variability and the pervasive lack of economic alter-
natives for the rural poor at least suggest that the effectiveness of in-
clusive adaptation strategies along the rural-urban continuum hinges 
on the promotion of sustainable smallholder agriculture and non-farm 
employment options. Finding an appropriate balance between neces-
sary agricultural modernization and increased support for sustainable 
agroecological food systems will then be a major challenge for Ghana-
ian decision makers. 
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From an institutional point of view, the analysis also revealed that con-
tested cultural values, norms, discourses and power relations, which 
shape institutional life in all its diversity, have received far less atten-
tion in contemporary adaptation research and practice. These blind 
spots have tangible consequences for the implementation of socially 
inclusive adaptation actions, since many project-based interventions 
tend to downplay or simply ignore the inherently politicized nature of 
complex adaptive processes. 
In sum, the results of the survey have thoroughly confirmed that social 
vulnerability and low adaptiveness are not merely resulting from cli-
mate change and increased variability. Income and power disparities 
as well as existing skills gaps and gender imbalances also have a 
strongly negative effect on peoples’ adaptiveness. At the same time, 
more integrative and multi-sectoral CCA and DRR approaches are still 
missing when it comes to addressing the negative impacts of macro-
level social dynamics. Negative macro-level impacts include persistent 
decentralization and infrastructural challenges; poverty related con-
cerns; corruption and rent-seeking; the absence of non-farm economic 
opportunities; and the erosion of social support networks. Together 
with low organizational capacities and a lack of policy coordination 
among donors and government agencies, this situation contributes to 
patchy policy implementation and results in unreliable support mech-
anisms, particularly for vulnerable citizens who depend on a gradually 
deteriorating resource base. 
In order to put these empirical findings into a concrete decision-mak-
ing context, however, I will now link the results of the study to an in-
stitutional pathways perspective. In doing so, I aim to present forward-
looking and actionable adaptation alternatives, while simultaneously 
taking the discussion beyond a strictly managerial focus. 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: FROM ADJUSTMENT 
TO TRANSFORMATION? 
The concluding chapter briefly summarizes possible institutional 
adaptation pathways based on a set of four empirically grounded 
and structurally different adaptation scenarios. These scenarios are 
meant to serve as heuristic devices to support decision making. They 
are defined as institutional adjustment, reform, and transformation. 
It is neither assumed that any particular institutional pathway pre-
sents an optimal adaptation solution nor that there is always a choice 
between alternative options. Therefore, the chapter also discusses 
institutional factors embedded in each of the three adaptation path-
ways vis-à-vis the regressive tendencies of business-as-usual. While 
investigating possible scenarios, particular emphasis is placed on 
the political nature of adaptation. It is argued that adaptation plan-
ning is not a straightforward and normatively neutral approach to 
addressing risk and vulnerability, since planning practices them-
selves are embedded in wider political and institutional contexts. In 
other words, it must be considered that planning and other power-
ridden processes of rational organizing are influencing risk and vul-
nerability. Hence it is the goal of this chapter to summarize the em-
pirical findings of the study to demonstrate under which circum-
stances one may speak of tangible institutional influences on the so-
cial production of vulnerability, and under which circumstances one 
may have to reject the hypothesis that institutions are the primary 
factor that determines social vulnerability in the research area. 
 
 
Emerging Institutional Adaptation Pathways 
Institutions exert a great influence on the ways in which risks are me-
diated and produced in the social sphere. Responding to risks such as 
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rapid urbanization, rising social inequalities and climate change thus 
requires societies to address the institutional root causes of multidi-
mensional vulnerabilities. Yet, addressing the root causes which make 
people, ecosystems and the built environment vulnerable also means 
to recognize that adaptive processes are intrinsically political. It is evi-
dent that occurring harm is not only determined by biogeochemical 
and technological hazards, for instance climate variability and infra-
structure failures, but also by the degree of vulnerability and exposure 
to multiple social risks (IPCC 2012, p. 69). Institutionally entrenched 
power asymmetries as well as competing goals, values and know-
ledges must all be taken into account while exploring how adaptation 
is defined and implemented by various interest groups. 
Contending with the 'messy' day-to-day reality of organizing and de-
cision making therefore means to realize that individual or collective 
action in favor of institutional change is frequently ignored or even ac-
tively resisted. Accounts of institutional change that emphasize the 
creativity and agency of progressive forces run the risk of underesti-
mating the often quite remarkable resilience of reactionary elements. 
In other words, exploring how resistance to change shapes institu-
tional processes over time also means to identify those actors "who 
benefit from a particular institution, and who support continuation or 
will fight a change that will disadvantage them" (Sorensen 2015, p. 22). 
Especially if immediate 'win-win' solutions are unlikely to materialize, 
resistance to change is to be expected. This problem may be defined as 
the "politics of unsustainability" or the contradictory practice of at-
tempting to sustain unsustainable development pathways, while sim-
ultaneously espousing a rhetoric of ecological modernization, resili-
ence, and progress (Blühdorn 2011, p. 34). Hence it is reasonable to as-
sume that deeply engrained cultural-cognitive patterns, behavioral 
routines and short-term orientations make it inherently difficult to 
purposefully transform unsustainable socio-material structures domi-
nated by powerful vested interests into more equitable, sustainable 
and adaptive forms of social organization. 
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In view of these analytical and political predicaments, so-called "adap-
tation pathways" have gained increased prominence as approaches 
that support the inclusive development and coordination of adapta-
tion responses across multiple scales and under conditions of deep un-
certainty. Sharpe et al. (2016, p. 3) describe adaptation pathways as per-
spectives that "aim to help work toward new futures in a semiexploratory 
way (e.g., by identifying different routes and paths) but without the specificity 
of a single roadmap that assumes the ability to control all the sources of com-
plexity." 
Multiple pathways approaches have been proposed in the adaptation 
literature. Some of these approaches are highly technical, and focus on 
large-scale, integrated models and other types of computational sce-
narios to project the key characteristics of adaptation pathways. This 
includes future emission scenarios, cost-benefit analyses, and the mon-
itoring of social-ecological tipping points (Haasnoot et al. 2013, Clarke 
et al. 2014).  
Other pathway principles, in turn, are more concerned with integrat-
ing diverse knowledges and questions related to power or social justice 
when informing decision making (Leach et al. 2010, Butler et al. 2016, 
Eisenhauer 2016). This specific understanding of adaptation pathways 
is less focused on technical modeling, and can be seen as more accom-
modating to interpretive perspectives from the social sciences and hu-
manities. As the opening case study has shown, it is indeed of para-
mount importance to better integrate social scientific research and the 
views of marginalized groups into adaptation planning to prevent so-
cial conflicts and maladaptive outcomes. Yet, identifying the key deci-
sion points and critical junctures of adaptation pathways in advance to 
work toward equitable outcomes is a daunting task, particularly in 
view of the complex political realities and informational constraints of 
everyday decision making. It is therefore questionable whether the 
simplistic "stop-go" logic of social change that arguably informs no-
tions of 'key decision points' and 'critical junctures' has the potential to 
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account for more slow moving and incremental dynamics of institu-
tional change (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 202). Change within in-
stitutional adaptation pathways, in other words, is not necessarily 
characterized by long periods of strict path dependency that are punc-
tuated by critical junctures or external shocks (i.e. the 'stop-go model' 
of change). Instead, institutional pathways are in a state of permanent 
dynamism due to constant antagonistic struggles over meanings and 
resources, while the impacts of hazards such as climate change can be 
interpreted as the outcome of long-term human interactions with the 
Earth system. Instances where abrupt social-ecological change be-
comes visible as a critical juncture, as a regime shift, or as an impactful 
event are thus often the result of the gradual interaction between cul-
tural-cognitive and biogeochemical change processes over time. This 
is precisely the point where a combination of institutional analysis, dis-
course analysis and pathways approaches can provide valuable in-
sights into the structural aspects of socio-material change over time. 
To operationalize process-oriented pathways approaches under condi-
tions of complexity and uncertainty, scenarios remain one of the most 
widely applied methods today. Scenarios "are usually developed as a 
small set (two to four) of plausible and structurally different futures" 
and serve as inputs to strategic pathway processes by keeping existing 
uncertainties visible in ways that challenge the basic assumptions on 
which current activities are based (Sharpe et al. 2016, p. 3). In Ghana, 
the so-called 'Akropong Approach' has been developed as a tool for 
adaptation planning and cross-sector impact analysis. The Akropong 
Approach uses qualitative and quantitative scenario components to 
explore interactions between drivers or trends that have been identi-
fied as central to the adaptive challenge by the individuals involved in 
the planning process (Kemp-Benedict and Agyemang-Bonsu 2008, p. 
834). 
Nevertheless, due to the inherently politicized nature of adaptation 
planning, it needs to be borne in mind that scenario planning tools 
such as the Akropong Approach also have their specific weaknesses. 
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First, it may be contended that questions related to power, social inclu-
sion and underlying political values receive relatively little attention, 
since the planning focus is more on cross-sectoral policy coordination, 
and less on the wider sociocultural, institutional, economic and discur-
sive context in which adaptation pathways are embedded. Second, 
there is a clear tendency to limit the range of stakeholders to govern-
ment and donor agencies, NGOs, and select specialists, whereas mar-
ginalized groups such as smallholder farmers and the urban poor are 
seldom permanently involved in planning procedures. This means 
that scenarios might be biased in favor of more powerful groups who 
are actively engaged in their development, while the interests and per-
spectives of less well networked groups are not sufficiently accounted 
for.  
Lastly, although it is difficult to deduce trends in risks from locally 
specific risk perceptions, the excessive use of quantitative models and 
statistics to inform future policy scenarios is not always advantageous. 
Primarily relying on calculative models to inform qualitative 'futuring' 
strategies might even provoke different forms of cognitive bias. This 
includes the tendency to interpret scenario-related information in a 
way that confirms one’s preconceptions, as well as the tendency to re-
gard future options that are based on numeric information or quanti-
fiable probabilities as more objective, because the normative assump-
tions behind calculative approaches are often less visible. 
The notion of institutional adaptation pathways, as I have described it, 
thus offers an additional perspective on scenario planning by focusing 
on empirically traceable discursive and institutional determinants of 
social change. Therefore, it can serve as a useful extension of existing 
scenario planning approaches. Augmenting the cross-sectoral strategic 
perspective of the Akropong Approach, the notion of institutional ad-
aptation pathways combines qualitative methods such as institutional 
and discourse analysis with quantitative risk assessment components. 
The main aim is to determine how dynamic institutional settings might 
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potentially influence the ways in which adaptation pathways are spa-
tially and temporally evolving.  
At the same time, however, institutional pathways seek to explore how 
institutions and organizations themselves adapt to rapidly changing 
socio-environmental conditions. Based on information gathered from 
empirical research, different institutional adaptation pathways are 
represented by a set of possible scenarios. These scenarios are institu-
tional adjustment, reform, and transformation. It is neither assumed 
that any particular institutional pathway scenario presents an optimal 
adaptation solution nor that there is always a choice between alterna-
tive options. Therefore, attention is also given institutional factors that 
may move adaptation pathways toward business-as-usual scenarios. 
The main aim is to show under which circumstances one might speak 
of tangible institutional influences on the social production of vulner-
ability and risk, and under which circumstances one may have to reject 
the hypothesis that 'institutions are the primary factor that determines 
social vulnerability.' 
 
'Adjustment' 
The adjustment pathway scenario is based on the core assumption that 
the paradigms of technological adjustment and resilience will continue 
to dominate adaptation policy making in the short and medium term. 
Especially the 'climate-proofing' of economic development is currently 
promoted as a key policy response by a variety of influential political 
actors in Ghana. In the context of proposed adjustment strategies, 
strong emphasis is placed on infrastructural improvement as well as 
on the agricultural, energy, and natural resource sectors. Infrastruc-
tural adjustment projects are not only popular among the general pop-
ulation, they are also politically lucrative and prestigious. In his fore-
word to the National Climate Change Policy, the President of the Re-
public of Ghana, H.E. John Dramani Mahama, writes: 
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"What is relevant for Ghana is to ensure the mainstreaming of the             
climate-proofing agenda into national development (…) It is my cher-
ished hope that the National Climate Change Policy will serve as 
springboard for initiating a climate-resilient economy that will acceler-
ate our development efforts and enhance the well-being of our people 
without sacrificing the quality of the environment and its resources" 
(NCCP 2013, p. v-vi; emphasis added). 
Overall, a detailed analysis of organizational discourses at the national, 
regional and district levels revealed that the understanding of adapta-
tion as adjustment to climatic stressors presently dominates organiza-
tional perceptions at multiple scales. Donor-driven efforts at 'main-
streaming' CCA into DRR planning at the district level, for example, 
primarily resulted in interpretations of adaptation as adjustment to en-
vironmental stressors. This normative bias will clearly affect adapta-
tion policy and practice, as long as international donor agencies focus 
their adaptation efforts on "what might be termed the more 'managea-
ble' manifestations of climate change, namely, changes in seasonal and 
inter-annual variability (for example, in rainfall), and in the frequency 
and severity of extremes such as droughts, storms and floods (Brooks 
et al. 2009, p. 752). 
In view of these converging trends, adjustment is a highly probable 
adaptation scenario that is likely to generate additional organizational 
feedbacks and shape future institutional pathways through the distri-
bution of resources and risks. Overall, proposed adjustment policies 
favor the maintenance of systemic equilibrium by adjusting to actual 
or expected climate change and its effects. In terms of concrete policy 
interventions, adjustment mainly focuses on infrastructure improve-
ment and technical responses to narrowly defined 'natural' risks, while 
promoting 'no regrets' adaptation strategies such as the development 
of more effective early warning or emergency response systems. Other 
proposed measures include the improvement of irrigation, transport 
and storage infrastructure, as well as the promotion of agricultural 
technologies and inputs such as new seed varieties. Consequently, the 
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primary focus of adjustment adaptation is not so much on the social 
root causes of multidimensional risks and vulnerabilities, but rather on 
the safeguarding of economic growth and development pathways un-
der conditions of climate change and increased variability.  
However, while ecological and population pressures on scarce re-
sources such as land, soil and water are constantly growing, a mere 
focus on adjustment adaptation might not be suitable to address the 
more structural constraints of adaptation. A lack of social inclusion 
and economic opportunities, together with persistent quandaries of 
low organizational capacity and unfinished decentralization are still 
hampering collective efforts to increase social adaptiveness. Techno-
logical and infrastructural adjustment, in other words, are unlikely to 
be successful as a primary adaptation strategies, as long as the organi-
zational and political conditions for their integrated implementation 
are not met. 
In the case study on the rehabilitation of the Vea irrigation dam, for 
example, it has become clear that inclusive planning and a thorough 
knowledge of complex institutional, cultural and political settings is an 
absolute necessity to avoid prolonged conflicts that might stall the im-
plementation of infrastructural adjustment projects. This applies even 
in situations where positive sentiments toward specific adjustment in-
terventions prevail among the population, and 'bottom-up' and 'top-
down' policy approaches are pursued in tandem. 
Moreover, it has become evident that mere access to irrigation facilities 
or credit schemes did not significantly improve the food and livelihood 
security of rural farming households in the research area. A focus on 
access alone is hardly sufficient, as long as issues of quality and utiliza-
tion receive comparatively little political attention. For example, even 
if financial credit and agricultural inputs such as inorganic fertilizer 
can be accessed, their utilization is frequently ineffective. This is partly 
the result of factors such as labor shortages for land preparation and 
poor infrastructure, but also because of the risky nature of farming in 
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general. If households are affected by additional hazards such as 
drought, floods or storms during the cropping year, it is clear that or-
ganizations such as NADMO are not able to assist individuals in cop-
ing with the medium- and long-term impacts of property loss and 
damage. Since crops and household items are normally not insured, 
farm households can easily fall back into poverty due to recurring haz-
ards, while agricultural credit may be diverted to non-agricultural 
uses. Previous research in northern Ghana has also proven that the 
adoption of improved seed varieties is not always the optimal solution 
for farmers (see Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr 2015). Despite 
the promise of higher yields, hybrid maize varieties have higher labor 
as well as fertilizer and agro-chemical requirements, while new seeds 
must be bought every season. This makes the production of hybrids 
more expensive and creates economic dependencies on agrochemical 
producers and their pricing policies. At the same time, hybrids are less 
resistant to late season droughts than local seed varieties, and also less 
well-suited for beneficial intercropping with legumes or other cereals. 
Therefore, it can be concluded from the empirical findings of the study 
that technical adjustment approaches alone will not be sufficient to re-
duce complex vulnerabilities and move multi-layered institutional set-
tings toward more integrated, equitable and forward-looking adapta-
tion pathways. Consequently, the second pathway scenario will focus 
on the idea of institutional reform and discuss under which circum-
stances a reformist pathway may be required to complement or enable 
proposed adjustment measures. 
 
'Reform' 
The reformist pathway scenario is based on the political goal of im-
proving particular attributes of a given reference system without alter-
ing its fundamental properties. When applied in the context of adapta-
228   CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN GHANA 
tion, a reformist institutional pathway entails incremental organiza-
tional responses to the negative effects of actual or expected climate 
change and variability. In other words, a reformist adaptation pathway 
neither advocates for the social status quo nor endorses fundamental 
systemic or paradigmatic change. It rather concentrates on managerial 
reforms within socio-ecological systems through the iterative modifi-
cation of laws, technologies, rules, and decision-making processes. Put 
differently, reformist adaptation may question organizational rules 
and decision-making processes, but not the underlying socioeconomic 
paradigms and asymmetric power relations that govern these very 
rules. The dominant normative and behavioral paradigms under 
which the reformist approach operates – according to the critical 
CCA literature – are ecological modernization and sustainable de-
velopment interventions.  
However, depending on its concrete political interpretation, a reform-
ist institutional pathway may still enable transformative outcomes be-
cause of its emphasis on incremental institutional and structural 
change in existing governance regimes. Simultaneously, the reformist 
approach reaches beyond the primarily technical and infrastructural 
perspective of adjustment pathways, due to its focus on changing 
multi-layered institutional settings, and its orientation toward devel-
oping flexible and responsive organizational structures. 
In the context of Ghanaian climate politics, reformist institutional path-
ways are linked to the influential policy narrative that institutional re-
forms are urgently needed to build a strong organizational basis for 
policy implementation. Institutional and governance reforms, in other 
words, are seen as a necessary conditions to mitigate the risks that cli-
mate change and increased variability pose for socioeconomic devel-
opment (see, for example, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005, NCCP 
2013, NADMO 2015). In short, institutions should be strengthened to 
become more transparent and adaptive to change, which can present 
new development opportunities.  
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However, discussions about institutional reform are not a novel phe-
nomenon that is merely related to adaptation. Reformist ideas are, in 
fact, tightly linked to older decentralization debates that have shaped 
Ghanaian political discourse since the late 1980s. Accordingly, decen-
tralization challenges were frequently mentioned as a key problem 
during expert interviews, and are widely acknowledged to be one of 
the most important reasons why the implementation of adaptation pol-
icies is exceedingly difficult. In fact, decentralization challenges are 
featured prominently in scientific articles and donor brochures about 
every imaginable development issue that is currently under discussion 
in Ghana, ranging from local economic development and natural re-
source management to DRR, gender mainstreaming and CCA. Curi-
ously, however, the analysis often stops at this point and technical or 
managerial recommendations are made, assuming the existence of a 
neutral administrative apparatus, while trying to explain how 'actors' 
form their causal beliefs about political interventions according to 'ra-
tional' criteria.  
This reformist management logic does not present a problem per se, 
due to the fact that people who are working in governmental environ-
ments are certainly engaged in multiple practices of rational organiz-
ing. However, even if it is assumed that a reformist pathway is the sine 
qua non to advance adaptation, it has to be asked how managerial ra-
tionalities are perceived – and often transcended or transformed – by 
those who are supposed to enact them. 
At the regional and district level, government officials and assembly 
members have developed a rather critical view of new mainstreaming 
and policy pilot initiatives, mainly as a result of increased workloads 
for pilot districts and due to mainstreaming approaches that neglect 
long-term training measures. Capacity building and training work-
shops at the regional, district and sub-district levels are often irregular 
events, mainly as a result of relatively short project and funding cycles, 
while organizational capacities for the implementation and integrated 
coordination of CCA and DRR activities are still weak. 
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When asked to name the most relevant political bodies that could        
facilitate the decentralized coordination of adaptation and DRR activ-
ities across sectors, policy experts frequently mentioned the Regional 
Disaster Management Platforms. However, it is evident that the focus of 
regional DRM platforms is mainly on disaster prevention and relief ef-
forts, and not necessarily on the planning and local implementation of 
adaptation programs or sustainable development projects. It was also 
mentioned during interviews that there was little exchange on climate 
change matters among the regional heads of government ministries, 
departments and agencies in the context of DRR platform meetings. 
Government specialists pointed out that the activities of DRM plat-
forms are mostly focused on advocacy, awareness creation, and coor-
dination. 
Participants also considered Environmental Management Committees at 
the regional and district levels to be particularly relevant for the coor-
dination and implementation of adaptation activities. Arguably, how-
ever, these coordinating platforms are still embedded in the same elite 
policy networks and top-down governance structures that characterize 
the entire political management system in Ghana. Particularly in the 
Upper East Region, Environmental Management Committees are 
nonetheless perceived to be suitable institutional entry points for the 
implementation of integrated adaptation actions, mostly due to the fact 
that there is already practical experience with desertification control, 
environmental awareness creation, and community involvement. 
Strengthening the role of these environmental committees, financial 
and otherwise, and linking them more closely to the work of the DRR 
platforms and the Ghana Meteorological Service was thus considered 
a preferred policy choice compared to establishing new adaptation-re-
lated implementation arrangements. 
Nevertheless, strengthening existing DRR platforms and Environmen-
tal Management Committees could be considered an ambitious or even 
unrealistic political goal, as it implies to tackle the underlying struc-
tural problems of unfinished decentralization and conflicting and/or 
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overlapping political mandates. At the same time, it may be contended 
that the permanent introduction of new coordinating mechanisms for 
environmental management has thus far yielded little evidence of 
meaningful community involvement and tangible improvement on 
the ground. 
A prominent reformist proposal for improving the direct political in-
volvement of individuals that has been made in this context is to adopt 
a participatory approach under which communities drive the concep-
tualization and application of integrated CCA or DRR measures, for 
example with regard to the improvement of early warning systems. 
What is inherently problematic about such a reformist approach is that 
it normally avoids a deeper engagement with power-ridden institu-
tional processes that affect the outcomes of deliberative decision mak-
ing. Communities are, in other words, neither entirely communal – for 
example with regard to existing gender disparities and social inequal-
ities – nor fortuitously 'at risk'. 
Placing bottom-up communication and implementation at the heart of 
integrated DRR and CCA approaches thus requires great caution, since 
potentially conflicting political expectations, ambiguous social norms 
and previous experiences with development projects structure local 
power sharing arrangements. Flows of knowledge and resources be-
tween agencies and administrative levels in Ghana are highly politi-
cized, while clientelist networks or political affiliations may under-
mine the impartiality of political interventions. At the same time, it is 
evident that structural and financial constraints are fundamentally 
limiting the operational readiness of local governance structures, espe-
cially at the level of the Town/Area Councils and Unit Committees. 
The basic suggestion by Sova et al. (2016, p. 1) that "increased partici-
pation from political agents, as well as from traditional authorities and 
farmers (…) can help reverse the a-political nature of the adaptation 
regime, improve power pluralism across actor groups and levels, and 
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facilitate cross-level cooperation between formal and informal institu-
tions" therefore runs the risk of gravely underestimating the inherent 
complexities of an already highly politicized and multi-layered insti-
tutional environment. The caveat by Sova et al. (2016, p. 12) that locally 
specific research findings are not necessarily reflective of all districts 
or regions, and that "traditional ruling structures for example, differ 
dramatically across the country" certainly apply in the context of the 
area that has been the focus of this investigation.  
Traditional leaders, for example, enter in locally diverse and highly 
complex relationships with the bureaucratic state, whereas state au-
thorities and politicians often seek to align themselves with coalitions 
of customary authorities to advance their strategic priorities. Evi-
dently, these political configurations are not always free of conflict. 
The opening case study has clearly shown, for example, how conflicts 
might arise between state authorities and traditional leaders, as well as 
between customary authorities themselves, while communities may be 
internally divided. Statements implying that conflict resolution capac-
ities in the region are fairly high based on community solidarity and 
the influence of traditional leaders such as chiefs and earth priests who 
can enter in rational negotiations with the state thus have to be consid-
ered superficial at best, and outright risky at worst, depending on the 
concrete policy and planning context. In essence, such reformist pro-
posals assume that adaptation processes are governed by clearly iden-
tifiable, benevolent and essentially neutral institutions that interact 
based on shared political values like swift conflict resolution in the 
public interest. That this is not necessarily the case, at least as far as the 
'messy' everyday realities of policy implementation and decision mak-
ing are concerned, is certainly a valuable lesson that can be drawn from 
this investigation. 
However, reformist institutional pathways are not necessarily limited 
to improving public participation or integrating DRR and CCA 
measures. In addition to the reform of existing governance arrange-
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE  233 
 
ments, various reformist policies are also focusing on economic devel-
opment and adaptation in the agricultural sector. High population 
growth together with a strong economic dependence on precarious ag-
ricultural livelihoods ties many rural households to a gradually dete-
riorating natural resource base, thus forcing farmers to engage in un-
sustainable agricultural practices such as cultivating already infertile 
and degraded soils one year after another, without fallow. 
Yet, despite the ecological pressures that result from current small-
holder farming practices, there is evidence to suggest that agroecolog-
ical food production systems can indeed be environmentally sustaina-
ble, economically viable, and increase food security as well as yields, 
provided that the right incentives for farm-level adoption are put in 
place (see EOA 2015). Resorting to large-scale and export-oriented con-
ventional agriculture with high input demands, as it is currently envi-
sioned in relevant agricultural reform strategies for northern Ghana, is 
certainly not a 'silver bullet' for sustainable pro-poor development, 
food security and long-term yield stability, as previous research has 
shown (Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr 2015).  
Instead of completely shifting the focus of agricultural policy away 
from small-scale farming and toward large-scale commercial agricul-
ture, it is rather recommended to simultaneously strengthen small-
holder agricultural systems and traditional crops that are historically 
well adapted to the northern savanna zone. Supporting the implemen-
tation of the Ecological Organic Agriculture Initiative (EOA 2015) that is 
coordinated by the African Union Commission and aligned with the 
Malabo declaration as well as "Agenda 2063" (African Union 2014) can 
be an important step in this direction, even if it is to be expected that 
such an approach to agricultural development will not be sufficient in 
view of the complex structural challenges facing Ghana’s northern re-
gions.  
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Nevertheless, from a political point of view, it is equally unrealistic to 
expect single reform-oriented government initiatives such as the Sa-
vannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) to solve the 
structural and development related problems of northern Ghana. Al-
Hassan (2013, p. 241) aptly remarks:  
People expect SADA to transform agriculture, provide adequate in-
frastructure and ensure sustainable environmental practices. The ma-
jority perceive SADA as a saviour that will develop Northern Ghana. 
The divide between what people expect from the Authority and what 
it is mandated to do suggests that it will be difficult to meet those 
expectations, particularly due to political risks and funding limita-
tions.  
These political risks are closely related to the aforementioned institu-
tional dynamics, which give rise to political power struggles over ma-
terial and symbolic resources, and regularly lead to cooptation, delays, 
and socially unbalanced results. Yet, if modernization and expansion 
strategies for rural agriculture are not implemented in a socially equi-
table manner, it is to be expected that these interventions will create 
economic dependencies on large corporations and lead to the expro-
priation of smallholder farmers in areas with scarce land resources, 
thereby deepening already existing social problems and potentially 
creating new ones. The general lack of non-farm economic alternatives 
in northern Ghana, which is further aggravated by the realities of in-
creased climate variability and uneven urbanization, at least suggests 
that the effectiveness of adaptation strategies hinges on finding the 
right balance between agricultural modernization, inclusive social de-
velopment, and increased support for agroecological food systems. 
With respect to the issues surrounding rapid urbanization and urban 
adaptation pathways in particular, it seems intuitive to assume that the 
institutional challenges of urban development in northern Ghana 
markedly differ from the problems confronting the agriculturally de-
pendent population.  
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However, previous research on urbanization in Ghana rather suggests 
that insufficient financing, land market friction, poor infrastructure 
and unfinished decentralization are key challenges of urbanization, 
and that these challenges are structurally determined by "weak insti-
tutional capacity and coordination" (World Bank 2015a, p. x). Common 
institutional challenges of development across the rural-urban contin-
uum therefore require greater scientific and political attention, espe-
cially in view of achieving long-term adaptation goals such as ensuring 
social inclusion under conditions of increased climate variability, ex-
pected climate change, and rapid urbanization. 
What can be said so far with regard to the nature of urban livelihoods 
is that agriculture and livestock keeping play a comparatively minor 
role as primary economic activities for urban populations in the re-
search area, with moderately positive effects for household food secu-
rity. In sum, the study revealed that urban households are relatively 
more food secure than irrigating and non-irrigating farm households 
in rural areas, notwithstanding that households in rapidly urbanizing 
areas are less well networked, and receive less institutional support 
than their rural counterparts. Hence it must be assumed that the urban 
environment offers structural conditions which have a potentially pos-
itive effect on food security, even if opportunities for households to 
engage in non-farm economic activities are generally limited, espe-
cially for low-skilled workers and vulnerable groups.  
Some of the key factors which are most likely to have a positive impact 
on the food security of urban households are education, salable skills 
and household composition, whereas previous studies suggest that 
factors such as remittances and access to credit are less relevant (Max-
well et al. 2000, p. 147; also see Frimpong and Asuming-Brempong 
2013, p. 29). Overall, there is reason to assume that better education 
leads to a higher likelihood of finding gainful employment, thus ulti-
mately effecting increased per capita food expenditures that outweigh 
the higher costs of living in an urban environment. 
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Conversely, it is clear that a regional political and trading hub like Bol-
gatanga attracts more educated individuals due to its moderately di-
versified economic structure and related job possibilities. 
In any case, while more research on the precise determinants of urban 
household adaptiveness is undoubtedly needed, it can be concluded 
that the empirical findings of the study support at least two reformist 
pathway scenarios. The first scenario would assume that urbanization 
is beneficial for those who are already well-educated and both socially 
and spatially mobile, whereas low-skilled workers and the poor will 
suffer because of social inequalities that are both caused and aggra-
vated by accelerated urbanization.  
However, considering the overwhelming evidence in favor of the hy-
pothesis that institutions are the primary factor which determines so-
cial vulnerability in the research area, these empirical findings also 
open up the possibility for a counterfactual pathway scenario, which 
assumes a more pronounced influence of environmental factors on so-
cial risk and vulnerability. The alternative reformist scenario is based 
on the key assumption that diversification away from agricultural live-
lihoods and a degrading natural resource base is an effective strategy 
to increase household adaptiveness and reduce social vulnerability. 
Put differently, urbanization trends such as a 21 percentage point de-
crease in the agricultural employment share from 1992-2010 may con-
tribute to poverty reduction, human well-being and food security, pro-
vided that negative urbanization effects such as rising social inequali-
ties and increased pressures on the environment as well as basic infra-
structural services are kept in check (see World Bank 2015a, p. iii). 
Yet, as long as it is not entirely clear in how far urbanization and a 
lower reliance on agricultural livelihoods may increase the adaptive-
ness of households, it is extremely difficult to make further predictions 
about the possible evolution of reformist institutional pathways. Con-
sequently, it may be beneficial to pursue a twofold strategy. First, it is 
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absolutely crucial to strengthen organizational implementation capac-
ities in the region for: (a) pro-poor service delivery and DRR (with a 
strong focus on post-disaster rehabilitation solutions and service utili-
zation); (b) improved infrastructure provision (including long-term 
maintenance arrangements); (c) as well as long-term quality control 
and oversight to ensure the sustainability and effective coordination of 
flexible adaptation pathways. Simultaneously, however, it will be nec-
essary to find a balanced strategy for agricultural reform that drives 
modernization and quality improvement in commercially oriented ag-
ricultural sectors, while acknowledging the ecological and social limi-
tations of the conventional model of agriculture, especially for small-
holder farmers. 
Arguably, the adaptiveness and productivity of smallholder farming 
systems can not only be increased by agrochemical-based intensifica-
tion, but also by supporting sustainable agroecological methods. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that there is a dormant potential for 
intensifying urban agriculture through improved organizational sup-
port and more targeted agricultural service delivery. This dormant po-
tential of urban agriculture can be tapped to further diversify income 
sources and increase the adaptiveness as well as the food security of 
urban populations – especially of the urban poor – with potentially 
positive rippling effects for education, health, and social security un-
der conditions of rapid urbanization. 
After exploring these various reformist perspectives, it must neverthe-
less be concluded that reformist institutional pathways are still primar-
ily concerned with organizational and managerial processes. Institu-
tional life is then perceived through the lens of bureaucratic tasks such 
as risk assessment, risk reduction, coordination, prioritization, and in-
formation management. While these organizational aspects are cer-
tainly important, it should be borne in mind that attempts at increasing 
public participation and incrementally reforming top-down govern-
ance structures have been beset by many problems in the past, includ-
ing entrenched standard planning protocols, vested interests, and risk 
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aversion among decision makers. Moreover, the analysis of dominant 
adaptation discourses revealed that reformist approaches still exhibit 
the problematic tendency to naturalize socially produced risk. Natu-
ralizing risk means to adopt a perspective on adaptation that (a) em-
phasizes adaptive responses to environmental phenomena and thus 
diverts attention from the social root causes of vulnerability and hu-
manly induced climate change; (b) individualizes responsibility by ex-
plaining vulnerability as the result of low individual capacities, inde-
terminate systemic pressures, or irresistible fate; and (c) depoliticizes ad-
aptation by assuming that complex nature-culture relations are gov-
erned by clearly identifiable, benevolent and neutral institutions. 
Hence a transformative scenario perspective on institutional pathways 
is needed as well to avoid self-referential debates about organizational 
reform, which neglect the fact that adaptation planning is not a 
straightforward and normatively neutral approach to addressing risk 
and vulnerability. Evidently, planning practices are embedded in 
wider political contexts and guided by contested normative values and 
paradigms. In other words, it must be considered that planning, pro-
ject interventions and other power-ridden processes of rational organ-
izing are themselves influencing social risk and vulnerability. 
 
'Transformation' 
When invoked in the most generalized sense, the term transformation 
denotes a fundamental, non-linear change to the functioning of a sys-
tem. Occasionally, transformation might proceed in a predesigned or 
consciously steered fashion, while in other cases it might materialize 
as an abrupt change between different systemic equilibria. The opti-
mistic concept of deliberate transformation thus includes the possibil-
ity to shift from a given trajectory of systemically produced risk and 
vulnerability to a potentially 'better' path. 
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Considering the mounting evidence for devastating human effects on 
the Earth system, it is not hard to imagine what the word 'better' could 
actually mean with respect to the current state of affairs. The annual 
Global Risks Report (World Economic Forum 2016, p. 10), for example, 
identifies "the failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation" as the 
most potentially impactful risk of our time – and the third most likely. 
Anthropogenic climate change, together with other global megatrends 
such as urbanization, population growth, environmental degradation 
and mass migration is likely to cause major disruptions and transfor-
mations in our societies. Whether these major transformations can be 
steered at all is certainly debatable, particularly because the degree to 
which social institutions are malleable and can be shaped as uniform 
entities must be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis. Yet, the ar-
gument for transformative adaptation holds that adjusting incremen-
tally to disruptive megatrends such as anthropogenic changes in the 
Earth system will remain ineffective, unless the systemic aspects of so-
cially produced vulnerability and risk are sufficiently addressed. 
Another important argument in favor of transformative institutional 
pathways is the pervasiveness of rising social inequalities across soci-
eties. Inequalities, according to Bebbington et al. (2008, p. 3), can be de-
fined as structurally entrenched "differences in people’s access to eco-
nomic opportunities, sociopolitical participation, and ability to live a 
fulfilling life." In drawing on such a non-monetary definition of ine-
quality, the authors content that persistent inequalities may be con-
tested either on the grounds of normative or ethical values – which 
might differ considerably according to a given social context – or else 
based on purely instrumental reasons such as "strong evidence that   
inequality can significantly lower both the level and the durability of 
economic growth" (Ostry et al. 2016, p. 41). 
It is already implicit in the latter argument that inequality is a norma-
tively contested term. From the perspective of economic realpolitik, 
strong arguments exist in the way of perceiving the productive capac-
ities of societal inequalities through an utilitarian lens. Put differently, 
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making an ethical argument for institutional transformation purely on 
the grounds of reducing inequality would not uniformly resonate 
across all policy circles, unless instrumental reasons are invoked as 
well. The example of social inequality therefore illustrates that the 
practical translation of transformative institutional pathways depends 
on how the goals behind transformation are discursively framed. Like 
the idea of reform, transformation can be interpreted in both, a more 
socially progressive or rather conservative way.  
If adhering to a socially progressive interpretation of transformation, 
institutional trajectories of change are regarded as central to how risks 
and inequities are produced in the social sphere. The social production 
of risk is considered to proceed through material as well as symbolic 
practices of territorialization, resource distribution and discursive nor-
malization. Overall, it is argued that deep transformations of existing 
institutional structures as well as dominant social, political, and eco-
nomic paradigms are required to minimize negative institutional ef-
fects on social equity and the Earth system. 
A conservative interpretation of transformation, in turn, is based on a 
rather narrow definition of transformation as an agricultural policy ap-
proach that advocates for the industrialized Green Revolution model 
of systemic transformation. In this sense, transformation (a) aims to re-
form agricultural and food systems on a bigger scale and with greater 
intensity, (b) entails new types of adaptation innovations such as the 
introduction of new crop varieties together with new partnerships be-
tween institutions, and (c) involves different places and locations (e.g. 
resettlements) (Grist 2014, p. 4). Such a narrow interpretation of trans-
formation is rather advancing an understanding of transformative 
change that might align with reformist or adjustment pathways, since 
it largely ignores paradigmatic questions of social justice as well as the 
contested political and cultural context in which institutional adapta-
tion pathways unfold. 
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Presently, political signals concerning the interpretation of transfor-
mation in Ghana are rather mixed. On the one hand, there is a strong 
tendency in relevant agricultural policies to support a conservative ap-
proach to systemic transformation, with a clear focus on agriculture 
(SADA 2010, GSGDA II 2014). On the other hand, however, major cli-
mate policy documents also contain strong references to social equity, 
sustainability and the development related aspects of adaptation (see 
NCCAS 2010, NCCP 2013). While these references are visibly articu-
lated in key policy documents, there are nonetheless considerable 
practical challenges for their implementation that will likely require a 
progressive political interpretation of transformative institutional 
pathways. 
For example, it is clear that unsustainable and socially unjust systemic 
arrangements will necessitate a fundamental transformation of exist-
ing institutional structures and underlying systemic paradigms. These 
structural challenges of achieving sustainability and equity are not suf-
ficiently covered by a reformist or more conservative transformational 
agenda. This is the case, for example, if it is assumed that the systemic 
logic behind dominant organizational arrangements is impartial, or 
that official risk discourses are normatively and politically neutral.  
Seen through the lens of political realism, however, the widening sci-
ence-policy gap currently hinders productive engagement on transfor-
mation across the scientific-practitioner divide. It needs to be clearly 
communicated that research on transformation and institutional 
power effects does not automatically equal unproductive finger point-
ing or political blame shifting. Similarly, it must be clear that trans-
formative adaptation is neither a purely academic concept, nor simply 
a paternalizing criminalization of Africa, cloaked in discussions about 
new structural transformations and good governance principles. What 
the progressive transformative approach aims to do, instead, is adding 
an important explanatory layer to the relatively narrow debate on the 
politics of adaptation, inasmuch as it helps to refocus attention on the 
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people who are directly affected by climate change, and the very insti-
tutions, discourses and normative paradigms that contribute to the 
current politics of unsustainability. 
In line with a progressive interpretation of transformative institutional 
pathways, it is therefore important to remain critical of international 
development and CCA scholarship that tends to individualize social 
risk by placing too much hope on the agency of individuals and the all-
too nefarious perception of local 'community'. Such perspectives run 
the risk of glossing over or downplaying the structural impediments 
that negatively affect household adaptiveness. These structural con-
straints include macro-economic factors such as the pervasive lack of 
diversified non-farm based livelihood mixes, youth unemployment, 
rigid gender roles and gendered perceptions, a low access to quality 
education, as well as large-scale trajectories of land acquisition and dis-
possession that intersect with elite capture and structural marginaliza-
tion. Such structural and development related challenges far exceed 
the reaches of agricultural transformation efforts, which at best encom-
pass particular institutional constellations that nevertheless possess 
bounded spheres of influence. The following scenario therefore as-
sumes that adjustment as well as reformist and transformative institu-
tional pathways will always have to contend with the possibility of re-
gressive forces that might move particular pathway trajectories toward 
business-as-usual. 
 
'Business-As-Usual' 
This pathway scenario describes business-as-usual trajectories, which 
are neither stable nor static in their own right. They rather entail hybrid 
institutional arrangements that combine with adjustment, reformist 
and even transformative pathways to varying degrees. Hence busi-
ness-as-usual pathways are by no means monolithic. In the face of at-
tempts at institutional adjustment or reform, business-as-usual may 
entail the reaping of political or material gains from resistance to social 
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change, or refer to processes of sabotage or hijacking that undermine 
ongoing adaptation actions. 
Transient institutional arrangements set up by donor-funded projects 
further reinforce such business-as-usual tendencies. As soon as new 
institutional arrangements are introduced, for instance in the form of 
new development initiatives, management committees, or marketing 
schemes, they are naturalized into existing social orders and often 
diverted from their intended purpose through subliminal relations of 
power and renegotiation in local power sharing arrangements. In the 
worst case scenario, business-as-usual may therefore encompass situ-
ations in which no sustainable long-term adaptation is undertaken at 
all. Infrastructural adjustment interventions such as the building of 
bridges and irrigation canals, for example, rarely include provisions 
for collective and inter-group maintenance into their project design, 
often leaving the physical infrastructure in disrepair and disuse after 
several years.  
One of the most compelling features of the business-as-usual scenario, 
however, is what has previously been termed the 'politics of indetermi-
nacy'. More evident in donor-driven discourses of risk and large-scale 
political processes such as decentralization, indeterminacy refers           
to scenarios in which normative ambiguities, structural voids or 
processual gaps arise as a result of social change or political reform. 
Such institutional voids, overlapping normative reference systems and 
processual gaps are generative in themselves, in the sense that they 
open up new opportunities for regulatory capture and profiteering.    
In such contexts, patronage ties and elite networks may encourage 
socially entrenched practices like clientelism, corruption and rent-
seeking behavior. While these practices usually reinforce deep-seated 
power asymmetries, for instance in cases where resource flows, sub-
sidies or 'pro-poor' interventions are diverted from their intended use, 
they are also grounded in subliminal power relations that have barely 
been addressed by steered trajectories of institutional adjustment, 
reformist or transformative change. One such pervasive constellation 
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that arises from deep-seated political indeterminacies and normative 
pluralism has been identified by Laube (2007, p. 324) as "triangles of 
accommodation", referring to patron-client relations comprising (neo) 
traditional authorities, local administrative elites and large-scale com-
mercial farmers. 
At the same time, the findings of the discourse analysis have shown 
how international donor organizations and agencies are influencing 
technical governance discourses by identifying cause-and-effect 
connections, and by suggesting 'appropriate' adaptation responses. 
Indubitably, international development agencies exert a good amount 
of influence on sector-specific policies in Ghana, including climate 
change adaptation. Sometimes this influence is clearly visible, for 
instance through direct budget support, policy mainstreaming, 
assistance with report writing, and donor representation in political 
bodies. In other cases, donor influence is more subtle, and framed as 
'technical' assistance. This may include the operationalization of risk 
and vulnerability assessments, the selection of pilot studies as well as 
and the interpretation of technical concepts such as adaptation, often 
in line with private economic interests at the level of implementation. 
Thus, in view of the accelerating commodification and 'neoliberali-
zation' of the transformative development paradigm – especially in the 
agricultural and forestry sectors – there is little reason to value third 
party consultation as essentially objective and without motive. 
As previously discussed, regulatory capture together with lobbying 
efforts by special interest groups can lead to intransparent socio-
political processes that encourage the cooptation of natural resource 
regimes as well as the accelerated commercialization of environmental 
resources in ways that countervail core principles of environmental 
sustainability and climate justice. Coupled with agricultural intensifi-
cation, uncontrolled urbanization and large-scale land acquisition, 
donor-driven calls for a new 'Green Revolution' in Africa may veri-
tably portend an empty promise, if institutional questions about the 
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'capacity' of individuals and/or households to be endogenously adap-
tive are not addressed first. 
Put differently, the use of a concept such as adaptive 'capacity' is highly 
problematic, unless it is acknowledged that individuals or groups are 
often highly capable, while still being vulnerable as a result of structu-
ral or contextual factors that are not of their own making. For example, 
more coordinated CCA and DRR approaches are still missing when it 
comes to addressing the negative impacts of macro-level social dyna-
mics such as persistent decentralization challenges, the absence of non-
farm economic opportunities, and the erosion of social support net-
works beyond the core family. Together with poverty related concerns 
and a lack of coordination among donors and government agencies 
across sectors, this situation contributes to patchy policy implemen-
tation and leads to unreliable organizational support mechanisms for 
local populations. Thus, assuming that the main goal of adaptation is 
to reduce socially produced risks, and to strengthen collective actions 
to avoid risks, ambitious political goals should not be neglected, even 
if the interpretation of the transformative development agenda still 
remains a controversial political issue in Ghana. 
 
 
Directions for Future Research 
Based on the previously discussed adaptation pathways, a number of 
possible avenues for future research have been be identified. These re-
search recommendations are by no means exhaustive, and relate to the 
concrete questions and uncertainties that emerge from the empirical 
findings of the study. 
 First, it is recommended to better integrate the institutional path-
ways approach with projections for future climatic and land use 
change. Integrated scenario development with a strong emphasis 
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on the institutional dimensions of social-ecological change can fur-
ther increase the robustness of pathway scenarios. It also allows 
for realistic and flexible adaptation planning that integrates mul-
tiple pathway options into a coherent strategic framework. At the 
same time, the results of the institutional pathways analysis can be 
used to reflect on concrete institutional arrangements that are 
needed to implement existing adaptation strategies and achieve 
the key goals of the National Climate Change Policy. In this con-
text, it will be beneficial to identify synergies between institutional 
adaptation pathways and the Akropong Approach. 
 Secondly, it is important to further examine how the science-pol-
icy gap can be bridged and a continuous civil society dialogue can 
be initiated to better communicate the need for socially inclusive 
institutional transformation to decision makers, bearing in mind 
that business-as-usual and adjustment adaptation pathways will 
not be sufficient to avoid maladaptation. 
 Similarly, it is crucial to better integrate social science research on 
institutional pathways into adaptation planning and project im-
plementation to avoid prolonged social conflict, and to ensure that 
marginalized groups as well as various interests are accurately re-
flected from the outset. Instead of supposing that communities are 
socially homogenous, or that public participation and decision 
making are inherently neutral, a pathways approach can facilitate 
more inclusive deliberations that seek to integrate the interests,  
expectations and perceptions of various user groups into long-
term, resource-oriented adaptation planning. 
 Overall, the implementation of planned adaptation actions needs 
to proceed from the assumption that institutional pathways are 
dynamic, contested, and must be subject to revision or renegotia-
tion to achieve their long-term goals and remain flexible under 
changing conditions. Hence it is necessary to intensify social        
science research on business-as-usual scenarios and long-term 
oversight to prevent ineffective, unsustainable, or patchy policy 
implementation. 
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 With regard to the agricultural sector, it is recommended to better 
integrate scientific findings about the economic opportunities of 
Ecological Organic Agriculture (EOA) into existing agricultural 
reform and transformation strategies to avoid a one-sided focus 
on conventional 'Green Revolution' modernization pathways that 
can be socially and environmentally risky. At the same time, there 
is the need to further investigate how an enabling institutional en-
vironment for urban agriculture may be created to improve the 
food security and adaptiveness of urban households under condi-
tions of rapid urbanization. 
 Moreover, it is important to realize that contemporary urbaniza-
tion in Ghana mainly proceeds through the growth of smaller and 
medium sized cities, while existing scholarship is still primarily 
focused on a limited number of larger cities such as Accra, Kumasi 
and Tamale. Thus, more research on dynamic urbanization and 
peri-urbanization processes, as well as on changing livelihood pat-
terns in Ghana’s smaller and medium sized cities is needed. This 
also includes more comparative research on the determinants of 
household adaptiveness and service provision across the dynamic 
rural-urban continuum. 
 In addition, there is certainly the need for more comparative re-
search on complex institutional territorialization processes and lo-
cally situated risks that vary across regions.  
 The empirical findings of the study also reveal that it is crucial for 
improving food security and household adaptiveness to avoid a 
narrow analytical focus on patterns of access to infrastructure, 
credit, services, inputs, markets, etc. Existing problems of utiliza-
tion, quality control and long-term reliability need to be addressed 
as well. More and better research on these specific aspects of 
household adaptiveness is urgently required. 
 Future research will also have to address the converging structural 
problems of unfinished political and fiscal decentralization, as 
well as the challenges related to conflicting and/or overlapping 
political mandates. Unfinished decentralization still hinders the 
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effective coordination and implementation of proposed adapta-
tion actions, especially at the sub-district level. Yet, how exactly 
structural reforms could be carried out despite a long history of 
political resistance at the level of the central government is far 
from being clear. 
 In the key area of climate finance, it is important to build necessary 
organizational capacities to access and manage international fund-
ing streams. Since additional investments will be a prerequisite for 
successful adaptation in the short and long term, further scientific 
support in this endeavor is required. 
 Lastly, adaptation scholars may wish to seize the opportunity to 
become more actively involved in debates about social transfor-
mations, applied ethics and climate justice, not merely to bring 
their own views to the table, but also to regularly reflect on their 
practical experience. 
This study has contributed to such an endeavor.  
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1: List of Expert Interviews and Organizations (n=15) 
 
ORGANIZATION LOCATION 
01) United Nations Development Programme            
(Group discussion with 4 participants) 
Accra 
02) Friends of the Earth Ghana & National Climate 
Change Committee 
Accra 
03) United Nations University (UNU-INRA) Accra 
04) CARE International, Ghana  Accra 
05) Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale                          
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 
Accra 
06) University of Ghana, Legon                                       
(Institute for Environment & Sanitation Studies)  
Accra 
07) University of Ghana, Legon                                    
(Department of Soil Science)  
Accra 
08) Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) Bolgatanga 
09) National Disaster Management Organization 
(NADMO) 
Bolgatanga 
10) Water Resources Commission of Ghana (WRC) Bolgatanga 
11) Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMet) Bolgatanga 
12) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Bolgatanga 
13) United States Agency for International                    
Development (USAID) 
Bolgatanga 
14) Irrigation Company of the Upper Region Ltd. 
(ICOUR) 
Vea 
15) District Planning and Coordinating Unit (DPCU)  Bongo 
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Annex 2: Ethics Principles for Research 
 
The ethics principles that inform the Code of Conduct adhered to by 
the principle investigator (Karsten A. Schulz) and research staff during 
field work are as follows: 
 
Beneficence  
As researchers we strive to ensure that our work should make a posi-
tive contribution to the welfare of those affected by it.  
 
Non-intrusion and non-maleficence  
The study aims to ensure that the research tasks undertaken within the 
context of the project, and this study in particular, do not cause harm 
to any segments or sectors of society and to its research participants.  
 
Justice and equity  
Justice refers to the obligations to treat all persons fairly and equitably. 
Equity in particular, necessitates that no segment of the population is 
unduly burdened with harms of research or is denied the benefits of 
the knowledge that is generated from it. All foreseeable benefits and 
risks associated with the research endeavors have been well assessed 
in advance. The benefits derived from the research findings should be 
equitably distributed throughout society.  
 
Autonomy of all participants  
Where applicable, the research respects and protects the rights and 
dignity of all participants. Many aspects of the study involve primary 
data collection, usually in the form of interviews, surveys and other 
findings derived from workshops and group discussions. The princi-
ple investigator is fully compliant with all national legal and regula-
tory procedures and requirements regarding the collection, storage, 
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handling, processing and analysis of data. In this light, the study seeks 
to conform to the highest standards of:  
 
(a) Veracity  
Participants in sample surveys and related data collection exercises are 
given full and accurate information with regard to issues such as the 
background, nature, purpose, funders and outputs of the research. 
 
(b) Prior informed consent  
Participants in interviews, sample surveys and related data collection 
exercises are given sufficient details on the research in question as to 
allow them to make an informed decision to participate or withdraw. 
Similarly, no photos depicting people were taken without their prior 
consent.   
 
(c) Protection of vulnerable groups  
No persons under the age of 18 will be involved in the research pro-
cess. Meanwhile, all researchers involved in data collection for this 
study will be conscious of their obligations to safeguard the interests 
of vulnerable groups, and those who have been socio-historically mar-
ginalized, and would be involved in the research process. They may 
involve women´s groups, persons of diverse gendered orientations, 
members of indigenous and minority ethnic communities, persons 
with disabilities, and or other sub-groups of the population. Moreover, 
participants in sample surveys and related data collection exercises 
have the right not only to agree to participate in the research but also 
to decide on which information to provide as part of the research, and 
to withdraw from the research process at any point in time. 
 
(d) Anonymity and confidentiality  
The information provided by participants is treated as confidential and 
used for research purposes only. Micro-level information will not be 
disclosed in any fashion to third parties that would allow data to be 
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associated with an identifiable individual, unless participants have 
given their informed consent when being recruited into the research. 
 
(e) Minimizing foreseeable risk  
Researchers involved in this study will comply by any standards or 
requirements necessitated by the relevant funding bodies and govern-
mental agencies of the countries in which they work. All research ma-
terial, including official fieldwork reports submitted to WASCAL pro-
ject members, research participants, collaborating networks, engaged 
stakeholders and the public shall adhere to the core ethics principles 
outlined in this section. 
 
(f) Outreach and communication  
The principle investigator is committed to putting the results of his re-
search into the public domain with a view to transparency, peer review 
and any necessary procedures that warrant its scrutiny. Yet, primary 
anonymized data will be made available only on request of the related 
funding bodies for validation or verification. Only published results 
will be freely accessible within the public domain.  
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Annex 3: Cropping Targets & Output for the Vea Irrigation Project (2001-2012) 
Season Crop Target 
(ha.) 
Monitored 
(ha.) 
Yield 
(t/ha.) 
Production 
(t) 
2001/2002  
Dry 
Rice 
Tomato 
Cowpea 
Onion 
'Pepper' 
300 
200 
5 
10 
10 
165 
198 
3 
5 
2 
5.5 
14.1 
0.5 
7.6 
0.3 
908 
2912 
1.5 
38 
0.6 
 525 373   
2002 
Wet 
Rice 
Groundnut 
Sorghum/Millet 
Cowpea 
300 
200 
200 
20 
91 
83 
213 
2.4 
4.6 
0.8 
0.7/0.7 
0.5 
419 
66 
149 
1 
 720 395   
2002/2003  
Dry 
Rice  
Tomato 
Onion  
'Pepper' 
300 
200 
5 
5 
167 
2.5 
0 
5 
4.5 
1.7 
- 
0.3 
752 
349 
- 
2 
 510 377   
2003  
Wet 
Rice 
Sorghum/Millet 
Groundnut 
Maize 
300 
200 
150 
0 
100 
225 
75 
19 
4.8 
0.7/0.7 
0.8 
1.3 
480 
158 
60 
25 
 650 419   
2003/2004  
Dry 
Rice  
Tomato 
Onion  
300 
200 
5 
70 
54 
2 
4.8 
10.7 
10 
336 
578 
20 
 505 126   
2004  
Wet 
Rice 
Maize  
Groundnut  
Sorghum/Millet 
300 
10 
200 
200 
57 
0 
112 
209 
3.7 
- 
0.8 
0.7/0.7 
211 
- 
90 
146 
 710 378   
2004/2005 
Dry 
Rice 
Tomato 
100 
50 
66 
45 
4.2 
9.8 
277 
441 
 150 111   
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Season Crop Target 
(ha.) 
Monitored 
(ha.) 
Yield 
(t/ha.) 
Production 
(t) 
2005  
Wet 
Rice 
Maize  
Groundnut 
Sorghum/Millet 
300 
10 
200 
200 
85 
5 
85 
313 
3.9 
1.3 
0.8 
0.7/0.7 
332 
7 
68 
438 
 710 488   
2005/2006 
Dry 
Rice  
Tomato 
Onion 
400 
300 
10 
78 
64 
10 
6.6 
16.9 
3.0 
525 
1082 
30 
 710 152   
2006  
Wet 
Rice 
Groundnut  
Sorghum/Millet 
Maize  
200 
200 
200 
0 
131 
106 
228 
6 
3.9 
0.8 
0.7/0.7 
1.3 
511 
85 
320 
8 
 600 471   
2006/2007  
Dry 
Rice  
Tomato 
Soybean 
200 
200 
10 
134.18 
205.46 
0.44 
4.9 
10.4 
- 
657 
2137 
- 
 410 340.08   
2007  
Wet 
Rice 
Groundnut  
Sorghum/Millet 
Maize 
200 
200 
100 
10 
93.38 
82.38 
165.00 
7.81 
3.7 
0.8 
0.7/0.7 
1.3 
34.6 
66.0 
116/116 
10 
 510 349.01   
2007/2008  
Dry 
Rice  
Tomato 
Onion 
200 
200 
0 
136.02 
65.63 
1.31 
5.6 
12.8 
10.5 
762 
840 
13.8 
 400 202.96   
2008 
Wet 
Rice 
Sorghum/Millet 
Groundnut  
Maize 
Others 
200 
100 
200 
10 
0 
66.38 
138.04 
19.96 
3.32 
0.76 
5.4 
0.7/0.7 
0.8 
1.3 
N/A 
358 
97/97 
16 
4.3 
- 
 510 228.46   
2008/2009  
Dry 
Rice  
Tomato 
Others 
200 
200 
0 
111.49 
47.65 
7.5 
4.2 
7.0 
- 
468 
334 
- 
 400 166.62   
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Season Crop Target 
(ha.) 
Monitored 
(ha.) 
Yield 
(t/ha.) 
Production 
(t) 
2009  
Wet 
Rice 
Groundnut  
Sorghum/Millet 
Maize 
200 
200 
100 
10 
100.40 
22.40 
181.00 
4.60 
3.5 
0.8 
0.7/0.7 
1.3 
351 
18 
127/127 
6 
 510 208.00   
2009/2010  
Dry 
Rice  
Tomato 
Others 
200 
200 
0 
75.28 
31.84 
16.74 
5.1 
1.3 
- 
384 
41.4 
- 
 400 123.86   
2010  
Wet 
Rice 
Groundnut  
Sorghum/Millet 
Others 
150 
200 
200 
0 
80.59 
13.80 
115.55 
12.40 
3.6 
0.8 
0.7/0.7 
- 
290 
11 
81/81 
- 
 550 222.34   
2010/2011  
Dry 
Rice  
Tomato 
Others 
200 
200 
0 
47.36 
19.76 
3.6 
3.9 
8.7 
N/A 
425 
173 
- 
 400 70.72   
2011  
Wet 
Rice 
Groundnut  
Sorghum/Millet 
Maize 
150 
100 
200 
20 
89.70 
22.90 
233.26 
10.68 
4.5 
0.8 
0.7/0.7 
1.3 
404 
18 
163/163 
15 
 470 356.54   
2011/2012  
Dry 
Rice  
Tomato 
Others 
200 
200 
20 
46.42 
29.38 
10.58 
4.10 
10.50 
- 
1893 
308 
- 
 420 86.38   
2012  
wet 
Rice 
Groundnut  
Sorghum/Millet 
Maize 
100 
50 
150 
30 
64.43 
19.21 
135.52 
8.25 
N/A N/A 
 330 227.11   
Source: ICOUR, Vea. 
